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ABSTRACT
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE LEVEL OF 
STATE GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZATION
Getachew Melkie 
Old Dominion University, 2013 
Director: Dr. John R. Lombard
Since thel980s, privatization has gained increasing acceptance among state 
governments. Yet, few empirical studies have investigated the factors influencing the 
level o f state government privatization focusing on a multitude of programs and 
services aggregated across departments. Most prior state level empirical research has 
emphasized single cases or programs but has not addressed the aggregate level o f 
privatization undertakings across the states. The paucity o f empirical research that 
investigated the amount of state privatization and the drivers thereof created an 
important gap in the literature that this study attempted to fill. Drawing on historical 
and contemporary privatization literature, this research examined the influences o f 
variables related to socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors on the 
level o f state government privatization.
This study employed ordinal logistic regression and tested fourteen hypotheses 
and four state comparative models (socioeconomic, economic, political, and 
ideological) and developed a fifth model o f best fit. The bivariate results show that all 
but state pension spending and political culture variables were insignificant. The 
multivariate results indicate that in the socioeconomic model only state pension 
spending variable was significant in the expected direction and the hypothesis was
supported. In the economic model, state per-capita spending, state fiscal capacity, and 
state deficits were significant in the opposite direction than expected and the 
hypotheses were not supported. With the exception of the political culture, all the 
variables in the political model were insignificant. The traditionalistic political culture 
was significant at both the bivariate and multivariate level, but in the opposite 
direction than expected and the hypothesis was not supported. The moralistic political 
culture was significant in the expected direction, but its significance disappeared in the 
model of best fit. All the variables in the ideology model failed to achieve statistical 
significance. In general, the analysis reveals that a large part of the variance in the 
dependent variable remained unexplained.
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that socioeconomic, political, and 
ideological factors are less likely to influence state government privatization. On the 
other hand, the findings do suggest that economic factors matter; although the 
influences o f the significant variables in the economic model were in the opposite 
direction than expected, the findings nonetheless appear to provide tentative support to 
the argument in the literature that economic factors are more likely to influence the 
level of privatization by state governments.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
After more than a century in which the worldwide trend has been toward the 
growth of government, a strong movement has emerged in the past decade to 
reduce government.... This movement is best known as the privatization 
movement.... Current political and economic trends will make privatization a 
policy direction of fundamental social significance for the future (Report o f the 
President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988, p. 229).
The study by the Council o f State Government (CSG) reveals the following.
The topic of privatization.. .seems to have re-emerged recently as a 
controversial management issue for state policymakers. Governors, agency 
directors and legislatures in many states are asking for either further promotion 
or curtailment o f such public-private partnership cooperation to deal with the 
faltering economy and dwindling revenues in the past two to three years. There 
appears to be no consensus as to the effectiveness o f privatization in part due 
to the lack of empirical data as well as the complexity of the issue” (Chi, 
Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p.466).
The above quotations aptly describe the controversies surrounding 
contemporary privatization and further underscore the importance of continuing the 
empirical investigation to understand not only the drivers o f privatization policy but 
also how pervasive privatization has been in the United States since privatization 
began in earnest in the early 1980s; these controversies set the background for this 
research study, which seeks to analyze and synthesize the development and evolution 
of privatization policy in the historical and contemporary contexts as well as to 
examine empirically the factors that are likely to influence the level o f state 
government privatization.
2Background of the Study
The concept of privatization is multidimensional with important social, 
economic, political, and ideological implications. Indeed, the stakes involved in the 
contemporary or modem privatization movement involve, among other things, 
reducing the size and role of government in society. (The terms contemporary and 
modem are used interchangeably in the literature and are used likewise in this study). 
The debates over the relative size and role o f government have been recurrent themes 
in the federal structure o f the United States since the beginning of the Republic, and 
the debates over the current privatization policy are, in many ways, a reflection of 
these competing but enduring American political and intellectual traditions (Kaplan 
and Cuciti, 1986).
The contemporary privatization movement has nonetheless created a new 
intellectual undercurrent that seeks to reorient government policies away from the 
interventionist policies o f the Keynesian orientation to a new strategy that emphasized 
the market approach (Boix, 1997; Box, 1999). But the current privatization movement 
has further intensified the blurring lines between the public and private sectors (Chi, 
Arnold, & Perkins, 2004; Leavitt and Morris, 2004) and has raised fundamental 
questions regarding the proper relationships between government and the private 
sector. As conceived by the eighteenth century classical economists, the private sector 
refers to an environment where free and individual economic activities were regulated 
by the market forces of supply and demand free from government intervention 
(Midgley and Livermore, 2009). In the classical period, the terms “free” and 
“individual” were the defining characteristics o f privatization (Florio, 2004, p.5).
3Historical accounts, however, reveal that, in the context of the United States, 
the role of the federal government changed in the last half of the nineteenth century 
during the Progressive Era giving rise to active government intervention in the social 
and economic affairs o f society (Milkis and Mileur, 2005; Midgley and Livermore, 
2009; Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986). The Progressive Era changes and subsequent reforms 
altered the scope and structure of governance by reorienting government policies to 
address issues of national scope. Over time the interventionist role o f the federal 
government increased leading to the expansion and growth of the public sector.
Guided primarily by demand-side economic theory or Keynesian economic thought, 
fiscal policy became an important policy tool to stimulate and stabilize the economy 
especially during the periods that included the Great Depression, World War II, the 
Cold War, the Vietnam War, and the Civil Right movement of the 1960s. The 
resulting intervention, growth, and expansion of the public sector set the stage for the 
emergence of the contemporary privatization movement (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; 
Milkis and Mileur, 2005; Midgley and Livermore, 2009).
The Report o f the President’s Commission on Privatization (1988) asserted 
that the emergence of the contemporary privatization movement in the United States 
was essentially “a reaction against the themes and results o f Progressive thought”
(p.230) that led to subsequent growth and expansion of the public sector. Ginsberg 
(2009) contends that the contemporary privatization movement represents a 
resurgence of conservative ideology; the author further states that “conservatism” 
refers to the belief in the laissez-faire political and economic ideology that includes 
“the free-market economic system, the family, and the traditional religious and
4cultural beliefs” (p. 195). Nonetheless, modem privatization appears to have little 
resemblance with the classical political and economic thoughts that only assign a 
minimal role for government.
Contemporary privatization appears to be incompatible with conservative 
ideology largely because the contemporary usage of the term privatization is taken to 
mean delegation of services to the private sector that “involve a substantial role for 
government” (Savas, 1987, p.278). The traditional meaning of privatization assigns 
no role for government, but the modem definition assumes the existence of some 
degree of government involvement in the privatized arrangement. This inherent 
inconsistency o f the contemporary privatization theory has generated controversies 
and debates about the proper relationships between government and the private sector. 
The multiple and somewhat contradictory meanings and practices o f modem 
privatization have spawned claims and counterclaims about the benefits and 
detriments of privatization and have complicated the efforts of scholars to delineate 
the actual drivers of privatization policy.
However, largely inspired by microeconomic-based theories, the use o f 
privatization policy has been justified primarily on grounds of economic efficiency. 
Economic drivers are widely cited in the literature as the primary determinants of 
privatization, but the empirical evidence is somewhat ambiguous. Studies show that, 
in addition to economic factors, privatization policy is also influenced by 
socioeconomic, political, and ideological factors as well. While the debates over 
privatization policy remain unsettled, privatization nonetheless continues unabated at 
all levels of government, and research has yet to unravel the breadth and scope of
privatization undertakings as well as the factors that drive the level o f state 
government privatization across the country.
Drawing on historical and contemporary literature on privatization, this 
research investigates the level o f state government privatization by examining the 
socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors. The rest o f this chapter 
presents the statement o f the problem, the purpose of the study, the significance o f the 
study, the contribution o f the study, and the research question. Also included in this 
chapter are: definition of key terms, methodology, data analysis, potential 
determinants of state government privatization, research hypotheses, assumptions, 
limitations, and delimitations of this study. This chapter concludes with an outline of 
the organization of the study.
Statement o f the Problem
There is little empirical research in the literature that investigated the factors 
influencing the level o f state government privatization focusing on a multitude of 
programs and services simultaneously. As indicated in the introductory quotations, in 
1988 the President’s Commission on Privatization predicted that privatization would 
be a new policy direction with “fundamental social significance” (Report o f the 
President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988, p. 229). While the prediction cannot 
be confirmed or denied conclusively based on the available empirical evidence, state 
officials have nonetheless expressed concerns about the recent direction and 
effectiveness of privatization (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004).
6Literature shows that, in the United States, the contemporary privatization 
movement gained momentum after the election o f Ronald Reagan in 1980 where the 
Reagan administration “pressed hard for increased use o f the private sector in 
delivering public services at all levels o f government’’ (Allen et al., 1989, p.2). 
Subsequently, state governments embraced privatization due largely to unfunded 
federal mandates, new and increased services, and the Federal Government’s shift of 
functions to the states (General Accounting Office (GAO), 1997; Featherstun, 
Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001).
Faced with expanded budget deficits, many states adopted privatization policy 
and began organizing and managing their previously ad hoc privatization efforts; state 
legislatures enacted statutes to encourage privatization and civil service reform and to 
make it easier to implement privatization initiatives (GAO, 1997; Featherstun, 
Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001). The GAO’s 1997 report indicated that governments 
needed “to enact legislative and/or resource changes to encourage or facilitate the use 
of privatization. These changes .. .are necessary to signal to managers and employees 
that the move to privatization is serious and not a passing fad” (p. 11). GAO’s report 
also noted that in addition to enabling legislations, budget cuts and management 
reductions prove to be effective in encouraging privatization.
Although prior to the 1980s the use of privatization existed on an ad hoc basis, 
the idea of expanded privatization efforts was somewhat unacceptable in many state 
governments (Auger, 1999). However, the emphasis on the economic dimension of 
privatization as an efficient means to provide public services eventually attracted the 
attention of state policymakers and privatization gained increasing acceptance among
7states and local governments as a means o f providing efficient and quality services to 
the public at low cost to taxpayers (Henton and Waldhom, 1984; Donahue, 1989; 
Pouder, 1996).
The GAO report also noted that, apart from the goals of cost savings and better 
quality, lack of the necessary skills and resources in the public sectors was a 
motivating factor to introduce privatization. State governments also engaged in the 
privatization scheme for a number of other reasons including the desire to reduce the 
size and role of government (GAO, 1997; Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti, 
2001). Government was to be made smaller, less intrusive and less proactive in the 
affairs o f both individuals and the private sector. The underlying force behind this 
movement was a strong belief in the fundamental superiority of the private sector as 
an agent for the provision, production, and delivery of many goods and services, both 
public and private (Savas, 1987; President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988; Chi, 
Arnold, & Perkins, 2004 ).
But privatization decisions take place in a political environment, and political 
considerations serve to impede or expand privatization initiatives. For example, 
studies show that Republican governors and legislatures favor more privatization than 
their Democratic counterparts. Public employee unions resist privatization because of 
fear of losing their jobs. Studies also point to several instances where public employee 
unions launch legal challenges to state efforts to privatize government services based 
on state civil service laws. Employee unions also use collective bargaining 
agreements to block privatization projects that impact public employees. In some 
cases politicians take sides with the unions and favor in-house provision o f services to
8gamer political support from public employees (GAO, 1997; Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001).
Furthermore, critics o f privatization policy contend that the economic benefits 
and the quality services from privatization are illusory because of the existence of 
hidden costs. They point out that there is transaction costs associated with the 
preparations and specifications of contracts as well as with monitoring performances. 
According to the critics, at least in the context o f contracting out, these hidden costs 
are not accurately estimated and considered in evaluating the cost savings from 
privatization (Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001).
Scholars also oppose privatization arguing that privatized arrangements may 
create “pathologies” that “combine elements o f government and market failures” 
(Morris, 2007, p. 319) as well as “loss of accountability” and recommend using the 
“public authorities” as an alternative arrangement “that may take advantage of private- 
sector efficiencies while maintaining public accountability” (Leavitt and Morris, 2004, 
p. 154). Other researchers have also suggested using managed competition to induce 
efficiency in the public sector by allowing both the public and private sectors to 
compete in providing services (Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001).
As the preceding discussion indicates, privatization has been widely embraced 
by state governments, but its effectiveness has been questioned even by state officials. 
In the early years o f the first decade of the 21st century, privatization again re-emerged 
as a controversial management issue prompting state policymakers to look for more 
empirical research whether to promote or curtail privatization initiatives (Chi, Arnold, 
& Perkins, 2004). But the CSG study noted that, in spite o f the lack of consensus
9about the effectiveness o f privatization, “state officials have continued to privatize due 
to the perceived efficiency the private sector might have demonstrated” (Chi, Arnold,
& Perkins, 2004, p. 476).
While economic factors are widely recognized as important drivers of 
privatization, the empirical evidence appears to provide weak support to the economic 
argument; this raises questions as to whether there are other factors lurking behind the 
economic argument that have the potential to influence privatization decisions. The 
logical question to ask therefore is: Are there non-economic factors that are likely to 
drive state privatization efforts as well? In view o f the opportunities and challenges 
that privatization offers, it is certainly appropriate and logical to investigate the level 
and drivers of state government privatization; but little attention has been paid in this 
regard. Apart from two studies -  GAO’s (1997) study and the 2002 survey conducted 
by CSG, a review of the literature shows that there is no previous study that has 
investigated the level or amount of state government privatization.
Similar to the proposed research, the GAO (1997) studied the extent of 
privatization efforts in six governments (Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
York, Virginia, and the city of Indianapolis, Indiana). But a six-state study focusing on 
selected projects is not comprehensive enough to explain the drivers o f state 
government privatization and the extent o f privatization efforts across the United Sates. 
On the other hand, the CSG’s study of 2002 which was published in the Book o f the 
States 2004 was relatively more extensive than the study conducted by the GAO. The 
CSG’s study involved surveying the “most popular privatized programs and services” 
by five departments (correction, education, health & human services, personnel,
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transportation) and covered all the 50 states. The CSG’s study is broad in scope and 
comprehensive in approach and is much in tune with the proposed investigation in this 
study. But the CSG study appeared to have a singular focus involving only the 
economic dimension of privatization and has not addressed other potential 
determinants o f privatization policy such as socioeconomic, political, and ideological 
factors in its 50-state survey.
Apart from the two studies mentioned above, most prior state level empirical 
research that employed variables related to socioeconomic, economic, political, and 
ideological factors has emphasized single cases or programs but has not addressed the 
extent of the spread of government privatization across the states that are accounted 
for by the aforementioned factors. To properly gauge the amount or level o f state 
government privatization, it is necessary to consider privatized services by a state 
government in aggregate and examine the likely drivers; the paucity o f empirical 
research in this regard creates an important gap in the literature that this study attempts 
to fill.
The Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of the level o f state 
government privatization. As indicated in the preceding section, the controversies 
surrounding privatization policy are many and varied, and claims and counterclaims 
about the benefits and detriments o f privatization abound the literature; nonetheless, 
states continue to privatize. Therefore, the proposed study draws on historical and 
contemporary literature to understand the social, economic, political, and ideological
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root o f contemporary privatization; building on the literature, this study examines the 
level o f state government privatization using socioeconomic, economic, political and 
ideological factors.
The Significance of the Study
This study attempts to examine the factors that influence the level of 
privatization undertakings by state governments. This study is significant because the 
information gained will provide new insights about the factors that are likely to 
influence privatization decisions by state government policymakers. Privatization is 
likely to have society wide consequences, both negative and positive, and the lessons 
learned in this research can help researchers and policymakers alike to frame the 
issues in the proper context. More often than not, the discussions of contemporary 
privatization in the United States refer to the role of governments in the provision of 
goods and services in a privatized arrangement and the policy choices governments 
make are likely to have significant implications, among other things, for accountability 
and democratic governance.
Governments are representative o f the people and reflect the collective 
identity of the citizenry; as such they are expected to respond to diversity as well as to 
promote social equity in privatization decisions (Box, 1999). Hefetz and Warner (2004) 
emphasize the need for governments to promote democracy, community building, and 
a more socially equitable system of urban service provisions. Proponents of 
representative democracy stress the importance of having public workforce that 
closely resembles the demographic characteristics of the citizenry it serves arguing
12
that inclusiveness would provide legitimacy to government practices (Oldfield, 2003). 
However, government policies are not free from controversies. For example, 
advocates of social equity express their concerns by arguing that government agencies 
give less attention to the interests o f disadvantaged groups while they tend to provide 
better services to citizens of higher social, economic, and political status (Oldfield, 
2003).
Governments make important decisions about what services to privatize and 
the circumstances under which privatization should occur (Featherstun, Thornton II, 
and Correnti, 2001). Seemingly, many programs targeted for privatization are 
perceived to affect the lives o f millions o f people, and the policy choices governments 
make can undermine or promote social justice, equality, as well as trust in government. 
In view of the concerns about the impact o f privatization on society, investigating the 
factors that drive the level of state government privatization is certainly warranted.
The Contribution of the Study
This research will fill the previously highlighted gaps in the literature and will 
contribute to state comparative literature in general and the theory of privatization in 
particular. The research will contribute to our knowledge base in privatization theory 
by empirically investigating the level o f state government privatization that is 
accounted for by socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors. By 
developing and using a composite privatization index for the level of state government 
privatization, the dependent variable, this research will examine the relationships
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between the dependent variable and the independent variables related to 
socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors.
The use of a privatization index that takes into account several types of services 
that states privatize is a new approach of investigation; if  this empirical investigation 
provides support to the hypothesis that privatization policy is significantly influenced 
by non-economic factors, the information learned in this study may then stimulate new 
questions or new hypotheses for subsequent studies. Over time, a body of research 
evidence would accumulate from which less ambiguous general conclusions about the 
determinants o f privatization policy can be drawn. Furthermore, if  the findings o f this 
study show that non-economic factors have statistically significant associations with 
the level o f government privatization at state level, then the findings would dispel the 
notion that privatization is solely an economic phenomenon.
The Research Question
This study seeks to examine the factors driving the level state government 
privatization. Recent trends in devolutionary government gave greater responsibility to 
the states for policy creations and service provisions. As a result states have 
concentrated their efforts in providing public services to their citizens using 
privatization with varying degrees o f intensity (Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti, 
2001). Even though privatization has gained increasing acceptance among the states 
(Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001), the level o f privatization initiatives by 
state governments is expected to vary because of the unique characteristics o f each 
state.
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Studies reveal that states possess unique characteristics that can be attributed to 
their respective political cultures, social and economic systems, demographic makeup, 
ideological beliefs, religious traditions, as well as institutional capacities (see Elazar, 
1984; Bowman & Kearney, 1988; Berry & Berry, 1992; Erikson, Wright, & Mclver, 
1993; Dresang & Gosling, 2008). Therefore, building on historical and contemporary 
privatization theory, this research study examines the factors influencing the level of 
privatization by state governments. The overarching research question that this study 
attempts to answer is: What factors predict the level o f state government privatization?
Definition of Key Terms and Constructs
Key terms
States -  refer to the forty-eight contiguous states and Alaska and Hawaii. District of 
Columbia and other US territories are excluded.
Services -  this term refers to both goods and services. Following Savas (1987; 2000) 
usage, the terms goods and services or simply services are used interchangeably. 
Provision of services -  refers to provision, production, and delivery of goods and 
services unless otherwise indicated to mean something else, in which case the meaning 
of the term should be understood in the context in which it is used.
Level of State Government Privatization -  the level of privatization that a state 
government has undertaken.
Constructs
The following four categories of constructs will be used in this study. The constructs 
will be operationalized as supported by the literature as shown in Chapter II.
15
Socioeconomic factor -  this term is used as a generic reference to social class, social 
equity, and socioeconomic status and related terms. Oldfield (2003) used some 
variant of these terms to examine the role o f social class in understanding government 
responses arguing that “Although, technically, the terms social class, socioeconomic 
status, class, and similar terms have slightly different meanings, they all entail notions 
of comparative rank, usually based on income, education, and wealth” (p.441; italics 
in original). This study employs social, social equity, and socioeconomic terms 
interchangeably to examine the relationships between social factors and the level of 
state government privatization. The socioeconomic concept will be operationalized 
using three variables: state healthcare spending, state pension spending, and state per 
capita personal income.
Economic factor -  this term is used to refer to fiscal policy of taxing and spending as 
well as to other economic indicators such as the unemployment rate. Economic and 
fiscal factors are used interchangeably. The economic concept is operationalized using 
four variables: labor costs, state per capita spending, fiscal capacity, and deficit.
Political factor -  this is expressed in terms of the responses of politicians to different 
pressure groups such as labor unions, environmental groups, think tanks and the like. 
As such the political factor accounts for the political environment that is likely to 
promote or constrain the level o f state government privatization. For example, the 
Republican Party is perceived to favor more privatization than the Democratic Party; 
strong public employee unions resist privatization than weak unions.
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Political culture also plays a role in politics as, for example, Elazar (1984) 
asserts: “Political culture is particularly important as the historical source of 
differences in habits, perspectives, and attitudes that influence political life in the 
various states” (p. 110). Elazar conceptualized and identified three political cultures: 
individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic each of which will be detailed in a latter 
section. Political factor is operationalized using four variables: union power (union 
laws), the party of the governor controlling state government, the party controlling the 
legislature, and political culture.
Ideology factor -  is defined as the need to reduce the size and scope of government; 
noninterference in the free market economy; belief in the superiority o f the private 
sector relative to the public sector. Since the political and ideological concepts are 
multidimensional, some of the measures of these two constructs appear to overlap. 
Political culture is a case in point. Political cultures refer to “habits, perspectives, and 
attitudes” (Elazar, 1984, p.l 10) which are acquired over a long period of time and 
assume meanings relevant to measure the ideology construct. For example, the belief 
in the superiority o f the marketplace is believed to be an ideological concept, which is 
also a “perspective” derived from the 18th century laissez-faire economic and 
political philosophy which has come to be a habit, attitude, or a belief system over 
time.
Likewise institutional capacity may well serve as a measure o f political 
construct. One of the reasons why governments privatize services is lack of skilled 
personnel in the public sector and is reflected in the decisions of governments to 
privatize services; this is essentially an issue related to institutional capacity. However,
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in this study institutional capacity is used to measure the ideology construct because of 
the fact that institution building is fundamentally based on and informed by the 
underlying ideology of a given society. The ideology factor is operationalized using 
three variables: state policy liberalism, state ideology index, and state institutional 
capacity. State policy liberalism is another name for government policy. On the other 
hand, the term state ideology refers to the ideology of the citizens of the states.
Methodology
The objective of this study is to examine the factors that are likely to influence 
the level o f state government privatization. The overarching research question this 
study attempts to answer is: What factors predict the level o f state government 
privatization? To answer this question, secondary data from various sources are 
collected. The variable o f interest, that is, the dependent variable is the level o f state 
government privatization (LSGP) across the states and is measured at ordinal level. 
LSGP is defined and operationalized based on the 2002 Council of State Governments 
(CSG) survey responses for four classes o f services: corrections, education, health and 
human services, and transportation. That is, the conceptual definition is 
operationalized using the responses o f state agency heads to the CSG’s question:
“How many services and programs in your agency are currently privatized?” The 
answers to this question for the four classes of services are used to operationalize the 
dependent variable.
The four services were selected out of the five classes of services that the CSG 
identified in its 2002 survey as “the most popular privatized services” and published in
The Book o f  the States (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p.477). However, the fifth, 
personnel programs and services, has over 30% missing data on the responses to the 
aforementioned question and is not included in this study. Based on the values for the 
four classes o f services, an index of the level of state government privatization is 
constructed using summated rating scales, which in turn are transformed into three 
ordinal levels o f low, medium and high level of privatization. This study also uses 14 
independent variables measured at interval/ratio, ordinal, and nominal scales.
Data Analyses
Ordinal regression is used to analyze and test the hypothesized relationships 
between the level of state government privatization (LSGP) and the explanatory 
variables. Appropriate model fit indices will be used to evaluate each factor. Ordinal 
regression is used because of the ordered nature o f the constructed dependent variable. 
States serve as the unit of analysis.
Potential Determinants (IVs) o f the Level of State Government Privatization
Researchers have employed a number of variables related to socioeconomic, 
economic, political, and ideological factors to empirically investigate privatization 
programs in different contexts. Likewise, in this study, several economic and non­
economic variables are utilized to investigate the level o f privatization undertakings at 
state level. Fourteen variables are used as independent variables. The variables are:
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labor costs (compensation o f public employees), state per capita spending, state 
deficit, state fiscal capacity; per capita personal income; state health care spending, 
and state pension spending; state union laws, state political culture, party affiliation of 
the governor controlling state government, the party controlling state legislature; state 
policy liberalism, state ideology, and state institutional capacity; based on these 
variables, fourteen hypotheses are developed and tested in this study. This study also 
models how well four general factors o f socioeconomic, economic, political, and 
ideology explain variation in the level state government privatization.
Research Hypotheses
HI: States with higher health care expenditures are more likely to have higher level of 
state government privatization than states with lower health care expenditures.
H2: States with higher pension spending are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with lower pension spending.
H3: States with higher per capita personal income are more likely to have lower level 
of state government privatization than states with lower per capita personal income.
H4: States with higher labor costs are more likely to have higher level of state 
government privatization than states with lower labor costs.
H5: States with higher per capita spending are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with lower per capita spending.
H6: States with higher fiscal capacity are more likely to have lower level o f state 
government privatization than states with lower fiscal capacity.
H7: States with higher deficits are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with lower deficits.
H8: States with weak union laws are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with strong union laws.
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H9: States with individualistic/traditionalistic political culture are more likely to have 
higher level of state government privatization than states with moralistic political 
culture.
H10: States with Republican governors are more likely to have higher level of state 
government privatization than states with Democratic governors.
H ll :  States with Republican-controlled legislature are more likely to have higher 
level o f state government privatization than states with Democratic-controlled 
legislature.
H12: States with conservative government policy are more likely to have higher level 
of state government privatization than states with liberal government policy
H13: States with conservative state ideology are more likely to have higher level of 
state government privatization than states with liberal state ideology.
H14: States with higher institutional capacity are more likely to have lower level of 
state government privatization than states with lower institutional capacity.
Assumptions
“Assumptions are statements that are taken to be true even though the direct 
evidence of the truth is either absent or not well documented” (Plichta and Garzon, 
2009, p. 15; italics in original). For the variable o f interest, that is, the dependent 
variable, this study uses pre-existing survey data collected by CSG between October 
2002 and December 2002 (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004). However, the survey is 
silent about the specific procedures followed to apply/implement the survey 
instrument in conducting the survey and does not provide information on the 
collection, aggregation, and interpretation of the data; if  these issues are addressed by 
the researchers, then the documentation is not made available for this study, and 
several attempts to contact the researchers directly at the Council o f State Government 
(CSG) by email and telephone ware not successful.
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Therefore, this study assumes that: 1) common terms and concepts associated 
with privatization of public goods and services are used correctly, 2) the selected 
participants in the survey understood the concepts and responded accurately to the 
survey questions, 3) the data collected in each state measure accurately the public 
services provided in that state, 4) the interpretation of the data accurately reflect the 
perceptions o f the respondents, 5) the data collection process is not unduly influenced 
by politicians, bureaucrats, and other stakeholders, and 6) appropriate procedures are 
used to check for response biases.
Limitations
“Limitations are weaknesses.. .that potentially limit the validity of the results” 
(Plichta and Garzon, 2009, p. 15; italics in original) and “are not under the control o f 
the researcher” (Irby & Lunenburg, 2008, p. 133). This study uses secondary data 
from multiple sources, but the accuracy o f the data cannot be verified, raising 
questions of validity. Welch and Comer (1988) made an important observation 
pertaining to the problem of testing the validity o f measures in research studies 
especially in the social sciences including policy research saying “that there are no 
hard and fast rules for testing whether a measure is valid” (p.42). However, a number 
of steps can be taken to check the validity o f the measures, including using simple 
common sense or intuition to check for face validly; to review the literature to find out 
whether the measures have been used in other studies to measure the same concepts 
that this study attempts to measure (Welch & Comer, 1988).
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Sample size may be an issue. The CSG survey covered all the 50 states, but 
only the data for 34 states are usable. The remaining 16 states have incomplete, 
missing, and outlier data and are excluded from the analysis; this is a threat to external 
validity in that the results cannot be generalized to all the 50 states. However, the 
characteristics of the 16 excluded states are compared with the characteristics o f the 
34 states included in this study using a t-test for sample bias. As Appendix D shows 
there is only one variable that demonstrates a significant mean difference between the 
two groups. Also history may affect external validity because the data collected for 
both the dependent and independent variables are for 2002, and some of the measures 
may have changed (O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner, 2003). Moreover, confounding 
variables may also impact the validity of the conclusion of this study; for example, 
while the selfish actions of politicians and bureaucrats are assumed to exist, their 
influences on the level of state government privatization cannot be directly detected, 
measured, and assessed. That is, the indirect influence of the utility maximizing 
behaviors of the actors may have altered to a certain degree the relationships between 
the independent variables and the dependent variables leading to a conclusion with 
questionable validity. As Creswell (2009) suggests, this study addresses the limitations 
and potential spurious results in the conclusion.
Delimitations
“Delimitations are boundaries in which the study was deliberately confined” 
(Plichta and Garzon, 2009, p. 15; italics in original). This study is confined to an 
investigation of privatized services aggregated by four departments (correction,
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transportation, education, and health & human services) and does not attempt to 
examine specific services or programs that are likely to be privatized by each 
department. Also for the dependent variable, the study is confined by data collected in 
2002 and does not attempt to look beyond the prescribed one-year time frame.
Organization of the Study
This study is organized in five chapters. Chapter I provided an introduction and 
background of the study followed by the statement of the problem, the purpose of the 
study, the significance of the study, the contribution of the study, and the research 
question. Chapter I also included the definition o f key terms, the methodology, the 
data analysis, the potential determinants o f state government privatization, the 
research hypotheses, the assumptions, the limitations, and the delimitations of this 
study. Chapter II presents the literature review followed by the discussion of the 
methodology in Chapter III. Chapter IV provides the results, and Chapter V covers 
the conclusions.
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
This chapter reviews the privatization literature to provide the background 
information and the rationale for conducting research on the factors that influence the 
level o f state government privatization by state governments. Specifically, this study 
examines the extent to which variables related to socioeconomic, economic, political, 
and ideological factors drive the level o f state government privatization. While 
evidence in the literature shows the existence of wide variations in the level of state 
government privatization (GAO, 1997; Chi, K., Arnold, K., & Perkins, H., 2004), 
there is little empirical research that investigates the factors influencing the level or 
amount of privatization undertaken by state governments. Most prior state level 
empirical studies that employed variables related to socioeconomic, economic, 
political, and ideological factors have focused on single cases or programs, and have 
not examined the aggregate level of state government privatization accounted for by 
the aforementioned factors.
Indeed, after more than three decades of experimentation in privatization, the 
level of state government privatization, the contributing factors thereof, and the 
implications for society have yet to be understood and explained based on empirical 
evidence. To properly gauge the level of state government privatization, to identify the 
potential factors that are likely to drive the level of privatization by a state government, 
and to draw evidence-based conclusion about the implications o f privatization policy
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for society, it is essential to conduct a comprehensive research that takes into account 
several classes of programs and services simultaneously. The lack o f empirical 
research on the level o f state government privatization accounted for by variables 
related to socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors creates an 
important gap in the literature that this study attempts to fill.
This is a state comparative research, but the subject matter to be examined -  
privatization -  is global in scope. It is therefore essential to understand the roots and 
philosophical background of contemporary privatization in order to grasp clearly the 
meaning and the context in which it is applied by state governments. This study 
therefore draws on historical and contemporary privatization literature to understand 
and explain the origin o f the philosophical assumptions that inform the development 
of contemporary privatization theory in the global context in general and the United 
States in particular. Underlying the rationale for reviewing the privatization literature 
from a historical perspective is the belief that contemporary privatization is a 
derivation of the classical market model, the development of which was based on and 
informed by the neoclassical economic theory (Sclar, 2000).
Reviewing the historical as well as the contemporary privatization literature 
provides useful insights to identify the factors that are most likely to be associated 
with level of state government privatization, and to answer the main research question 
of this study, namely, what factors predict the level of state government privatization? 
This chapter therefore summarizes the literature, identifies the potential factors that 
are expected to influence the level of state government privatization, and concludes 
with the development o f research hypotheses.
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The chapter is organized into six major sections which includes several sub­
sections. Section one provides an overview of the historical context for the 
contemporary privatization movement and highlights the philosophical assumptions 
underpinning privatization; this section includes discussions of laissez-faire economic 
thought, the Welfare state as a precursor of contemporary privatization movement, 
arguments against the interventionist policies with an emphasis on the United States of 
America; also the ideological, political, and economic arguments including the 
demand-side and supply-side perspectives are summarized in this section. Section two 
reviews the background of contemporary privatization in the United States. Section 
three covers the definition of privatization. Section four presents a detailed discussion 
of the theory of privatization which includes the characteristics o f goods, the 
arguments for and against privatization, and the reasons why governments privatize. 
Section five presents an overview of selected empirical studies. The final section 
discusses the factors influencing the level of state government privatization and 
concludes with the development of fourteen research hypotheses.
The Historical Context and the Philosophical Basis of Privatization
Historical accounts link modem privatization theory to the laissez-faire 
political and economic philosophy that dominated most o f the first hundred years o f 
the Republic. But the dominant philosophy came under attack in the second half o f the 
19th century as a result o f growing social and economic problems spawned by the 
industrialization of the economy, the urbanizations of society, and the growth of the 
population (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; Milkis and Mileur, 2005). The economic and
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social changes o f the nineteenth century transformed the political landscape of the 
United States giving rise to what is referred to in the literature as the Progressive 
movement; the changes of that period demanded a strong, centralized government that 
could provide a “path to social peace, class equilibrium, and industrial democracy” 
(Milkis and Mileur, 2005, p. 87).
The Progressive Era changes and subsequent reforms created the conditions for 
government to play an active role in society. According to historical accounts, the role 
o f government was broad in scope and involved the initiation and development o f 
many programs that gradually led to the growth and expansion of the public sector, 
which, in turn, set the stage for the emergence o f contemporary privatization 
movement (Milkis and Mileur, 2005; Midgley and Livermore, 2009; Kaplan and 
Cuciti, 1986). These historical developments as they relate to the privatization 
movement are reviewed in the pages that follow.
Historical Context: The Laissez-Faire Economic Thought
Sclar (2000) noted that “privatization as a method of providing competitive 
public service is derived from modification of the standard market model, the core 
element in neoclassical economic theory” (p.6). To understand this linkage, it is 
perhaps important to review the historical root of privatization and the philosophical 
assumptions upon which it is built. The genesis o f the contemporary privatization 
movement can be traced to the eighteenth century laissez-faire economic thought that 
is commonly attributed to Adam Smith’s work The Wealth o f Nations (1776) ( Moe, 
1987). Adam Smith “propounded the notion of laissez-faire economics and was an
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early advocate o f free enterprise.... Smith believed that an invisible hand governs 
financial interactions and that free economic pursuits build economies and create 
wealth” (Midgley and Livermore, 2009, p. 196).
Individuals, not groups, are the foundation of the laissez-faire economic 
thought, which asserts that “a large number of buyers and sellers engage in market 
exchanges of goods and services with any individual actions having little or no 
appreciable impact on the price, quantity, or quality of the product” (Sclar, 2000, p. 6). 
The laissez-faire economic thought or more commonly known as the classical 
economic theory further assumes that the private sector does not have “organizational 
size larger than a single individual” (Sclar, 2000, p. 15), and that individuals enjoy free 
and unimpeded entry to or exit from the market.
The eighteenth century economic philosophy suggests that the private sector is 
essentially an environment with a self-correcting market system where individual 
entrepreneurs pursue their economic activities to maximize their individual profits 
without the interference or coercion of the state. In an effort to maximize their 
individual profits, the invisible hand of the entrepreneurs also benefits the national 
economy, leading generally to the creation and accumulation of national wealth. This 
simple but elegant economic principle characterized the early period of capitalist 
ideology, which continues to inform the beliefs, customs, and practices o f many 
Western societies.
For over two centuries, the values o f individual freedom, personal liberty, the 
preeminence of the private sector, the free market system, and limited government 
have been the defining ethos of the Western liberal democracies and remain to be the
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case to this day. Certainly in the United States o f America, “Smith’s ideas remain 
widely accepted and popular today. They are fundamental to American economic 
activity and law, which attempt to guarantee competition, the pursuit of free economic 
development, the avoidance o f monopolies, and relatively little government 
interference” ((Midgley and Livermore, 2009, p. 196).
Indeed, laissez-faire capitalism created unprecedented levels o f wealth and 
transformed the social, economic, and political landscapes of many Western societies, 
but it also produced undesirable consequences such as monopolies, social dislocations, 
and instabilities (Sclar, 2000). Beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
Europe and the United States began experiencing the impacts of the industrialization 
of the economy, the rise and influence of corporate power, the urbanization of society, 
and the growth of population and its concomitant social problems (Kettl, 2002; Sclar, 
2000).
The self-correcting mechanism that the classical economists attributed to the 
laissez-faire economic model either didn’t exist or faltered so much that a belief in the 
power of governments to serve as agents o f positive social changes became 
widespread. For example, in the United States, “Citizens came to see the national 
government as generally benign and competent -  a force for constructive change and a 
healthy offset to market failures” (Sclar, 2000, p.viii). Over time, as a reaction to the 
social and economic malaise that engulfed societies on both sides o f the Atlantic, 
many governments adopted interventionist policies, which gradually led to the 
development o f what is now commonly referred to in the literature as the welfare state
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(Kuttner, 1987; McAllister and Studlar, 1989; Sclar, 2000; Boix, 1997; Milkis and 
Mileur, 2005; Midgley and Livermore, 2009; Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986).
The Welfare State: the Precursor o f Contemporary Privatization Movement
Governments began exerting considerable effort to overcome the economic 
difficulties and social instabilities brought on largely by the market forces operating in 
the private sector that was deeply enthroned with the capitalist ethos of individual 
freedom, self-correcting market system, personal liberty, and minimal government 
interference. Although the interventionist policies varied from country to country, in 
general, however, many governments responded to the economic and social realities of 
the first half of the twentieth century by subjecting industries to strong regulations, 
nationalizing key industries, and expanding social welfare (McAllister and Studlar, 
1989; Boix, 1997; Kettl, 2002: Sclar, 2000; Kuttner, 1987). For example, from 1945- 
51, the Labor government in Britain nationalized many industries and expanded social 
welfare. In 1951, the nationalized industries employed 28 percent o f the workforce, 
which represented a significant government involvement in the economy (McAllister 
and Studlar, 1989). McAllister and Studlar (1989) made an apt observation when they 
said: “From being the primary exponent of laissez-faire economics in the nineteenth 
century, Britain moved in the twentieth century to ever-increasing levels o f 
government involvement in the economy” (p. 159).
In the United States, partly as a reaction to the Progressive movement, the 
responses involved not nationalization of industries but “strong government
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regulation” to curb the power of the corporate trusts as well as to promote efficiency 
and accountability, which Woodrow Wilson argued could be accomplished by 
separating politics from administration (Kettl, 2002, p.81). Over time the 
interventionist role of the federal government expanded especially during the periods 
that included the Great Depression, World War II, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, 
and the Civil Right movement o f the 1960s. During these periods, on the domestic 
front, unprecedented demands were placed on government to play a more active role 
in the socioeconomic sphere, and the federal government introduced massive 
programs, especially the New Deal programs of the 1930s and the Great Society 
programs of the 1960s (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; Milkis and Mileur, 2005; Midgley 
and Livermore, 2009).
The New Deal programs of the 1930s and the Great Society programs of the 
1960s represented the largest initiatives undertaken by the federal government since 
the founding of the Republic (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986). The New Deal programs were 
enacted essentially to cope with the economic disaster that was largely believed to 
have been caused by the Great Depression. Although a host of programs were put in 
place during the period that was largely associated with the Great Depression, none of 
the programs involved nationalization of private enterprises. Most o f the major 
programs appeared to have been designed to provide purchasing (spending) power to 
people in order to pull the economy from the depths of the Great Depression. While no 
nationalization of industries took place in the United States of America, government 
intervention nonetheless became necessary to correct market failures. In due course of
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time, however, the public sector began experiencing significant growth and continued 
expanding throughout the Great Society era.
The Great Society programs were far more expansive and focused primarily on 
ending poverty and racial injustices by creating opportunities for the poor (Ylvisaker, 
1986; Gifford, 1986). The creation of opportunities involved providing resources and 
skills for the poor as well as outlawing various types of discrimination (Kaplan and 
Cuciti, 1986). In essence, the progress made in the early sixties reinforced the beliefs 
of prior generations going as far back as the Progressive Era in the problem-solving 
abilities o f government and provided optimism about the positive role that government 
can play in society. These beliefs enhanced government involvement and expanded 
the type and scope of the programs created during the Great Society era (Kaplan and 
Cuciti, 1986; Midgley and Livermore, 2009).
Indeed, the political and economic philosophy o f the Progressive Era that 
sought to legitimize active government role in the social and economic lives of society 
reached its peak during the Great Society era, culminating in what is today known as 
the welfare state. However, the Progressive Era political and economic thoughts in 
general and the legacy o f the Great Society in particular were challenged not only on 
the basis of fiscal and economic issues but also on political and ideological grounds as 
well. The oppositions, in part, came by way of the privatization movement (Kaplan 
and Cuciti, 1986; Midgley and Livermore, 2009).
Literature reveals that the growth and expansions o f government that led to the 
creation of the welfare state were believed to be the underlying causes of the 
economic problems of the 1970s that included economic inefficiency, chronic fiscal
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imbalances (large budget deficits), and huge national debt (Donahue, 1989; Hodge, 
2000; Kuttner, 1987; 1997; Savas, 1987; 2000). Research further shows that the 
regimes of the welfare state have been characterized by lack of public confidence and 
trust in government. These developments in turn led many governments around the 
world to abandon the interventionist policies in favor o f limiting the size and scope of 
government and promoting privatization policy (Boix, 1997).
While much of the contemporary research alludes to the public sector 
inefficiencies and slow economic growth of the 1970s as reasons for the emergence of 
the contemporary privatization movement (Boix, 1997), historical accounts offer 
broader explanations, at least in the context of the United States, that appear to be 
much more in tune with the long secular changes that had taken place since the 
Progressive Era (Report of the President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988).
Viewed in the historical context, therefore, the contemporary privatization 
movement is not only a strategy for cost savings or for correcting fiscal imbalances 
governments faced, but it is also an attempt to resurrect an ideology that is based on 
laissez-faire political and economic thoughts. In other words, the movement toward 
privatization is essentially an attempt not only to reorient the fiscal side o f government 
but also to alter the political and economic philosophy that gave rise to the 
interventionist policies in the first place. In many cases, the ideological battle 
manifests itself in the increasing calls by conservative politicians and economists for 
limited government and for the transfer o f public services to the private sector. Thus, 
the arguments against the interventionist policies and in favor of privatization must be 
considered within the context of the long secular developments o f the last hundred
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years that have altered the political and economic orientations of governments around 
the world. These themes are the subject o f discussions in the next few pages.
Arguments against the Interventionist Policies
For several decades after the turn of the twentieth century until the late 1970s, 
the interventionist policies became the national strategies for many advanced countries 
including the United States of America to spur economic growth, to promote stable 
economic policy, to redistribute wealth, to provide public goods and services, and to 
improve the welfare of workers and the least well-off sectors of society (Kuttner, 1987; 
Sclar, 2000; Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986). However, research shows that most developed 
countries began shifting their domestic economic policies from the interventionist 
policies of the Keynesian orientation to a new strategy that emphasized the market 
approach (Boix, 1997; Box, 1999). Studies further reveal that privatization began to 
gain salience both in the political debates and in governmental agendas because of 
renewed enthusiasm about the virtues o f the competitive markets and the belief in the 
efficiency of the private sector (Boix, 1997; Mitchell, 1988).
The arguments against the interventionist policies were essentially a reaction 
against the economic slowdown of the 1970s, the fiscal imbalances and the related 
revenue shortfalls, the growing budget deficits, and the stagflation crisis (Boix, 1997). 
While the specific policy prescriptions vary from country to country, in general, 
however, the economic malaise o f the 1970s “certainly put into question the political- 
economic institutions o f the Keynesian post-war consensus and triggered, among state 
elites, a search for new approaches to governing the economy” (Boix, 1997, p.477). But
35
Boix (1997) also offered a contrasting view regarding the extent to which economic 
difficulties and the failure o f “the expansionary policies o f the late 1970s to solve the 
stagflation crisis” served as a catalyst for the emergence o f the privatization movement 
around the world (Boix, 1997, p. 474).
In reviewing the experiences of some of the Organization for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD) countries, Boix (1997) noted that “lower growth 
rates and larger public deficits did not mechanically trigger the privatization of public 
businesses” (p.477-478). He argued that there was no evidence to show that 
privatization strategies were implemented only among countries that experienced bad 
economic performances and harsh stagflation crises. “While it is true that several 
countries suffering long-term economic stagnation, such as New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom, engineered vast privatization packages, nations like Japan or Portugal, with 
growth rates well above OECD average, engaged in sizeable sales of state assets as 
well” (Boix, 1997, p. 478). Moreover, budget deficits/public debt played very little role 
in approving privatization packages in many nations. For example, countries such as 
Belgium, Italy, Ireland, with huge levels o f public debt, sold hardly any public 
corporations (Boix, 1997), which underscores the fact that, in some of the advanced 
economies, fiscal imperatives play at best a marginal role in the privatization decisions.
According to Boix (1997), privatization decisions in OECD countries are 
political and institutional in nature, but the author emphasized that the responses o f 
individual countries depend largely on the alignment of political forces and institutional 
arrangements available at the domestic level. That is, “the privatization movement was 
mainly driven by the political actors in power at the time, constrained by the institutional
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settings in which they operated -  Conservative governments privatized and left-wing 
cabinets did not” (Boix, 1997, p.476). For example, privatization has been the 
“centerpiece o f Margaret Thatcher’s three Conservative governments, reflected in the 
sale o f publicly-owned industries to the private sector and in the sale of council houses 
to their tenants” (McAllister and Studlar, 1989, p. 157).
The argument that conservatives privatize more than left-wing politicians or 
liberals suggests that political and ideological preferences figure prominently more than 
fiscal concerns in the privatization decisions. In some cases, in an apparent attempt to 
project a stance of ideological neutrality, proponents of privatization invoke arguments 
saying that voters demand the privatization of public enterprises; but these claims also 
become matters of empirical investigations. For example, in Britain, McAllister and 
Studlar (1989) conducted an empirical study to determine the extent to which voters 
demand privatization of public enterprises. They tested two models -  the median voter 
and the elite interests model -  to examine voters’ choices about privatizing public 
enterprises. The median voter model argues that privatization policy is a policy 
demanded and initiated by voters. In contrast, the elite interests model argues that 
privatization decision is government initiated and there is no popular demand for it. The 
authors concluded: “The evidence confirms the elite interests model and shows that 
public opinion has generally accepted the status quo on the public ownership of 
industry” (McAllister and Studlar, 1989, p. 157).
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The Case of the United States o f America
In the United States of America, the anti-interventionist policy was also triggered 
by the economic conditions of the 1970s; much of the recent literature describes the 
contemporary privatization movement as a reaction to the fiscal crisis, growing budget 
deficits, and overall macroeconomic problems associated primarily with the welfare 
state that was spawned by the Great Society programs (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; Milkis 
and Mileur, 2005). It is true that the poor economic performance of the 1970s had 
considerable impact on government policies, but there is no unequivocal evidence to 
suggest that it was the only factor that contributed to the development of anti­
interventionist policies and in favor of privatization policy.
In fact, numerous scholars argue that in the United States, as in Europe, the 
political and ideological factors account for much of the shift in public policies and for 
the adoption of privatization policy as a result of the conservative ascendancy to power 
in the early 1980s (Savas, 1987; Donahue, 1989; Kuttner, 1997; Sclar, 2000). Thus, in 
the United States o f America, explaining the anti-interventionist policies in general and 
the movement toward privatization in particular entails, among other things, 
understanding the ideological, political, and economic arguments in a historical context. 
These arguments are addressed in the next section.
The Ideological Arguments
Studies show that the contemporary privatization movement in the U.S. is “a 
reaction against the themes and results of Progressive thought” (Report o f the 
President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988, p. 230), and represents a resurgence of
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conservative ideology; as noted elsewhere, conservatism is essentially a belief in the 
laissez-faire political and economic ideology including the family, the neighborhood, 
the small republic, as well as the cultural beliefs (Ginsberg, 2009). As indicated earlier, 
the Progressive movement emerged in the 19th century as a reaction against this 
conservative ideology that dominated the early period of the Republic and sought the 
development of strong central government and the promotion of true national 
community in the U.S. (Report o f the President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988; 
Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; Brinkley, 1995; Midgley and Livermore, 2009). In many 
ways, the Great Society programs represented a concrete expression of the Progressive 
thought (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; Brinkley, 1995; Midgley and Livermore, 2009).
From the economic perspective, as noted elsewhere in this paper, the Great 
Society programs spawned the welfare state setting the stage for the emergence of the 
contemporary privatization movement. With the election o f Ronald Reagan in 1980, 
the New Federalism policy that subscribed to the laissez-faire political and economic 
ideology began shaping the conservative direction of the nation (Schambra, 1986;
Sclar, 2000; Kuttner, 1987; Brinkley, 1995; Midgley and Livermore, 2009). The 
resurgence of the conservative ideology and the desire to change the legacy of the 
Great Society and the Progressive vision eventually led to the emergence of 
contemporary privatization movement (Report o f the President’s Commission on 
Privatization, 1988).
Thus, as the preceding discussion clearly illustrates, the privatization movement 
was not solely an economic phenomenon or a cost-savings strategy, but it also had an 
ideological dimension (Schambra, 1986). While the ideological reasoning against the
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Progressive thought emphasizes a smaller government and a return to the traditional, 
small republican values (Ginsberg, 2009), the political argument, at its core, appears to 
be developing strategies for attaining or maintaining party control o f the institutions of 
government, that is, political power. This political perspective is reviewed below.
The Political Arguments
In discussing the political aspect o f the privatization movement, recent 
literature focuses largely on the demands made on governments for actions in an 
environment o f sever fiscal constraints; but this is only part of the argument, and it 
plays a marginal role when viewed in the context of the broad reforms associated with 
the Great Society era and prior decades. Historical accounts unravel the racial and 
class or socioeconomic implications inherent in the privatization movement, which 
largely became prominent in the 1980s following the decline of the political and 
economic thoughts associated with the Progressive Era.
Studies that focused particularly on the Great Society era provide useful 
insights that shade some light about the political dimension of privatization.
According to some studies, the Great Society programs were efforts, among other 
things, to reduce poverty by providing services through private agencies (Piven and 
Cloward, 2005; Reisch, 2009); using private agencies was believed to be important in 
order to curtail the influences o f local bureaucracies (Piven and Cloward, 2005; Reisch, 
2009). Also, the financial burdens of state and local governments were reduced 
because “the traditional grant-in-aid practice of requiring states and localities to match 
federal contributions was reduced, to as low as 10 percent in the case o f poverty
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programs, and eliminated altogether in the case o f programs funded under the 
Manpower Development and Training Act” (Piven and Cloward, 2005, p. 258). The 
Manpower Development and Training Act was designed “primarily for reasons of cost 
efficiency and out of reluctance to expand public assistance benefits” (Reisch, 2009, 
p. 159).
In view of the strategy highlighted here, one would expect the Great Society 
programs to gamer broad national support. In fact, it would be difficult to invoke the 
privatization argument on grounds of insufficient funding and increased demand for 
services because of the fact that there was no supporting evidence for such claims. The 
problem, however, was that most o f the Great Society programs were targeted to the big 
cities, especially to the inner-city populations that were black and poor (Piven and 
Cloward, 2005). According to Piven and Cloward (2005), the focus on race, ethnicity, 
and class did not bode well for the political future o f the Democratic Party; yet, the 
Democratic administration at the time sought to strengthen the allegiance o f urban 
blacks because their electoral participation had become particularly important in terms 
of determining the outcome of presidential elections. The political strategy of the 
Democratic Party in the 1960s was to line up the interests o f the Democratic Party with 
the policies that promoted antipoverty programs (Piven and Cloward, 2005).
Likewise, the Nixon and Reagan administrations were acting in their political 
interest when they reversed the pattern o f the Great Society and began channeling 
program authority and funds back to the states and encouraged greater business 
participation (Reisch, 2009). For example, according to Donahue (1989), “One o f the 
Reagan administration’s earliest, biggest and most-relished budget cuts was the
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elimination of CETA’s [Comprehensive Employment and Training Act] public service 
employment component. When the program came up for reauthorization in 1982, it was 
restructured to enlarge the role of the private sector“(p.l81-182).
The preceding analysis suggests that the contemporary privatization argument 
that is premised solely on cost effectiveness rationale appears to be less plausible. The 
implication of the political argument is that, even in the absence o f budgetary constraints, 
fiscal issues become a rallying point for some conservative groups to oppose federal 
programs to the extent that those programs target race, ethnicity or class perhaps because 
these groups are perceived to be allies of the Democratic Party. The political dimension 
further underscores the fact that political party interest plays a significant part in 
defining intergovernmental relationships; that is, shifting program authority and funds to 
states and/or localities are likely to occur to the extent that the change of venues serves 
the interests o f the governing political party. The implication here is that competing 
party interests play a part in privatization decisions. As Boix (1997) argued in the 
context of European governments where conservatives privatized and their liberal 
counterparts did not, in the United States, at least in theory, the Republican Party tends 
to privatize and the Democratic Party seeks to restrict it (Sclar, 2000; Savas, 1987; 2000; 
Donahue, 1989).
While the political argument discussed above highlights the intricacies inherent 
in the privatization policy, the economic perspective offers an argument how the private 
sector can expand the economic pie for all to get maximum benefit. However, it is 
worth noting that, although political and economic arguments can be differentiated 
theoretically, the degree to which political and economic considerations can be separated
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unambiguously, at least in the context o f privatization discussion, is very much an open 
question. More often than not, economic arguments overlap with political and 
ideological arguments, and this limitation is evident in this study. The next section 
focuses on the economic argument.
The Economic Arguments
Recent privatization literature alludes to decreasing public resources and 
citizens increasing demand for services as the underlying factors driving the 
contemporary privatization movement; while this may be partly the case in the past 
thirty years or so, the major cause that underpins the movement towards privatization 
is deeply rooted in competing economic philosophies. Much of the debate over the 
privatization policy from an economic perspective has reflected differences between 
those who support government intervention and those who support theories of a 
market economy.
Although the extreme case of government intervention involving 
nationalization of industries did not occur in the United States (Kolderie, 1986; Moe, 
1987; Donahue, 1989), government nonetheless employed regulatory and managerial 
strategies as well as fiscal tools as it assumed an active role in the economy (Brinkley, 
1995). But, in the 1980s, the conservative regime sought to promote economic growth 
through restrictive monetary policy, deregulation, tax cuts, private saving, and 
investment. In essence, conservative regimes sought to alter the direction of 
government policies towards privatization. The difference was thus, in pure economic
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terms, between demand-side and supply-side macroeconomic doctrines (Midgley and 
Livermore, 2009).
The Demand-Side Perspective
The demand-side economic theory, also called Keynesian economics, focuses 
on increasing the demand for goods and services in order to stimulate economic 
growth. The demand-side economic policy utilizes fiscal tools (spending and taxing) 
to promote high employment with stable price level or inflation. The idea central to 
demand-side or Keynesian economic thought is that government can stabilize the 
economy by spending more and taxing less during recession; and taxing more and 
spending less during period of high employment and sustained price increases 
(inflation); the graphical representation of this strategy is what is known in economic 
literature as the “Philips curve,” and involves essentially a “trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation” (Ackerman, 1982, p .l 1). The demand-side idea is 
essentially an expression that reflects a belief in the ability of government to manage 
the economy effectively, efficiently, and responsibly using the tool o f fiscal policy.
Indeed, fiscal policy became the major economic tool to stimulate economic 
growth, to promote mass consumption, and to expand social programs for nearly three 
decades after the end of WWII (Ackerman, 1982). Summarizing America’s social and 
economic experience in the aftermath of WWII, Ackerman (1982) noted the steady 
expansion of the welfare state that started in the 1930s with the New Deal program 
(social security, for example). The author further claimed that, in the 1960s, the 
welfare state expanded so much that public expenditures on programs such as
unemployment compensation, food stamps and welfare were growing steadily. Yet, 
according to Ackerman (1982), in the face o f growing public expenditure, “inflation 
was unknown, wages climbed at a fairly steady pace, and spells o f high unemployment 
were brief’ (p.2). Indeed, some scholars assert that the United States enjoyed the most 
dramatic period of economic growth in its history in the first thirty years after World 
War II, and liberal economic policies were believed to be instrumental in sustaining 
and accelerating that growth (Brinkley, 1995).
However, Brinkley (1995) wrote: “The effort to create economic growth and 
full employment through consumer-oriented fiscal policies floundered after 1973 in 
the face of global competition, environmental degradation, and deindustrialization” 
(p.270). Moreover, Ackerman (1982) asserted that the “levels o f inflation, interest 
rates and unemployment that would have been called catastrophic a few years ago are 
now commonplace. In the 1970s, Republicans and Democratic administrations alike 
seemed powerless to reverse [America’s] declining fortunes” (p. 2). Although, the 
demand-side economic doctrine informed much o f the economic policies o f the 
postwar period, “the postwar expansion nonetheless came to a close and was replaced 
by an erratic and often stagnant economy, increasing inequality, and growing social 
instability” (Brinkley, 1995, 271). It is against this social and economic background 
that the “New Federalism” also called “Reaganomics” or “supply-side” economics 
emerged (Ackerman, 1982; Lowe, 1984; Brinkley, 1995).
The Supply-Side Perspective
As noted above, in the aftermath o f WWII, the Keynesian strategy or otherwise 
known as demand-side economic doctrine was widely embraced, and as a result, the
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1960s saw a more aggressive fiscal policy. Nevertheless, studies show that in the
1970s supply-side economic doctrine was growing in importance; in particular,
monetary policy was recognized as an important policy tool to combat inflation, and
even became more evident in the 1980s with the emergence of the New Federalism or
Reaganomics (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; Ackerman, 1982; Lowe, 1984). Scholars note
that the shift in the relative roles o f fiscal and monetary policies was essentially a
reflection of the growing influence of the supply side economic theory (Kaplan and
Cuciti, 1986; Ackerman, 1982; Ulmer, 1984).
The supply side economic thought subscribes to the notion that private sector
production (supply) of goods and services is the primary engine of growth. According
to supply-side perspective, economic policy should focus on fostering economic
growth through high private savings, investment, and production. Lower corporate-
income taxes, liberal depreciation schedules, cutting capital gains taxes, and reducing
marginal tax rates on high personal income are central to the supply-side theory
(Kuttner, 1987). In the United States, the supply-side economic thought gained
acceptance and prominence with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. As Kuttner
(1987) noted, “With Ronald Reagan’s election, the capital-supply school o f economics
came fully of age” (p. 52). Ulmer (1984) also asserted that
[T]he ‘supply-siders’ moved to center stage with the Reagan administration. 
The more extreme among them favor the market over government almost to 
the point o f old-time laissez-faire. Substantial inequalities in income, allowing 
incentives for effort and ambition, are in their eyes essential not only for 
industrial progress but for individual freedom (p. 10).
In general, the supply-side policy prescription calls for restrictive money supply, lower
wages, budget cuts, less regulation, and lower taxes.
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Upon assuming power, the Reagan administration followed pro-business 
economic policy and encouraged restrictive monetary policy, tax cuts, budget cuts, 
and deregulation (Ackerman, 1982). However, the results were not encouraging. The 
tax cuts did not achieve the intended goal. “The actual personal savings rate declined 
from an average of 7 percent in the 1970s to about 5.5 percent under Reagan, and 
investment declined sharply between 1980 and 1983” (Kuttner, 1987, p.52). Overall, 
tight monetary policy discouraged investment, and the tax cuts widened the deficit. In 
the ensuing period, concern over the budget deficit led Congress to enact a series of 
tax legislations, and the budget deficit “served the crusade against the public sector” 
(Kuttner, 1987, p. 52).
Literature reveals that the federal government sought to reduce its load by 
devolving programmatic authority and responsibility to the states without providing 
resources, which in turn constrained states’ ability to meet citizens increasing demand 
for public services (Posner, 1998). For example, Posner (1998) cited studies that 
showed that “counties spent $4.8 billion in fiscal year 1993 for twelve unfunded 
federal mandates, or over 12 percent o f locally raised revenues” (p.5). The financial 
difficulties o f states and localities were further compounded by lack o f public support 
for tax increases to fund the additional services demanded by citizens.
Some skeptics took unfunded mandates as the federal attempt to get rid of 
some programs that were meant to serve the poor. The skeptics claim “that the 
President’s [President Reagan] aim was to rid Washington of its most troublesome 
domestic programs [by shifting the responsibilities to] the states in the expectation that
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many would soon die there” (Nathan, 1984, p, 36). While this argument might have 
some resonance in some circles, it was not widely believed to be the case.
Aside from the interests of the Republican political party, the Reagan 
economic policy was far deeper than the superficial argument suggested by the 
skeptics. The Reagan economic policy (and hence the supply-side theory that 
informed it) was deeply rooted in laissez-faire political and economic ideology that 
was discussed at length earlier. The essence of the economic policy was to reduce the 
role o f government and narrow the size and scope of the public sector in many areas 
including social programs at all levels o f government so that the private sector would 
be able to take over functions that were previously performed or provided in the public 
sector. “The fundamental belief of the Reagan team is that private enterprise will 
work wonders as soon as the government leaves it alone” (Ackerman, 1982, p.3). Thus, 
in line with the supply-side theory, state governments sought to alleviate their 
financial difficulties by privatizing some of their public services.
However, different state governments are likely to respond to federal policy 
changes in different ways, depending on a number of factors such as the 
socioeconomic condition, the economic situation, and the political culture o f the state 
as well as the ideological orientation of the citizens and state policymakers. The 
challenge for researchers who want to understand the level of state government 
privatization is to identify the relevant factors and explain the extent and variations of 
their influences on the aggregate level of state government privatization efforts. In 
reviewing the root of the privatization history o f the past hundred years, this research 
has revealed the existence of a link between contemporary privatization theory and the
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conservative ideological, political, and economic thoughts of the 18th century. 
Conservative ideological, political, and economic thoughts are assumed to exert 
considerable influence on privatization decisions at all levels of government, but the 
extent of their influence on the level o f state government privatization is a matter o f 
empirical investigation that this study attempts to undertake.
To understand the level o f state government privatization, identifying the 
factors that are likely to impact privatization policy is certainly a necessary condition 
but not a sufficient condition. Understanding the meaning of contemporary 
privatization and the perspectives that inform it are also essential in order to make a 
meaningful assessment o f the influence of each o f the factors mentioned above. The 
review of the literature from a historical perspective has clearly established the 
conservative root o f privatization, but the historical narration nonetheless offers little 
insight into the conceptualization and meaning o f contemporary privatization in the 
context of the United States in particular.
The rationale for providing an account o f the background o f contemporary 
privatization in the United States in a separate section as opposed to privatization in 
the global context is to tackle the theoretical and analytical challenges that are likely to 
arise in discussing privatization policy in the United States. There is a difference in 
the conceptualization of the term privatization between the United States and other 
developed economies. In the United States, privatization does not involve complete 
severance of government intervention in the privatized services, whereas in most 
advanced economies, privatization means primarily selling assets completely 
(Donahue, 1989).
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Moreover, as indicated in the review o f the historical literature, the United 
States of America has had a mixed economy for a long time, and did not nationalize 
any industries even during the height of the Great Depression (Donahue, 1989). In 
view of these unique U.S. circumstances, the conceptualization of privatization is 
fundamentally different from other economically advanced countries, and its meaning 
is certainly intriguing and warrants separate discussion. Thus, the background of 
contemporary privatization in the United States is reviewed in the pages that follow.
Background of Contemporary Privatization in the United States o f America
In the United States o f America, the use o f privatization as a means of 
providing public goods and services gained ground after the California voters passed 
in 1978 Proposition 13, a major fiscal containment act ( Allen et al., 1989). The 
privatization movement gained further momentum after the election of Ronald Reagan 
in 1980 where the Reagan administration “pressed hard for increased use o f the private 
sector in delivering public services at all levels o f  government” (Allen et al., 1989, 
p.2). All government initiatives that involved public-private collaborations and 
coordination constituted privatization because of government reliance in varying 
degrees on the private sector to provide the services that the citizens needed (Report of 
the President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988). But prior to the 1980s, 
privatization had existed on an ad hoc basis in a limited scope and had not been a 
source of major controversies that characterized the 1980s and beyond (Featherstun, 
Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001).
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The privatization movement that emerged in the 1980s became controversial 
because of concerns in some circles that privatization has gone far beyond the issue of 
simple economic efficiency and has become deeply ideological and political at its core 
(Savas, 1987). For example, one of the staunch advocates of privatization, E.S. Savas 
described the controversies surrounding the concept of privatization in the following 
manner.
The very word of privatization unfortunately summons forth images from a 
deep reservoir and causes misunderstanding, premature polarization, and shrill 
arguments.... Some read into the word a plot to restore a completely free 
market, with overtones of dog eat dog, exploitation of weakest, and survival of 
the fittest. Others interpret the word as an attack on government and the things 
government has been doing; direct beneficiaries o f  government programs, 
including employees, may therefore defend their self-interest by attacking 
privatization. Still others are provoked by the term because they see it as an 
attack on the ideals they cherish. Public to them denotes brotherhood, sharing, 
and community, and they mistakenly interpret private to mean the negation of 
these important values (Savas, 1987, p.277; italics in original).
Also, the following quotations from a speech by James C. Miller III, former director of
the Office o f Management and Budget (OMB) under the Reagan administration,
provide a vivid illustration of the problem associated with the concept o f privatization.
James C. Miller III wrote:
While I was at the OMB, I had the temerity to suggest that the Post Office be 
privatized. Well, that triggered considerable resistance.... I immediately had 
congressional inquiries down my neck, and one o f the labor unions produced 
‘WANTED’ posters o f ‘Postal Enemy Number One’ which featured an 
unflattering caricature of me.
He further observed:
Opposition to privatization is entrenched on Capitol Hill, and those that are 
threatened by privatization lobby very hard to retain their privileged position. 
The concept of privatization is generally hard to sell to the American people. 
(We looked long and hard for an alternative word to ‘privatization,’ because it 
sounds somewhat commercial and selfish, but we didn’t find anything) (Miller, 
1992, p. 3-4).
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It was not only on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C. that the term privatization
became provocative, but it also sparked vigorous rejection in state legislatures in the
early 1980s (Auger, 1999). In fact, privatization was so viewed as anathema to public
concerns that many leaders around the world sought to use a different term, as E.S.
Savas reported as follows.
Numerous public officials throughout the world have told me, in great 
frustration that they wished another word could be found. Indeed, the 
euphemism productivity enhancement was employed early in the Reagan 
administration to minimize reflexive employee opposition, and alternative 
service delivery is the term of art often used in municipal government circles in 
the United States. In fact, I devised this term specifically for that audience as a 
circumlocution to avoid using privatization (Savas, 1987, p.277; italics in 
original).
The ambiguity o f the term privatization also raised questions of motivation in the 
sense that some advocates of privatization wanted to eliminate “worthy goods” 
arguing that they were private goods and should not be provided by collective 
financing (Savas, 1987, p.277). Thus, as Savas (1987) candidly acknowledges, 
privatization, in its contemporary usage, is controversial because of the fact that the 
concept is subject to different interpretations. A detailed discussion o f the definition 
o f privatization is in order.
Definition of Privatization
Privatization has been defined in many different ways in the literature. 
Historically, the concept of privatization refers to human economic actions in the 
pursuit of their individual self-interests in the market place (Florio, 2004). Elaborating 
the concept of privatization further, Florio (2004) notes: “ The personal responsibility
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of the entrepreneur is in fact an essential ingredient of the line o f reasoning that, from 
Adam Smith onward, sees free individual economic action as a requirement of social 
order -  free, but also individuaV (p.5; italics in original). As a concept, privatization 
traces its origin to Adam Smith’s (1776) book the Wealth o f  Nations, and “free” and 
“individual” economic activities underpin privatization in the early period of 
industrialization.
In view of the definition offered by Florio (2004), public companies, that is, 
stock companies that are owned by shareholders do not fit the definition of 
privatization. Florio (2004) further writes: “Many ‘public’ companies were in fact 
private companies in disguise. Private ownership in the larger firms no longer bore 
any resemblance to that of the individual entrepreneur” (p.5). In the historical context, 
the terms “free” and “individual” were the defining characteristics o f privatization, 
which is rarely applicable in the current global economic environment.
A more recent conceptualization of privatization is somewhat broader. 
According to Donahue (1989), “Two concepts share the same word -  privatization. 
The first concept involves removing certain responsibilities, activities, or assets from 
the collective realm.... The second [concept involves] retaining collective financing 
but delegating delivery to the private sector” (p.215; italics in original). The terms 
“removing” or “retaining” are two critical elements that allow differentiation between 
privatization as selling off government assets and privatization as the provision of 
services that involves some sort o f arrangement between government and the private 
sector.
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Donahue (1989) further explained that the first concept “is the chief meaning 
of privatization in countries retreating from postwar, postcolonial experiments with 
socialism, as they separate factories, mine, airlines, and railroads from public control” 
(p.215). This definition implies complete termination of governmental functions or 
public ownership of assets in favor of private ownerships, which can take the form of 
individual entrepreneur or private firms or public companies.
The concept of privatization, in the sense o f selling off assets to the private 
sector, has been widely used in most countries around the world but is less common in 
the United States. In Britain, for example, under Prime Minister Thatcher, the 
government sold several enterprises ranging from large scale industries such as 
telecommunications, oil, and steel to public housing units. While the scale of 
privatization was much greater in Britain, many other countries have also sold 
government assets to the private sector. For example, France, Italy, Spain, Japan, and 
other less developed economies such as Turkey, Malaysia, Argentina, Singapore, 
Mexico, and Brazil have sold state owned enterprises (SOE) but at a much lower scale 
than Britain (Donahue, 1989; Marsh, 1991; Savas, 1987; 2000).
In the United States, selling off assets to the private sector is uncommon with 
the exception of the sale of the National Consumer Cooperative Bank in 1982 and the 
sale of Conrail in 1987 (Report of the President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988; 
Donahue, 1989); in these two cases, like the countries mentioned above, the assets 
were completely transferred to the private sector and were consistent with the meaning 
of privatization in which the relationship of government and the private entities was 
completely severed (see first definition of Donahue, 1989 cited earlier; Dominy, 1999).
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Apart from the two examples mentioned above, selling off assets to the private sector 
is not practiced in the United States.
In the United States, the meaning of privatization is much less precise, and is 
somewhat consistent with Donahue’s (1989) “second meaning of privatization: 
retaining collective financing but delegating delivery to the private sector” (p.215). 
This is so because, as Donahue (1989) pointed out: “America has never had all that 
many government enterprises and assets.... America had kept private in the first 
place.. ..Aside from a strictly limited number o f asset sales, it [privatization] meant 
(and continues to mean) enlisting private energies to improve the performance of tasks 
that would remain in some sense public” (p.7). Similarly, Moe (1987) argued: “From 
the outset o f the Republic, the government has relied on the private sector to provide 
commercial services and to own utilities.. ..Thus, today, compared to most other 
nations, developed and less developed, relatively few candidates are available for full 
divestiture by the United States government” (p.454).
With the few exceptions noted above, large scale sale of assets that parallels 
other industrialized countries is practically unknown in the United States; this 
prompted some critics to question the meaning o f privatization arguing that if  assets 
cannot be sold off to the private sector, then it would be a misapplication or misuse of 
the term privatization to refer to public-private sector arrangements as privatization. 
Dominy (1999), for example, argued that “the asset sale is the single defining act o f  a 
true privatization” (p.347). However, scholars point out that in the 1980s, 
privatization appeared to be less contentious at the federal level, but the idea of 
privatization especially in the form of service shedding or asset selling to the private
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sector was politically unpalatable proposition in many state governments (Auger, 
1999).
Nonetheless, other scholars offered definitions o f privatization that take into 
account the relationships between government and the private sector. Kuttner (1987) 
referred to privatization as “the idea that public services will be provided more 
efficiently if they are contracted out to private-sector providers.. ..Subsidizing services 
by means of tax incentives or vouchers” (p.258). This definition is more in line with 
Donahue’s (1989) second concept of privatization as “retaining collective financing 
but delegating delivery to the private sector” (p.215). Also Kolderie (1986) defined 
privatization as “government turning more to private producers for services for which 
government remains responsible and which government continues to finance. It has 
become simply a new name for contracting” (p.287).
Savas (1987) offered an ambiguous definition by referring to privatization as 
“Relying more on the private institutions of society and less on government to satisfy 
the needs of the people.. ..The act o f reducing the role o f government, or increasing 
the role o f the private sector, in an activity or in the ownership of assets” (p.3). This 
definition is somewhat imprecise and can lead to different and often competing or 
conflicting interpretations. Kettl (2002) also referred to privatization, in an ambiguous 
manner, as a condition where “Government has come to rely heavily on for-profit and 
nonprofit organizations for delivering goods and services ranging from antimissile 
systems to welfare reform” (p. 120). Unless Kettl is talking about the degree of 
“reliance,” government has always depended, in varying degrees, on the private sector
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for delivery of goods and services. Kettl’s observation sheds little light in terms of 
clarifying the concept o f privatization.
The U.S. General Accounting Office (1997) provides an all-encompassing 
definition by referring to privatization “as any process aimed at shifting functions and 
responsibilities, in whole or in part, from the government to the private sector” (p. 1). 
Similarly, the Council of State Governments (CSG) offers a range of definitions that 
include:
• The transfer of government functions or assets to the private sector.
• The shifting of government management and service delivery to private providers.
• A shift from publicly-to privately-produced goods and services.
• Government reliance on the private sector to satisfy the needs o f society.
• A movement from collective action to private control (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 
2004, p.2).
The definitions of privatization described in the preceding section are certainly 
overlapping, but imperfectly matching. Some of the definitions are too ambiguous to 
be useful in clarifying the meaning of privatization and have contributed to the 
confusions and controversies surrounding the debate over privatization. Yet 
restructuring the relationships between the public and the private sectors appears to be 
central to all o f them. Another important and comprehensive definition of 
privatization that can perhaps capture and reconcile the discrete ideas that 
characterized most privatization definitions is offered by Morris (1999). He argued 
that “the term privatization refers to a range of potential service arrangement available 
to public decision makers” (Morris, 1999, p. 153; italics in original). This definition is
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consistent with the usage of the term in much of the recent literature of privatization, 
and is broad enough to include various public-private arrangements.
Recent developments in privatization have certainly expanded the range and 
scope of involvement of private firms in the public sector, requiring a definition or re­
definition of privatization broad enough to include a variety of new activities and new 
methods of privatization. McNamara and Morris (2008) further offered a useful 
definition of privatization that allows considering different forms o f service 
arrangements between the public and the private sectors. The authors thus wrote: “In 
a broad sense, privatization refers to a variety of service arrangements linking the 
public, private, and nonprofit sectors in different ways” (p. 569). Again, this 
definition is consistent with the evidence in the literature as, for example, Auger 
(1999) noted: “Privatization techniques in use today span a broad area ranging from 
contracting of services to use of vouchers, from volunteerism to use o f asset sale or 
sale/leaseback arrangements involving governmental property or enterprises” (p. 436- 
437).
As controversial as it is, privatization has been gaining acceptance as a public 
policy tool at all levels of government in the United States, especially since the 1980s. 
Prior to the 1980s, the term privatization was largely unknown in the United States, 
though Peter Drucker has been cited as having used the term “reprivatization” as far 
back as 1968 (Savas, 1987; Donahue, 1989). As far as its current usage is concerned, 
according to Donahue (1989), privatization has a foreign origin. Donahue (1989) 
provides the following account.
Privatization, as today’s fiscally ambitious, ideologically charged phenomenon,
began as a British import. English academics and Conservative party officials
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prepared a sweeping privatization agenda as Margaret Thatcher took office in 
1979, and the British government shed major assets and responsibilities 
throughout the 1980s. Conservative intellectuals in the United States set out to 
emulate the British example (p.4).
The British experience might have been influential on ideological grounds, but 
the method of privatization employed in Great Britain has little resemblance with the 
privatization scheme followed in the United States. Because of the absence of 
nationalized enterprises, the American economic structure required a public-private 
sector arrangement with government retaining some degree of involvement. 
Nonetheless, the contemporary privatization movement has the same intellectual 
origin regardless o f the mode of privatization used in different countries.
The Theory o f Privatization
Characteristics o f  Goods
In advanced economies, drawing a line between the government and the 
market system in supplying goods and services is somewhat difficult because of the 
differing nature o f goods and services that are available for human use. According to 
E. S. Savas, “the nature o f good determines the conditions needed to supply it” (Savas, 
2000, p.45). E.S. Savas classified goods and services based on exclusion and 
consumption characteristics. These characteristics allow “[distinguishing] private 
goods, public goods, and two intermediate kinds o f goods -  toll goods and common- 
pool goods” (Mikesell, 2007, p.3) as shown in Figure 2.1 below. Based on these 
intrinsic characteristics, it is possible to make privatization decisions and to choose the 
appropriate method of privatization.
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Private goods and services have several attributes: they are available for 
individual use, the quantities diminish as they are used, once they are sold to one 
individual, they cannot be made available to other individuals, payment must be made 
to use the good or service, those who do not pay are excluded. Goods and services 
with these properties are appropriate for market transactions. They can be supplied 
according to market principles of voluntary exchange between buyers and sellers. In a 
competitive market, ceteris paribus, the market forces o f demand and supply 
determine the market clearing (equilibrium) price resulting in an efficient allocations 
o f resources.
Consumption
Exhaustible
Exclusion Feasible
Private
Example: cars, food, television set.
Not feasible Intermediate (Common-Pool
Resources)
Example: fishing grounds, aquifers
Figure 2.1. Innate Characteristics of Goods and Services
Source: adapted with minor modification from Savas (2000); Mikesell (2007).
Examples of private goods and services include: cars, food, and hair cut (Savas, 1987; 
2000; Mikesell, 2007).
Public goods and services, on the other hand, are the polar opposite o f private 
goods; they can be used by many people concurrently at the same time without
Non-exhaustible
Intermediate (Toll 
Goods)
Example: Turnpikes, 
toll roads, motion 
pictures
Public
Example: National 
defense, justice system
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affecting the quantity and quality o f the goods or services. Furthermore, no one can be 
excluded from using the goods or services once they are provided; these features o f 
the public goods and services create incentives for free riders. Thus public goods and 
services pose transaction difficulties in fully functioning markets. Essentially, when 
non-payers cannot be excluded from using the good or service, a private business 
cannot successfully charge a price. People not paying (free-riders) would use the good 
or service as completely as those who paid leading to market failure. For this reason, 
the public realm (government) appears to be the appropriate venue for the transaction 
o f public goods and services. Examples o f public goods are: national defense, 
mosquito abetment, pollution control (Savas, 1987; 2000; Mikesell, 2007).
Toll goods and common-pool goods have one public-good characteristic but 
not both. Toll goods combine feasibility of exclusion and joint consumption attributes. 
Toll goods nonetheless are easier for market transactions. An individual can consume 
the service without reducing the amount or quality of service available for someone 
else, but nonpayers can certainly be excluded. Examples include drive-in movies and 
toll roads (Savas, 1987; 2000; Mikesell, 2007). Common-pool goods or services are 
natural resources that can be consumed individually and are exhaustible; but exclusion 
is not feasible. It is difficult to exercise exclusive ownership control over natural 
resource, and when used, the resource becomes unavailable for others, and it may be 
rapidly exhausted. Common-pool good or service requires government intervention 
because there is an element o f market failure. Examples are: aquifers, oil and gas 
deposits, and fisheries (Savas, 1987; 2000; Mikesell, 2007).
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The above classification scheme provides useful prototype to determine which 
goods and services to privatize and how to privatize them. But also political factor 
plays a role in the privatization decisions, in which case the innate characteristics o f 
the good may have less significance than what is suggested by the classification 
scheme. Savas (1987; 2000) pointed out that society might consider some goods or 
services worthy and other goods or services not worthy.
Worthy Goods
According to Savas (1987;2000), worthy goods are certain private and toll 
goods, such as food, education, and mass transit that society considers providing them 
to the public regardless o f the ability to pay. The exclusion feature o f the private 
goods and toll goods in this case doesn’t matter because government decides to 
provide the good or service either through direct production or subsidies. An example 
of a private good that is redefined or designated as a worthy good is food. Food is 
distributed to the poor at collective expenses in order to avoid starvation of people 
who do not have the financial wherewithal to take care o f themselves.
Although the worthy good argument contravenes the innate characteristics 
argument as the basis for privatization decisions, the classification scheme nonetheless 
offers clarity about the types of goods that state governments are heavily involved in 
providing them. E.S. Savas thus claims that “the big growth in government has taken 
place in expenditures for individual and toll goods” that are designated as worthy 
goods (Savas, 2000, p.62). Furthermore, identifying the nature of goods and services 
allows a role for government as a provider or producer o f the good or service in
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question. The issue of production verses provision is an important theme in the debate 
over privatization.
Production versus Provision
Practical and political reasons are offered to explain the inherent implications 
of privatizing production and privatizing provision based on the distinction made 
between the two concepts: production and provision. Kolderie (1986) differentiated 
the two concepts and the role government plays in the privatization decisions. He 
argued that production decision is less complicated because it involves “operating, 
delivering, running, doing, selling, administering” (p. 286), whereas provision 
decision is more complicated and political in nature because it involves “policy 
making, deciding, buying, requiring, regulating, franchising, financing, subsidizing” (p. 
286). Kolderie contends that “While [privatizing production] has its ideological side, 
most of it is intensely practical. It is very much a clash between competing producers, 
both of which want the government’s business” (Kolderie, 1986, p.287).
Kolderie saw privatizing production from the perspective o f competition. But it 
is also possible to conjecture other practical reasons; production is perhaps much 
easier to write the contract because specification of the good and its quantity and 
quality is less complicated. Politically, it is less controversial and perhaps less value­
laden because it involves no distributional decisions. On the other hand, privatizing 
provision is tantamount to selling assets to the private sector, which is one of the 
definitions of privatization, and allows no role for government. The scope for 
privatization that severs the relationship between government and the private sector in
63
the privatization arrangement is very limited and even less applicable in the U.S. 
because of the absence o f nationalized industries (Kolderie, 1986; Donahue, 1989). 
Moreover, providing public goods and services or what E.S. Savas called “worthy 
goods” has significant social and political implications, and for this reason, perhaps, 
provision decision remains in the public realm.
Since financing or payment regardless o f preferences or consumption is a 
unique feature of government provision, decision regarding provision involves 
distributional decisions that include what to provide, how much to provide, to whom 
to provide, where and when to provide; these are certainly value decisions, and, in a 
democratic society, only government has the legitimate authority to make such 
distributional decisions. Therefore, provision of some types of goods, especially 
public goods and services, or worthy goods, cannot be left to the vagaries o f the 
market without government intervention. Here the government certainly has a role 
to play.
As Kolderie (1986) pointed out: “Here privatization has come to mean mainly 
the government turning more to private producers for services for which government 
remains responsible and which government continues to finance” (p. 287). The author 
further underscores the fact that it is privatization of production not provision that 
allows government to maintain “its role as buyer, regulator, standard setter, or decision 
maker” (Kolderie, 1986, p.288). While this study does not emphasize the differences 
between the two concepts -  production and provision -  understanding the distinction 
between the two concepts is useful in order to have conceptual clarity, to avoid 
unnecessary confusion and analytical difficulties, and to appreciate the theoretical
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arguments between supporters and opponents o f privatization. It appears from the 
literature that the debate involves, by and large, privatization of production not 
provision of goods and services, and powerful arguments are offered by both 
proponents and opponents of privatization.
The Arguments For and Against Privatization
The review of the historical literature offers useful insights into the 
conservative nature of the privatization movement. The conservative ideological, 
political, and economic root of privatization certainly underpins the debates over 
privatization policy between supporters and opponents o f privatization. Nonetheless, 
in this section, this study highlights the arguments of the recent past, particularly since 
privatization became the prominent feature of the national policy agenda under the 
Reagan administration.
Arguments fo r  Privatization
Proponents of privatization invariably point to poor government performance 
and public dissatisfaction with government activities as the major reasons underlying 
the movement toward privatization. While acknowledging that public “complaints 
about poor government performance are commonplace throughout the world,” E.S. 
Savas asserts that “there is ample evidence that much of the dissatisfaction is justified” 
(Savas, 2000, p.l 11). The author listed several indicators o f poor performance ranging 
from government inefficiency to theft and corruption.
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According to Savas (2000), poor performances reflect “the fact that many 
government activities are performed by monopolies, which have little incentive to use 
resources efficiently or to use labor-saving practices and suffer no penalty for poor 
performance” (p.l 12). Advocates of privatization thus argue that government should 
privatize most public services to overcome the problems listed above, to break 
government monopoly, as well as to reduce the size and scope o f government. Savas
(1987) further argued that “privatization is the key to both limited and better 
government.. .in that society’s need are satisfied more efficiently, effectively, and 
equitably” (p.288).
The argument in favor of the private sector is premised on the existence of 
competition in the marketplace. Competition is central to supporters o f privatization; 
they assert that “the issue” that divides supporters and opponents “was not public 
versus private but monopoly versus competition [and] called for more competition in 
the public services” (Savas, 2000, p. xiv). Supporters o f privatization often invoke the 
efficiency and effectiveness attributes of the private sector to underscore the 
advantages o f privatizing public services. According to proponents of privatization, 
the major advantages of private over public organizations include: “less red tape and 
bureaucracy’’ (another way of saying less government), ‘’'’more competition, ” and 
more quality services (Allen, et al., 1989, p.4; italics in original); all these translate 
into lower costs to taxpayers, effectiveness in service delivery, responsiveness to the 
needs of the citizenry, and, of course, efficient allocations and utilizations o f public 
resources. Certainly proponents o f privatization make a powerful argument on 
theoretical grounds. They even point to some empirical evidence to support their
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claims of the benefits o f privatization. Likewise, opponents are equally persuasive in 
their arguments.
Arguments against Privatization
Opponents of privatization emphasize the frequent market failures that 
necessitate government intervention to stabilize the market and the economy as a 
whole. They point to many problems with privatization ranging from corruption to 
private monopoly, from higher costs to poor services, from creating market 
pathologies to diminishing accountability of government, from lower morale of 
government employees to lower wages, reduced benefits, and fear o f losing their jobs 
(AFSCME, n.d.; Morris, 2007; Kuttner, 1987; Sclar, 2000; Hodge, 2000).
According to critics of privatization, the major problems of using the private 
sector include: “potential fo r  corruption, incentives to reduce service quality, 
increased chance o f  service interruptions, and possible reduced access to services fo r  
the disadvantaged” (Allen, et. al, 1989, p.5-6; italics in original). Critics further 
question the wisdom of heavy reliance on the private sector (the marketplace) for the 
provision of public goods and services that are traditionally the domain of 
governments, arguing that the limitations and difficulties that are associated with 
government failures apply to the marketplace as well ( Sclar, 2000; Hodge, 2000).
In fact, studies show that there was opposition to privatization from many 
circles including the public at large. One of the ardent advocates o f privatization, E.S. 
Savas himself noted that supporters of privatization “encounter only four sources o f 
opposition -  to put it whimsically: workers, public officials, business interests, and the
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general public” (Sava, 2000, p.286). Nonetheless, with the ascendance of the 
conservative regime in the 1980s, the advocates o f privatization managed to have 
considerable sway and their arguments and positions prevailed. The question however 
is that, in the albescence of consensus about the benefits and effectiveness or 
privatization, why do governments want to privatize?
To frame the question slightly differently: what objectives do advocates o f 
privatization want government to accomplish through privatization? Privatization is 
global in scope, and the objectives that governments seek to accomplish through 
privatization are likely to vary from country to country and from government to 
government within a country, depending, in large part, on the ideology of the party in 
power (Boix, 1997). In general, however, privatization programs have several 
objectives, and governments seek to accomplish one or more of these objectives.
Savas (2000) offered a long list of objectives of privatization programs that even 
include a foreign policy component (see Appendix A). The objectives are many and 
varied, but, at least in the context of the United States, a few of them stand out clearly 
as the primary factors that motivate policymakers to privatize at all levels of 
government. Some of the reasons are discussed next.
Reasons Why Governments Privatize
Multiple reasons are offered why governments privatize. In the United States, 
in large part, state and local governments adopt privatization policy for pragmatic 
reasons, that is, to alleviate their fiscal crises (Donahue, 1989). For example, Allen et 
al. (1989) noted that state and local governments “use the private sector [as] one
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potential way to contain costs and improve services” (p.2). Similarly, focusing on 
prison privatization, Price and Riccucci (2005) sought to understand the reasons why 
state governments privatize. They asked: “Why do state policy makers decide to 
privatize their prisons?” (p. 231). The authors found out that “The conventional 
response by political and appointed policy leaders has consistently and unequivocally 
been to save costs” (p.231).
In general, studies show that state and local governments’ privatization 
schemes focus primarily on few critical areas. Allen et al. (1989) provided six reasons: 
1. to obtaining special skills or supplement staff for short periods, 2. to meet demands 
beyond current government capacity, 3. to reduce costs, 4. to improve service quality,
5. to provide clients with more choice ofproviders and levels o f service, and 6. 
ideology (p.4; italics in original). Survey information also shed some light regarding 
the reasons why governments privatize. For example, in the context o f local 
governments, the International City/County Managers Association (ICMA) conducts a 
national survey every five years to find out why governments privatize. Table 2.1 
below presents the results o f surveys for 1997, 2002, and 2007.
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Table 2.1 Reasons Why Local Governments Are Interested In Privatization*
Percent of local governments reporting 
reasons for considering privatization for 
the three different survey years
Reason 1997 2002 2007
External fiscal pressures, including restrictions 
placed on raising taxes, e.g., Proposition 13 44 50 50
Internal attempts to decrease costs of service 
delivery
87 88 87
State or federal mandates tied to 
intergovernmental financing
11 10 10
Changes in political climate emphasizing a 
decreased role for government
25 16 14
Active citizen group favoring privatization 7 6 4
Unsolicited proposals presented by potential 
service providers
21 21 16
Concerns about government liability 12 13 10
Other 10 13 12
♦The table information is compiled from aggregate survey results o f local government service delivery 
choices for 1997, 2002, and 2007. Percentage is rounded to a whole number. A fraction less than .5 is 
dropped, but a fraction of .5 or more is rounded to the next whole number.
Source: Alternative Service Delivery in Local Government, Aggregate Survey Results, International 
City/County Managers Association (ICMA). Retrieved June 12, 2011 from 
http://icma.org/en/results/surveving/survev research/survey results
The results of the surveys show that internal efforts to reduce costs are cited as 
the main reasons why local governments privatize, accounting for 87% in 1997, 88% 
in 2002, and 87% in 2007. External fiscal pressures are the second strongest reason 
(about 50 %). On the other hand, federal mandates account for less than 11 %, and 
active citizens favoring privatization declined from 7% in 1997 to 4% in 2007. As the 
survey results suggest, overall, cost savings figures prominently as the principal reason 
why governments privatize. Although ICMA’s survey does not address state level
70
privatization, the survey results nonetheless provide useful information pertaining to 
the primary reasons why governments privatize.
Also, at state level, many studies reveal that cost savings is the main reason 
for privatization. For example, the Council of State Governments (CSG) conducted a 
nationwide survey of state government officials in 2002 and found cost savings to be 
the principal reason why governments privatize. The results of the survey showed that 
cost savings accounted for 68.4% followed by lack of state personnel or expertise, 
which accounted for 53.9% of the responses from state budget and legislative staffs 
(Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004). Another study in 1997 by the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) of six governments showed cost reductions to be largely the primary 
reason for government-wide privatization efforts. See Table 2.2 below.
Table 2.2 Primary Reasons for Government-wide Privatization Efforts
Government Prim ary reasons
Georgia Limit growth o f government 
Reduce scope o f government 
Improve government efficiency
Massachusetts Reduce state budget deficit
Reduce costs o f  government services
Improve quality o f government services
Michigan Reduce the state’s budget deficit 
Shrink size and scope o f government
New York Reduce size and scope o f government
Reduce cost and improve the quality of government services
Virginia Improve services and productivity of government services 
Reduce cost o f operations
Indianapolis (Indiana) Reduce size and scope o f government
Increase the quality and decrease the cost o f services
Source: GAO (1997). PRIVATIZATIONS: Lessons Learned by State and Local Governments, 
GAO/GGD-97-48, p. 26-32
71
The survey results summarized above are consistent with the core argument in 
the literature that, as Van Slyke (2003) notes, “States and municipalities have 
privatized services in an effort to improve their cost-effectiveness and quality” (p.296) 
These studies are just part of a plethora of research studies that provide support to the 
claims that cost reduction is the main reason, if not the only reason, why governments 
privatize.
The question is, how efficient and effective has privatization been in reducing costs? 
To address this question, a summary of selected empirical studies is presented below.
An Overview of Selected Empirical Studies
Many program-specific empirical studies that sought to estimate the gains from 
privatization can be found in the literature. The types o f programs investigated in the 
literature are too numerous to cover here, and mentioning only a few major studies 
will suffice for the purpose of this study. With this caveat, this researcher looks at a 
few major studies that have been cited repeatedly in many books and scholarly journal 
articles dealing with the issue o f efficiency, effectiveness, as well as the cost 
differentials between the public and the private sectors in the provision of goods and 
services.
Kettl (1993; 1988) has examined both the efficiency and effectiveness of 
privatization at the federal level. For example, he cites the case o f the “Divad,” an 
anti-aircraft weapon procured by the Pentagon in the early 1980s to protect armored 
vehicles on the battlefield from enemy aircraft and helicopters (Kettl, 1988). Even 
though the weapon failed to meet most o f the requirements issued by the Army, the
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contractor rigged the tests and falsified data to suggest the weapons system would 
work better than it actually did. The Army invested $1.8 billion in the program and 
bought some 65 of the guns before cancelling the program. In another case, Kettl
(1988) describes the 1985 crash of a contracted airplane carrying 248 soldiers that 
crashed in Gander, Newfoundland, killing all aboard. A subsequent investigation 
showed that not only did the airplane’s operators ignore important safety regulations; 
they also discovered that the aircraft had a history of severe maintenance problems 
that would have grounded a commercial passenger airliner.
In a third case, Kettl (1993) describes the illegal disposal o f nuclear waste by 
Rockwell International at the Rocky Flats, Colorado weapons production facility. In 
this case, the FBI raided the facility and seized records from both Rockwell and the 
US Department of Energy, the responsible government agency. Rockwell later paid 
huge fines to clean up the radioactive waste. While these examples do not speak 
directly to efficiency and cost savings, they do reflect an important question of 
value—did government get its money’s worth through these arrangements? Whether 
there was any cost savings involved, the evidence suggests that the broader goals of 
government were not well served. One may reasonably argue that the effectiveness of 
the goods or services purchased was, at best, compromised. Weapons that cannot 
meet their mission requirements, poorly maintained private aircraft that crash and kill 
soldiers, and companies that pollute important groundwater sources with deadly 
radiation are not examples o f effective service.
Heilman and Johnson (1992) also addressed the questions o f efficiency and 
effectiveness in their study o f seven privatized wastewater treatment plants in the US.
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They reported mixed results; the construction costs for four of the seven plants were 
above estimates. A closer examination o f their data reveals that a variety o f factors 
work simultaneously to increase and reduce costs, making any specific determination 
of cost savings problematic. In terms of the effectiveness question, Heilman and 
Johnson report that the most important factor in the operation of the privatized 
treatment plants was the specificity of the contract regime that governed the overall 
satisfaction (a proxy for effectiveness) of the partners in the arrangement.
Savas (1987; 2000) provides summaries o f several empirical investigations 
ranging from specific programs to a general survey of public officials. Two of these 
studies reported by E.S.Savas are included herein. The first involves a summary o f 
program-specific nine major empirical studies conducted over a period of ten years, 
most of them prior to the 1980s. The studies covered “the United States, Canada, 
Switzerland, and Japan, as well as regional studies in Connecticut, California, and the 
Midwestern United Sates” (Savas, 1987, p. 124). Two researchers, Savas and Stevens, 
conducted the study in the United States using a 1974 data for city sizes ranging from 
2,500 to 720,000. The study investigated the relative efficiency between municipal 
and private residential refuse collection and found that contract collection for cities 
larger than 50,000 residents cost 29% to 37% less than municipal collection (Savas 
and Stevens 1975; cited in Savas 1987, p. 126). Savas summarized the findings as 
follows:
• A municipal budget director has to allocate 35 percent more money for municipal 
collection than for contract collection of equivalent quality.
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• A resident has to pay 58 percent more for municipal collection than for contract 
collection, after taking into consideration the tax rebate he receives indirectly from 
the contractor.
• It costs the municipal agency 88 percent more to perform the same work; that is, 
the agency is much less productive. (Savas 1987, p. 124).
The next case involves a summary o f a 1987 nationwide survey of public 
officials of local governments. According to Savas (2000), three-quarters o f U.S. 
local governments had saved money by contracting out services to the private sector 
providers. Savas summarized the responses of 450 respondents and reported the 
following figures: “11 percent reported savings o f 40 percent or more, 41 percent 
reported savings o f 20 percent or more, and 80 percent reported savings o f at least 10 
percent” (P. 148).
In 1984, a study sponsored by the Department o f Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) found that private contractors were 50 percent more efficient 
than municipal agencies (Sclar, 2000; Savas, 1987; 2000; Donahue, 1989). The HUD- 
sponsored 1984 study, led by economist Barbara J. Stevens, examined twenty cities of 
comparable size within metropolitan Los Angeles. Ten o f these cities were served by 
municipalities and the other ten were served by private contractors. Then the study 
compared the efficiency of these two categories o f cities on eight different services 
ranging from building janitorial services to asphalt overlay construction. The results 
revealed that private contractors provided services at a much lower cost than the direct 
services provided by municipal agencies. The reported cost savings range from 96 
percent for asphalt overlay construction to 37 percent for street tree maintenance.
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These savings represent about 5 percent o f the municipal budgets (Sclar, 2000). Some 
scholars have questioned the validity and generalizability o f the findings o f this study 
on methodological grounds (Sclar, 2000; Donahue, 1989).
The results of the above studies do not appear to support unequivocally the 
gains from privatization in terms of cost reductions. However, the 2002 nationwide 
survey conducted by the Council of State Governments (CSG) provides a different 
picture about the gains in cost savings. On cost savings, Chi, Arnold, & Perkins (2004) 
reported the responses o f two groups of officials-state budget and legislative staffs 
and line agency heads from the 2002 CSG survey. According to this study, “Most 
budget and legislative service agency directors reported on savings from privatization 
to be 5 percent or less. But many of them could not answer whether privatization 
saved their state agency money or not, while 18 percent said it has resulted in no 
savings.... [ Also] 29 percent o f agency heads reported cost savings to be more than 
15 percent, and 33 percent of the agency heads reported no savings from privatization” 
(Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, P. 14).
Cost savings also varies from program to program or from agency to agency. 
For example, about 39 percent o f the transportation agency directors who responded to 
the survey said their cost savings from privatization was less than one percent, while 
36.5% percent said they did not know; 2.4 percent reported cost savings between 11 
and 15 percent, and another 2.4 percent said their cost savings was over 15 percent.
The cost savings trend for all other agencies covered by the survey is similar to the 
responses given by transportation agency directors, with only minor variations (see 
Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p. 17-18). Also, in their empirical investigation of the
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determinants o f state prison privatization decisions, Price and Riccucci (2005) found 
that “the fiscal and economic variables are not determinants of prison privatization.... 
Rather, the factors that seem to better explain why states privatize their prisons relate 
more to politics and ideology” (p. 229).
The empirical studies reviewed in the preceding sections provide conflicting 
results. Some o f the findings provide compelling evidence about cost savings and 
confirm the advantages o f the private contractors. The weight of the evidence in favor 
of privatization is so overwhelming as to render the debate over privatization mute. 
Taking the findings of the studies at face value, one would conclude that state and 
local governments have much to gain from privatization. Privatization can indeed be a 
panacea to cure all their financial problems. However, other studies throw doubts 
about the efficiency of the private contractors. Even the validity and generalizability of 
the findings confirming cost savings have been questioned on methodological grounds.
The bottom line, however, is that the empirical studies are at variance with the 
theoretical argument that advocates often employ to support privatization. Brudney et 
al.(2005) point out that “empirical studies differ substantially in regard to the amount 
of cost savings achieved and, in some instances, whether any savings (or even cost 
increases) might be forthcoming” (p.395). In fact, in some situations, “direct public 
service” can provide better services at low cost (Brudney et al., 2005). In light o f this 
empirical ambiguity, it is perhaps reasonable to question the wisdom of continuing 
debating the efficiency gains from privatization. But advocates of privatization argue 
that the “appropriate policy environment must be in place in order to achieve the 
intended objectives.... The elements o f an ideal policy environment are the familiar
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ones o f a competitive market economy” (Savas, 2000, p. 124). Savas (2000) then 
provided a long list o f the elements o f an ideal policy environment that would induce 
efficient and effective privatization as shown in Table 2.3 below.
Table 2.3 Elements of an Ideal Policy Environment
• Market prices without price controls or subsidies
• The right to own property and to exercise property rights
• No government barriers to entry by competitors and no protectionism
• Equal application and enforcement of laws, including the tax code and contract law, 
within a fair, comprehensive, independent legal system
• No favoritism by government in providing access to credit and foreign exchange
• No favoritism by government in selling raw materials or purchasing products
• Market-based interest rates, not preferential rates on government loans
• Freedom for the newly privatized firm to hire and fire employees, subject to equal 
application of labor laws and the privatization agreement
• Freedom for the private firm to restructure or change the business, subject to the 
privatization agreement
• Political stability
• Currency stability and control inflation
Source: Savas, 2000, p.124-125.
These are elements that few countries can achieve. E.S. Savas was certainly 
aware of the impossibility of achieving these elements o f an ideal policy environment 
when he said: “Needless to say, nowhere is such an ideal policy fully in place” (Savas, 
2000, p. 125). While some of the elements are less applicable in the context o f U.S. 
privatization, the existence of market competition is nonetheless central to the 
efficiency, effectiveness, and cost savings arguments. The belief in the existence of 
competition in the private sector underpins the push for privatizing public services. 
The cost savings argument is based primarily on the premise that the private sector is 
more efficient and effective than the public sector in allocating resources through the 
market mechanism of competition. The key assumption here is the existence of
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competition. As Van Slyke (2003) noted, “Each o f the arguments for privatization is 
grounded in an assumption that competition exists” (p.297).
Competition is certainly the cornerstone o f private sector economy. In an ideal 
competitive environment, prices are regulated in the marketplace through the supply 
of and demand for goods and services leading to an efficient allocation of resources. In 
a market where competition exists, a given output can be produced or attained at the 
lowest possible cost (McNamara and Morris, 2008). Hence, governments engage in a 
variety of privatization arrangements to take advantage of the competitive 
environment in the private sector in order to achieve the public goals at the lowest 
possible cost to taxpayers.
Yet critics point out that the existence of competition is questionable for a 
number of reasons including: environmental constraints, actions by private 
organization, network relationships, and government-enacted barriers (Van Slyke,
2003 ; Morris, 2007). Developing competition is further complicated because of the 
fact that the public and private sectors appear to have conflicting values -  divergent 
goals, competing incentives, political and bureaucratic realities (McNamara and 
Morris, 2008; Van Slyke, 2003); these issues undermine the abilities of agencies “ to 
manage contract relationships and provide meaningful oversight that mitigates fraud, 
waste, and abuse” (Van Slyke, 2003, p.307).
Furthermore, Morris (2007) argues that privatization may create pathologies 
that “combine elements of government and market failures”. By adding new 
“pathologies” to existing pathologies that characterize government and market failures, 
privatization complicates the nature o f the principal-agent relationship, the manner
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outputs are measured, and the flexibility o f the private actor. In a case study involving 
prison privatization in the state of Mississippi, the author identified three pathologies 
(Morris, 2007). First, privatization added a new level o f complexity to the principal- 
agent arrangement that forces the principal to assume the roles o f both principal and 
agent simultaneously. Government serves as an agent to the people and as a principal 
to the private contractor; this additional layer of principal-agent arrangement creates a 
new pathology, complicating monitoring problems such as opportunistic and rent- 
seeking behaviors normally associated with agents and principals respectively; it 
further complicates problems related to accountability such as information asymmetry.
The second pathology that privatization creates refers to the problem of 
measuring output. While some services such as clients served, potholes filled are 
relatively easy to measure, other services such as quality and effectiveness do not lend 
themselves to easy measurement that can readily be reduced to numerical indices.
The difficulty in valuing output is unlikely to be solved in the privatized arrangement. 
The third pathology refers to government’s imposition of strong accountability 
mechanism (rules and regulation) on the privatized arrangement to prevent 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the agent. The imposition of rules and 
regulations can undermine the market efficiency that the government hopes to take 
advantage of through the privatized arrangement. These three pathologies reinforce 
each other and blur the lines between government and market failures (see Morris, 
2007, p.318-335). The implication of the study by Morris (2007) is that privatization 
may not necessarily produce the desired results not only because of the obvious
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existence of government and market failures, but also because o f the addition of 
“hybrid” pathologies that privatization arrangement creates.
In short, creating all the elements o f an ideal policy environment for 
privatization to work, as suggested by Savas (2000), seems to be an impossible task.
As far as competition is concerned, scholars have argued that many factors including 
environmental constraints, interest groups, and other related factors complicate the 
development o f competitive market (Van Slyke, 2003; Morris, 2007; McNamara and 
Morris, 2008). Privatization could not produce an unambiguous result in terms of cost 
reductions because of the fact that the appropriate environment, namely, competitive 
marketplace did not exist.
The mixed results of the empirical studies reviewed underscore the fact that the 
perceived benefits and superiority o f the private sector/the marketplace could not be 
confirmed consistently. This means in effect that the mixed empirical evidence cannot 
be fully relied on as a guide for privatization decisions, which leads one to ask: In the 
absence of unequivocal empirical evidence to support the cost savings arguments, why 
do state governments continue to privatize? The literature reviewed thus far provides 
useful insights to identify the potential answer to the aforementioned question.
Indeed, the review of the literature suggests that socioeconomic, economic, 
political, and ideological factors may have been the likely drivers o f privatization 
policy. Yet states show wide variations in their privatization efforts, and it is not clear 
the extent to which these factors influence the levels o f state government privatization. 
There is little empirical research that examined the influence of socioeconomic, 
economic, political, and ideological factors on the level o f state privatization
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initiatives. As mentioned earlier, this study seeks to contribute to state comparative 
research in general and to the contemporary privatization theory in particular by filling 
this gap in the literature. The factors that have been identified in the literature as the 
potential drivers o f privatization are summarized below; their expected relationships 
with the level of state government privatization are also described and working 
hypotheses are developed.
Factors Influencing the Level o f State Government Privatization
The major concepts employed in this study for predicting the levels of state 
government privatization are derived from the review of the literature. Based on the 
review of the literature, 14 variables have been identified and classified under four 
major categories o f factors: socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological 
factors. Following the definitions in Chapter I, the concepts are further described and 
operationalized using measures for each of the above factors, and the relationships 
between these measures and the dependent variable are hypothesized. One dependent 
variable and 14 independent variables are employed to develop several research 
hypotheses to be tested by this study.
Research Hypotheses 
Socioeconomic Model 
Socioeconomic factors are operationalized using three variables: state health 
care spending, state pension spending, and state per capita personal income.
According to Oldfield (2003), socioeconomic is a term used interchangeably with
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social class or class since these terms “entail notions o f comparative rank, usually 
based on income, education, and wealth” (p.441). And discussions o f socioeconomic 
factors often involve understanding and explaining the effects of socioeconomic status 
(SES) on the wellbeing of individuals in society. Oldfield (2003) cited several studies 
in the literature showing the connection between socioeconomic status and various life 
outcomes in many areas such as health care, education, income and wealth, and 
highlighted numerous government programs to help the lower classes and “to assure 
greater social equity” (p.451).
As the review o f the literature reveals, the U.S. government created many 
entitlement programs to address the plight of the poor and the disadvantaged people 
including the elderly during the New Deal years o f the 1930s (for example, Social 
Security, Unemployment Compensation, Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
[AFDC], Aid to Aged, Blind, and Disabled, now called Supplemental Security Income 
or SSI) and the Great Society years o f the 1960s (for example, food stamps, Medicare, 
Medicaid) (Dye, 1998). However, the proliferations o f entitlement programs led to the 
growth and expansion of the public sector that became a target of criticism and 
spawned the contemporary privatization movement that sought to reduce the size and 
scope of the public sector as well as to reduce costs of providing goods and services.
Over the past several years, privatization was embraced by state governments, 
among other things, to reduce costs as well as to reduce the role o f government in the 
provision of goods and services; but the extent to which these goals are achieved 
through privatization still remains an empirical question that needs to be investigated. 
Thus, to determine the level o f state government privatization that are likely to be
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accounted for by socioeconomic factors, state health care spending, state pension 
spending and state per capita personal income are employed to test the relationship 
between socioeconomic factor and the levels o f state government privatization .
State Health Care Spending
As noted earlier, one of the legacies of the Great Society era was the 
development of health care system (Medicare and Medicaid) to alleviate the 
socioeconomic hardships of people o f lower socioeconomic status. Both Medicare 
and Medicaid were enacted in 1965 as an amendment to the Social Security Act o f 
1935 (Dye, 1998). While Medicare is designed for the aged (elderly) and is directly 
under the purview of the federal government, “Medicaid is a combined federal and 
state program, [and] states exercise fairly broad administrative powers and carry about 
half of the financial burden” (Dye, 1998, p. 134); Medicaid is a welfare program 
designed for needy people and the money is paid from the general tax revenues; states 
establish the eligibility requirements as well as the level o f benefits to be paid to 
recipients (Dye, 1998).
Over time, however, the growth of state health care expenditures raised 
concerns about the rising costs of providing health care services. For example, 
according to Levit et al. (2003), state Medicaid expenditures represented “an average 
of 20 percent o f spending” resulting in a significant “budgetary shortfalls in fiscal year 
2001 for state governments” (P. 156). Also, U.S. Census, Statistical Abstract o f the 
United States (2004-2005) reported that the combined state and local government 
medical care expenditures rose from $24.9 billion in 1980 to $258.7 in 2002, which is
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an increase o f about 939 percent. Medicaid accounted for much of the increase in 
expenditures rising from $23.9 billion in 1980 to $250.0 billion in 2002 representing a 
change of 949 percent in 22 years (Statistical Abstract o f the United States, 2004 -
2005).
Health care became a target of reform to control the rising costs as well as to
expand access (Dye, 1998), and many states privatized some of their health care
services as a cost saving mechanism (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004). But empirical
studies are scant regarding the influence o f health care expenditures on the levels of
state privatization efforts. This study therefore tests the extent to which heath care
expenditures predict the level of state government privatization.
Hypothesis 1: States with higher health care expenditures are more likely to have 
higher level of state government privatization than states with lower health care 
expenditures.
State Pension Spending
State pension systems also began taking root during the Great Depression to 
provide retirement security to elderly Americans (Almeida and Boivie, 2009). 
According to Almeida and Boivie (2009), state and local public sector employees were 
not included in the 1935 Social Security system, and states established their own 
retirement system to provide a secure source of income for their retirees; “45 states 
had retirement systems in place by 1961” (Almeida and Boivie, 2009, p. 154).
Today, state and local pension coverage is widespread, and many teachers, 
public safety personnel, and other public employees count on state and local 
government pension systems for a secure source o f income for retirement (Almeida 
and Boivie, 2009; Munnell, Aubry, and Muldoon, 2008). Public sector pensions are
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primarily defined benefit plans and cover a significant number o f workers. For 
example, in 2006, almost 80 percent of the state and local workers age 25-64 were 
covered by some type of pensions o f which defined benefit plans accounted for a full 
80 percent o f public sector participants (Munnell, Aubry, and Muldoon, 2008).
Some studies show that in the last couple of decades, many state and local 
governments have expanded generous retirement benefits to their workers (Edwards, 
2010), which help retirees maintain a standard of living similar or close to their pre­
retirement level. From the perspective o f social equity advocates, state pension plans 
provide additional safety net to prevent some retirees from falling into poverty.
Edward (2010), however, contends that since defined benefit pensions are essentially 
differed payments, policymakers have been able to expand benefit packages over the 
past several years with little short-term budgetary impact; but the expanded benefits 
have been largely unfunded and “have built up large liabilities in employee pension 
plans” (p. 92), eventually adding to the growth of state budget shortfalls in the long 
run.
Also, the Council of State Governments (CSG) reported that the majority of 
public pension plans are underfunded or unfunded and have constrained states’ ability 
to finance their public pensions and health care expenditures (CSG, 2007). Growing 
pension liabilities and increasing health care expenditures have exasperated state 
budget crises requiring major budget reforms and cuts. Although the state employee 
pension system has been designed to alleviate the financial hardships o f retirees and 
has been an integral part of state programs since the Great Depression, it has
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nonetheless been found to contribute to the fiscal crises that government faced in the 
last 20 or 30 years.
As a response to the growing fiscal crises, state officials have adopted many 
strategies such as trimming employee pension benefits, moving employee benefits 
away from defined benefit plans to defined contributions such as 401(k) plan, 
delivering public services more efficiently, privatizing services when feasible, cutting 
staffing levels, and terminating low-value programs (CSG, 2007; Edwards, 2010). Yet, 
existing empirical studies have not tested the impact of pension spending on the level 
o f state government privatization in the literature, which this study seeks to 
accomplish.
Hypothesis 2: States with higher pension spending are more likely to have higher 
level o f state government privatization than states with lower pension spending.
State Per-Capita Personal Income
Writing as far back as 1974, David O. Porter and Teddie Wood Porter noted the 
views of the time that “by transferring more governmental services and goods to those 
with lower incomes, [government can serve as] the vehicle for smoothing out gross 
inequalities of opportunity” (Porter and Porter, 1974, p. 36). Aside from smoothing out 
inequalities, politicians appear to respond to the demands of voters if  politicians perceive 
that the outcomes of their election or reelection efforts are likely to be swayed or 
influenced by those voters who demand changes.
For example, as detailed in the literature review, during the Great Society years, 
the Democratic administration sought to line up the interests of the Democratic Party 
with the policies that promoted antipoverty programs for urban blacks at the time
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because the Democratic Party saw that urban blacks had become important in terms of 
determining the outcome of presidential elections (Piven and Cloward, 2005). As Porter 
and Porter (1974) succinctly put it: “On the self-interest side, politicians have found it 
profitable to respond to large or new blocks of voters demanding redistributions o f 
resources” (p. 36). Recent studies have also supported the argument that politicians 
respond to the needs of low-income voters to gamer their votes in an election (see Soss 
et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 2007).
The theoretical arguments suggest that per capita personal income can be used as 
an indicator of state policy decisions; and there is an extensive empirical research in the 
literature that examined the association o f per capita personal income and state policy 
outcomes. Many researchers in state comparative studies have conducted empirical 
studies to test the relationships between per capita personal income and state policy 
decisions in many areas of public policy, such as tax policy, privatization policy, health 
care policy, welfare policy, and education policy (Berry and Berry, 1992; Price and 
Riccucci, 2005; Soss et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 2007). For example, Berry and Berry 
(1992) tested four tax adoption models using probit maximum likelihood estimates. The 
models included per capita personal income as one of the predictor variables and four 
dependent variables for four different time periods (income-tax for 1919-37, gasoline tax 
for 1919-29, any tax for 1919-39 and any tax for 1960-71).
The authors found a positive association between per capita personal income and 
tax adoption for “any tax” variable for the 1960-71 time periods, supporting their 
hypothesis that greater state per capita personal income results in a greater likelihood of 
a tax adoption by state policymakers. For the three other variables and time periods, the
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statistical results show negative associations between per capita personal income and tax
adoptions, which suggest that “greater per capita personal income is associated with a
lower probability of a tax adoption” (Berry and Berry, 1992, p.734).
Other studies have also examined the association between per capita personal
income and state policy decisions. For example, in their study of the determinants of
state privatization decisions, Price and Riccucci (2005) found per capita personal
income not to be a significant determinant o f prison privatization decision.
Nonetheless, both the theoretical arguments and the empirical results demonstrate the
validity of per capita personal income as a measure of state policy outcomes.
Assuming everything else being equal, it can be argued that states with higher per
capita personal income are more likely to collect more money in taxes and have
greater capacity to provide more goods and services to its citizens without resorting to
privatization. On the other hand states with lower per capita personal income are less
likely to generate sufficient revenues to meet the needs o f its citizens and may resort to
privatization scheme. Thus, the association between per capita personal income and
the level o f state government privatization can be hypothesized as follows.
Hypothesis 3: States with higher per capita personal income are more likely to have 
lower level of state government privatization than states with lower per capita personal 
income.
Economic Model
The economic factor is operationalized using state labor costs, state per capita 
spending, state fiscal capacity, and state deficits variables.
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State Labor Cost
Public employees’ compensations have been partly blamed for growing budget 
crises that states continue to face. According to the U.S. Census Bureau data, the 
payrolls o f state employees increased from $4.29 billion in 1980 to $14.84 billion in 
2002 representing an increase of 245.92 percent. For the same time period, the 
payrolls for local governments increased from $10.45 billion in 1980 to $37.49 billion 
in 2002, a change of 258.76 percent. Over all, the combined state and local payrolls 
increased by about 255 percent (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2006). While 
these figures appear to be large in absolute terms, it is not necessarily correct to 
conclude that they are excessive if the growth of population and the adjustment for 
inflation are factored in the calculation.
However, when employee benefits such as retirement benefits that include 
defined pension plans discussed earlier are added to the payrolls, the contributions of 
employee compensations to state budget shortfalls could be considerable. Furthermore, 
some researchers contend that unions push the costs of the state and local workforce 
because there are more unions in the public sector than the private sector (Edwards, 
2010). In his study of the costs of unionizations for states, Edwards (2010) found that 
“California’s 62 percent unionization rate translated into a statewide boost in public 
sector compensation costs of more than 10 percent” (p. 109). Similarly, Kodrzycki 
(1998) conducted an empirical study where she found that privatization in the form of 
contracting out was more prevalent in cities and towns paying high wages to their own 
employees. Sawicky (1998) also highlighted that “higher labor costs point more 
explicitly to increased level o f public spending and taxes” (p. 107).
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The growing budgetary crises have constrained states’ ability to provide goods 
and services to their citizens, and as indicated earlier, state policymakers have sought 
to curtail the growth of labor costs by adopting strategies that included, but not limited 
to, changing labor laws that contain collective bargaining provisions, cutting staffs and 
benefits, and privatizing services when possible (Edwards, 2010). Although 
privatization of services is invariably invoked as a means to tackle state financial 
crises, there is no empirical study that examined the association between labor costs 
and the level of state government privatization. Given the argument that labor costs 
(public employee compensations) contribute to budget shortfalls, the following 
hypothesis can be tested.
Hypothesis 4: States with higher labor costs are more likely to have higher level o f 
state government privatization than states with lower labor costs.
State Per Capita Spending
In 2002, the aggregate direct general expenditures on state and local 
government functions amounted to $6.01 billion on per capita basis, which is almost 
twice the level spent in 1990 ($3.36 billion) (Statistical Abstract o f the United States,
2006). Compared to the level of 1990, the 2002 per capita spending represents nearly 
79 percent increase in just 12 years. However, the aggregation conceals the existence 
of wide variations in per capita spending among the states. For example, in fiscal year 
2007, state per capita spending ranges from a low of $3,831 for Texas to a high of 
$13,508 for Alaska (U.S. Census, Tax Foundation, 2007). The data show that per 
capita spending has grown significantly over time and its effect on privatization 
decisions has been investigated empirically. In her study of the impact o f fiscal
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pressures on the privatization of local services, Kodrzycki (1998), for example, found 
that “High and/or rising per capita expenditures on police and fire were associated 
with a lower tendency to privatize service delivery, all else equal” (p.46; italics in 
original). Since police and fire services are not targets o f privatization, the result does 
not invalidate the basic hypothesis that higher per capita spending is likely to lead to 
more privatization.
Hypothesis 5: States with higher per capita spending are more likely to have higher 
level of state government privatization than states with lower per capita spending.
State Fiscal Capacity
Many studies have examined the impact o f fiscal capacity on privatization 
decisions (Berry and Berry, 1992; Price and Riccucci, 2005; Kodrzycki, 1998). More 
often the assumption is that higher fiscal capacity may mean greater state capacity to 
provide goods and services without incurring budget deficits; a corollary to this is that 
low fiscal capacity is likely to lead to additional costs that might require raising taxes 
or cutting services. Because of the unpopularity o f tax increases, politicians are less 
likely to adopt new taxes and may resort to privatization as an alternative to raising 
taxes in order to control the costs associated with the provision of goods and services 
to citizens.
There are many empirical studies that have examined the associations between 
fiscal capacity and state policy decisions. Among these are two studies cited earlier; 
one by Berry and Berry (1992) and the other by Price and Riccucci (2005). For 
example, Berry and Berry (1992) found a negative association between fiscal capacity 
and tax adoption supporting their “proposition that the poorer the fiscal health o f a
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state’s government, the more likely it is to adopt a new tax” (p.732). Intuitively, the 
conclusion appears to be logical, but, as indicated earlier, for many politicians raising 
taxes is in many cases politically unpalatable.
Also, Price and Riccucci (2005) examined the effect of fiscal capacity on state 
prison privatization and found fiscal capacity to be insignificant. Although the authors 
concluded that “fiscal conditions and economic factors do not explain why states may 
choose to privatize” (p.229), their investigation is confined to prison privatization and 
their conclusion cannot be safely generalized to other types of privatization including 
corrections other than prisons. In fact, numerous studies have found both positive and 
negative associations between fiscal/economic factors and state privatization decisions 
(Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Pouder, 1996; Kodrzycki, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005). For 
example, in a study that involved a two-stage process o f corrections privatization, 
Nicholson-Crotty (2004) examined the impact o f different variables that included 
various measures of economic factors on state correction privatization decisions.
The first model tested the factors that influence the adoption of enabling 
legislations by state legislatures or governors, and the second model tested the factors 
influencing administrators and managers to make decisions to privatize corrections; 
the researcher found that in the first case “not a single economic factor has a 
significant influence on the privatization decision.. .whereas in the second stage 
[e]conomic factors play a significant role in the corrections privatization process” (p. 
52).
Indeed, fiscal imperatives have been the most widely cited reasons for the rise 
of privatization; and governments have continued to justify their decisions to privatize
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on the basis o f fiscal imperatives. Yet there is little research that examined the level of 
state government privatization on a comprehensive manner that takes into account 
several classes of services simultaneously. This study will test the following 
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6: States with higher fiscal capacity are more likely to have lower level of 
state government privatization than states with lower fiscal capacity
State Deficits
Although subtle differences can be discerned between deficits and fiscal 
capacity, the two concepts are intertwined or closely related, and variables used to 
define and operationalize fiscal capacity can also be used to operationalize deficits. In 
view of this, the quantitative research and results cited for fiscal capacity variable 
above are equally valid to the discussion of the impact o f deficits on privatization 
decisions. With this caveat, some of the theoretical arguments about deficits are 
highlighted below.
Literature reveals that governments at all levels incur budget deficits for at 
least three main reasons: 1) slow economic growth or recession, 2) increased demand 
for services by the public, and 3) lack of public support for tax increases; these factors 
create fiscal imbalances often leading to large budget deficits; this is particularly the 
case in state and local governments (Henton and Waldhom, 1984). The increasing 
public demands for more services without additional costs coupled with the unfunded 
mandates from the federal government intensify the budget shortfalls that 
governments face. As a result, in some cases, governments resort to privatization as a
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means to reduce costs and to balance their budgets (Henton and Waldhom, 1984; Chi, 
1998; Kettl, 2002; Van Slyke, 2003).
Evidence exists in the literature in which researchers have investigated the 
effects of budget deficits on privatization decisions. Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny
(1997) conducted an empirical study on the factors driving privatization by county 
governments using variables that included measures of budget constraints. The authors 
found “that factors that increase the cost o f government spending, such as state laws 
restricting government financing and measures o f the state’s financial trouble, make 
privatization more likely” (Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny, 1997, p.468).
Related studies have found a positive association between deficits and 
privatization decisions in the context of local governments. For example, Kodrzycki
(1998) noted that “Rising deficits (or falling surplus) between 1987 and 1992 were
significant spurs to increasing a locality’s reliance on outside contractor” (p.46). While
these empirical studies do not focus directly on the deficits at state level, the studies
nonetheless support the validity of using deficit as a variable to measure the impact of
economic factor on state privatization decisions. Therefore, the impact o f state deficits
on the level o f state government privatization is hypothesized as follows.
Hypothesis 7: States with higher deficits are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with lower deficits.
Political Model
Numerous studies have shown that political factors influence privatization 
decisions (Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; 
Pouder, 1996). The theoretical argument about the influence of political factors on
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privatization decision is extensive, but there is a paucity o f empirical research that 
investigated the impact of political factors on the general levels o f state government 
privatization in a comprehensive manner, which this study attempts to accomplish. In 
so doing, the following four variables are used to operationalize the political factor: 
state union laws, state political culture, party affiliation of the governor controlling 
state government, the party controlling the state legislature.
State Union Laws
A plethora of research is available in the literature that shows that political 
opposition particularly from public employee unions impede privatization efforts; 
unions resist privatization of services that they have traditionally performed (Hirsch 
and Osborne, 2000; Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004; Sawicky, 1998; Pouder, 1996; 
Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Price and Riccucci, 2005; Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny, 
1997). For example, Nicholson-Crotty (2004) noted that public employee opposition 
can impede privatization efforts. Similarly, Sawicky (1998) and others highlight the 
power of relatively high levels of unionization to oppose privatization. Studies further 
indicate that “state employees in several states filed lawsuits against their government 
to oppose privatization” (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p. 476).
However, evidence exists in the literature that shows that the presence of 
unions and the level of unionization in a state fail to predict state privatization 
decisions. Nicholson-Crotty (2004) empirically investigated the extent of union 
influence on state corrections privatization decisions and found that “the degree of 
unionization.. .within a state did not have a significant impact on the decisions to 
privatize corrections management” (p.52). The author offered two explanations for the
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lack of the empirical support for the presence of union influence on state privatization 
decisions.
The first explanation has to do with what the author calls “construct 
invalidity,” which suggests that “the percent of public employee unionization within a 
state may not be a suitable proxy for the power of employee unions” (p.53). The 
second potential explanation refers to the fickleness of the theoretical argument that is 
premised on the assumption of unions having the power to thwart state decisions to 
privatize services; the author concluded that the “public employee unions simply do 
not wield the power over the privatization process that researchers had previously 
suspected” (p.53).
Other researchers use state’s labor law as an indicator of union power arguing 
that the presence of unions or the degree of unionization is not necessarily a valid 
measure o f the power o f unions. For example, Price and Riccucci (2005) argued that 
“Although the presence or absence of unions has typically been used as a measure of 
union strength, it does not accurately reflect potential union power...state’s public 
sector labor law would be a more accurate indicator” (p. 227). In their empirical study 
on the determinants of state prison privatization decisions, Price and Riccucci (2005) 
used state’s labor laws as a measure of union power in their model. Their findings also 
showed that unions were not significant predictors of state prison privatization 
decisions.
However, other empirical studies have found results that support the theoretical 
argument that powerful labor unions can deter privatization decisions. Indeed, some 
researchers argue that strong unions are more likely to influence privatization
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decisions in their favor. For example, Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny (1997) conducted 
an empirical study on the determinants o f local government privatization decisions and 
found that “the fraction of county employees represented by bargaining units 
[collective bargaining] comes out highly significant and negative, indicating that 
strong unions deter privatization” (p.457); in the statement cited here strong unions 
can be taken to mean strong union laws. Also, Hirsch and Osborne (2000) contend 
that “high levels of unionization in municipal labor force continue to create 
opportunities for municipal labor to effectively oppose privatization” (p.324).
While the first group of researchers found results that fail to support the 
theoretical argument that unions deter privatization, the results o f the second group of 
researchers appear to be consistent with the proposition that strong unions deter 
privatization. Nonetheless, the discussion above clearly shows that the variable state 
union law is a valid indicator of the strength or power (weak union power or strong 
union power) of public employee unions. Essentially, the concept weak union power is 
used to refer to states that have the right to work laws in their books, and the concept 
strong union power is used to refer to states that do not have the right to work laws 
and the unions can be represented by collective bargaining units. As such, the 
following hypothesis can tested.
Hypothesis 8: States with weak union power are more likely to have higher level of 
state government privatization than states with strong union power.
State Political Culture
Political culture has been used as a variable in state comparative studies to 
investigate state policy outcomes. Elazar (1984) defined political culture as “the
98
historical sources of differences in habits, perspectives, and attitudes that influence 
political life in the various states” (p.l 10). The author maintains that political culture 
combined with what he calls “sectionalism” and “frontier” shape “the individuals 
states’ political structures, electoral behavior, and modes o f organization for political 
action” (Elazar, 1984, p. 109; italics in original).
Based on the conceptualization o f Elazar (1984), Dresand and Gosing (2008) 
offer a more elaborate definition of political culture as the “combined effects of 
historical experiences, tradition, pattern o f immigration and migration, and religious 
identities that shape political attitudes, views of the appropriate role o f government in 
society, the relative priorities placed on public programs, and avenues for political 
participation” (P.21); this definition is likely to capture the many dimensions that 
political culture entails including the impacts o f immigration and migration Elazar 
(1984) identified three political cultures which the author thought define the American 
society. These are: individualism, moralistic, and traditionalistic.
Individualistic political culture focuses largely on the instrumentality of 
government policies as a means to promote individual self-interest; if  individuals view 
the market place as the best means to allocate values that benefit them, then 
government is to be restrained by keeping it out o f  the way of the marketplace. At 
other times, individuals support government policies, such as tax breaks, to extent that 
those policies are believed to be beneficial to them. In either case, from the 
perspective of individualistic political culture, tangible benefits must be realized from 
government inaction or action (Elazar, 1984; Dresand and Gosing, 2008).
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Moralistic political culture appears to embrace liberal philosophy in that it 
accords government a positive role in advancing the collective welfare over narrow 
individual interest. According to the moralistic political culture, as a representative of 
the people, government is expected to promote the interests of those who are 
disadvantaged in the economic and political marketplace as well as to encourage broad 
participation of common folks in determining what is in the public interest. From the 
perspective of moralistic political culture, issues are more important than individual 
interests or personalities (Elazar, 1984; Dresand and Gosing, 2008).
Traditionalistic political culture seeks to advance elite interests and embraces 
values that appear to have definite class overtones. According to Elazar (1984), the 
traditionalistic political culture seeks “to confine real political power to a relatively 
small and self-perpetuating group drawn from an established elite who often inherit 
their right to govern through family ties or social position” (p. 119). Dresand and 
Gosing (2008) also assert that traditionalistic political culture “is oriented toward 
protecting the interests of traditional elites and that often entails preserving the status 
quo” (p.22). The three political cultures are essentially “rooted in colonial America” 
(Dresand and Gosing, 2008, p. 22) and are presumed to be stable over a long period of 
time. Although the notion of political culture being stable over time for all states is 
challenged by some scholars (see Berry et al., 1998), it is still being used as a measure 
of state ideology in state comparative studies in many areas of public policy such as 
welfare, corrections and other related programs ( Soss et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 2007; 
Price and Riccucci, 2005; Breaux et al., 2002 ).
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Specifically, however, political culture is used as a variable to operationalize
citizen ideology as distinct from state government ideology; Berry et al. (1998) argue
that citizen ideology and state government ideology are different and point to previous
studies that have used political culture as “a surrogate for citizen ideology” (p. 328).
In the context of privatization policy, evidence exists in the literature in which
scholars have used political culture as a variable to state privatization decisions. For
example, Price and Riccucci (2005) included political culture in their empirical
investigation of the determinants o f state prison privatization. The authors
operationalized political culture using measures developed by Erickson, Wright, and
Mclver (1993) and found a statistically significant association between conservative
political culture and state prison privatization. This study will test the influence of
political culture on the level of state government privatization as hypothesized below.
Hypothesis 9: States with individualistic/traditionalistic political culture are more 
likely to have higher level o f state government privatization than states with moralistic 
political culture.
The Party Affiliation o f  the Governor Controlling State Government
The General Accounting Office ([GAO], 1997) states that “privatization can 
best be introduced and sustained when a political leader champions it” (p.8). But 
privatization decision, like similar other decisions, is made in a political environment 
and the political ideology o f the legislators or governors may have the most influence 
when enabling legislations for privatization are considered and privatization decisions 
are made (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Price and Riccucci, 2005; Breaux et al., 2002). 
More often “ideological conservatism creates an environment that is more supportive 
of privatization” (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004, p.46).
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As the review of the literature shows, ideological conservatism is associated 
with the Republican Party, and liberal ideology is associated with the Democratic 
Party; this ideological distinction between the two parties is believed to be generally 
true to this day. In view of this distinction, it is safe to argue that a Republican 
governor is more likely than his/her Democratic counterpart to promote privatization. 
Some recent studies support this general theoretical proposition. For example, in their 
study of welfare reform related to the implementation of the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in the state of Mississippi, Breaux et al. 
(2002) found that the conservative Republican governor, Kirk Fordice, chose to 
privatize the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.
Breaux et al.(2002) offered a detailed analysis that revealed that the 
conservative Republican governor managed to have “direct control over the state’s 
Department of Human Services (DHS), the state agency charged with the 
implementation of welfare programs after the state legislature abolished a bipartisan 
governing board that had served as a buffer between the governor and the DHS” 
(Breaux., 2002, p.96). Having direct control of DHS, the governor was able to fill “all 
top-level management positions with party faithful and those who shared his 
ideological beliefs on the direction of the agency; soon after heavy use o f privatization 
followed” (Breaux et al., 2002, p. 96).
Other studies offer a rather tenuous account of the ideological divide between 
Republican and Democratic governors as a determinant o f a governor’s privatization 
decision. For example, the 2002 Council o f State Government (CSG) study 
summarized the views of six state governors about the implementation o f privatization
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initiatives in their respective states. The governors were three Republicans and three 
Democrats, and their rationales for undertaking privatization efforts were essentially 
their beliefs in the efficiency and effectiveness o f the private sector. The opinions of 
both the Republican and Democratic governors were not fundamentally dissimilar and 
did not reflect the ideological divide when pushing for privatization (Chi, Arnold, & 
Perkins, 2004).
Also an empirical study by Price and Riccucci (2005), cited earlier repeatedly,
examined the impact of the political ideology of a governor on prison privatization
decision; they referred to evidence in the literature that showed “the importance of the
governor’s political party in state-level decision making” (p.328). Their findings
however did not show the political ideology of the governor to be a significant
determinant of state prison privatization decision (Price and Riccucci, 2005). The
conclusion to be drawn from the studies cited above is certainly contradictory, but this
mixed conclusion cannot invalidate the basic theoretical argument that privatization is
more in tune with conservative ideology than with liberal ideology. At best, the results
point to the need to conduct further research. The studies however show that the
political ideology of the governor controlling state government is a valid measure to
operationalize the influence of political factors on privatization decisions.
Hypothesis 10: States with Republican governors are more likely to have higher level 
of state government privatization than states with Democratic governors.
The Party Controlling the State Legislature
Writing in 1957, political scientist David Easton described the functions of 
politics in the following terms: “The study o f politics is concerned with understanding
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how authoritative decisions are made and executed for a society” (Easton, 1957, 
p.384). Since the appearance of Woodrow Wilson’s essay The Study o f  
Administration (1887) and later Frank Goodnow’s book Politics and Administration 
(1900), the politics-administration dichotomy model was believed to have served the 
nation well until the middle of the twentieth century in terms of setting the boundaries 
between policy making and policy execution; that is between the legislative and the 
executive branches, although the claim is “rejected on empirical grounds” (Svara,
1998, p.51).
Central to the dichotomy model is the idea that the lines o f responsibilities o f 
the legislatures and the chief executives must be demarcated clearly so that the 
legislatures set policies and the chief executives execute policies. For example, 
Goodnow (1900) “classified government actions in terms of two functions -  the 
expression of popular will through legislation and the execution of that will through 
administration” (Svara, 1998, p.51). While the distinction Easton’s (1957) made 
between “authoritative decisions” and “executions” appears to be an affirmation of the 
dichotomy model, literature shows that political ideology matters more than the 
institutional separations in many policy areas (Svara, 1998; Freire, 2008; Nicholson- 
Crotty, 2004).
Although the legislative and the executive branches are separate entities 
institutionally and serve, along with the judiciary, to check and balance each other, the 
notion of separating the legislatures from the chief executives in terms of developing 
policy proposals appears to be tenuous when ideological motivations are considered; 
in this connection, Freire (2008), writing in the context o f European political
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orientation, asserts that it is the “left-right political cleavage [that] functioned as a 
device to classify ideologies.. .by which parties categorize political orientations and 
policy proposals” (p.l 80).
Similarly, Nicholson-Crotty (2004) stressed the importance o f political 
motivations when legislators and/or governors consider the adoption of enabling 
legislations for privatization or other policy areas. Thus, it can safely be assumed that 
political ideology determines the relationship between the legislative body and the 
executive body in many policy areas not the institutional separation per se. It is 
commonly assumed that the political party controlling or dominating the state 
legislature is more likely to affect state policy decision than the minority counterpart. 
Since the Republican and Democratic parties are the only two major parties 
represented in state legislative branches (as well as in the U.S. Congress), the 
competition between the two parties essentially reflects their respective ideological 
persuasions.
The Republican Party is assumed to espouse conservative ideology and the 
Democratic Party is assumed to subscribe to liberal ideology. As reiterated in the 
review of the literature, conservative ideology is largely associated with the 
privatization movement, and by implication, the Republican Party is believed to be the 
major promoter o f privatization. Whereas the Democratic Party is commonly 
associated with liberal ideology and is assumed to exercise restraint when making 
privatization decisions. In view of these ideological distinctions, researchers have 
examined the link between political ideology and legislative decisions in public policy
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(Berry and Berry, 1992; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Price and Riccucci, 2005; Soss et al., 
2001; Breaux et al., 2007).
For example, the study of the welfare reform in the state o f Mississippi by 
Breaux et al. (2007) provides useful insights regarding the influence of ideology in 
state politics. The authors’ analysis showed how abolishing the bipartisan governing 
body by the state legislature allowed the conservative Republican governor to 
privatize the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) by exercising direct 
control over the Department of Human Services (DHS), the state agency responsible 
for the implementation of the welfare programs (see Breaux et al., 2007). Although 
the study does not speak directly to the party configuration in the state legislature, the 
analysis nonetheless sheds some light on the influence of ideology in state policy 
making.
Another study by Price and Riccucci (2005) examined specifically the extent 
of influence that Republican controlled state legislatures exert on prison privatization. 
The authors summarized some previous theoretical studies that link privatization to 
conservative ideology and the Republican Party. Based on the theoretical arguments 
in the literature they tested a hypothesis to determine the effect o f Republican- 
controlled legislatures on state prison privatization decisions; the results indicate that 
the “political party of governor” was not a significant predictor of prison privatization 
decisions (Price and Riccucci, 2005, p.231). The findings run contrary to the 
theoretical argument that conservative ideology drives privatization. But this 
conclusion may not hold for the level of state government privatization in general. 
Therefore this study tests the following hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 11: States with Republican-controlled legislature are more likely to have 
higher level of state government privatization than states with Democratic-controlled 
legislature.
Ideology Model
Literature shows that ideological factors influence many areas of state public 
policy including privatization policy (Morris, 1999; Hodge, 2000). Whiles many 
studies point to fiscal imperatives as the primary driver o f privatization initiatives at 
state and local levels (Henton and Waldhom, 1984; Donahue, 1989; Boyne, 1998), 
some scholars contend that “The context o f privatization is inherently ideological” 
(Hodge, 2000, p. 17). For example, Morris (1999) argues that “Privatization is and 
ideological choice requiring one to determine the particular set o f values to be 
maximized as well as to understand the inherent value tradeoffs” (p .l55). In fact some 
scholars have devised measures related to ideology that have been used in state 
comparative studies to assess the impact o f ideological factors on many areas o f public 
policy (Wright, Erikson, and Mclver, 1985; Berry and Berry, 1992; Erikson, Wright, 
and Mclver, 1993; Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson, 1998). In light of this 
theoretical argument, this study examines the impact o f ideology on the level o f state 
government privatization using three variables: state policy liberalism, state ideology, 
and state institutional capacity.
State Policy Liberalism
As indicated above, many researchers have constructed indices to measure 
variables related to ideology. One such variable is state policy liberalism, which is 
another name for government ideology. For example, Erikson, Wright, and Mclver
107
(1993) developed a government ideology index which they labeled “policy liberalism” 
by summing the standardized scores of the responses of 47 states to eight policy items 
which include: education (public educational spending per pupil), Medicaid (eligibility 
for Medicaid beyond the minimum levels required by federal regulations), AFDC 
(eligibility analogues to the Medicaid measure), consumer protection, criminal justice, 
legalized gambling, Equal Rights Amendment, and tax progressivity (p. 75-76). 
According to the authors, “the eight policy variables represent one single dimension of 
policy liberalism.” They maintain that “The index should be an accurate reflection of 
the liberal-conservative tendencies of states’ policies” (Erikson, Wright, and Mclver, 
1993, p. 77).
Similarly, Berry, Ringquist, Fording and Hanson (1998) used the scores from 
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the AFL-CIO Committee on Political 
Education (COPE) from 1960 to 1993 to create a composite measure o f citizen and 
government ideology for each of the 50 states; the composite measure is constructed 
based on an average score of interest group ratings of members o f Congress, 
supplemented by congressional election outcomes, the roll-call voting scores o f state 
congressional delegations, the partisan division o f state legislatures, and the party of 
affiliation of the governor (Berry et al., 1998). The composite measure “runs from 
zero representing the most conservative government ideology to 100 representing the 
most liberal government ideology” (Berry et al., 1998, p.334).
Some scholars have utilized the above government ideology measures to assess 
state policy decisions (Soss et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 2007; Price and Riccucci, 2005). 
For example, Soss, Schram, Vartanian, and O’Brien (2001) used the measures
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developed by Berry et al.(1998) to examine the impact o f government ideology on the 
choices state officials make when implementing the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act o f 1996, commonly known as the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Their findings reveal that states with more 
conservative government ideology had stricter sanctions for welfare recipients. “The 
states that acted quickly to impose tough welfare policies were those in which 
conservative governments held sway” (Soss et al., 2001, p. 389).
Also, Price and Riccucci (2005) examined the influence of government 
ideology on state prison privatization using the measure developed by Berry et 
al.(1998). The results support their hypothesis that “states are more likely to privatize 
their prisons when the government ideology is more conservative as compared with 
more liberal” (p.228). While the theoretical arguments and the empirical studies 
reviewed here suggest that governments with conservative ideology are more likely to 
promote privatization, the extent to which conservative government ideology 
influences the level of state government privatization is not addressed. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is tested in this study.
Hypothesis 12: States with conservative government policy are more likely to have 
higher level of state government privatization than states with liberal government 
policy.
State Ideology
Erikson, Wright, and Mclver (1993) and others maintain that government 
ideology is different from state ideology in that state ideology reflects the policy 
preferences of the citizens of a state. State ideology or “state citizen ideology” or 
simply “citizen ideology” is “generally conceived as the mean position on a liberal-
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conservative continuum of the ‘active electorate’ in a state” (Berry et al., 1998, p. 327- 
328; italics in original). Erikson, Wright, and Mclver assert that states vary in their 
policy choices even though they appear to exhibit similarities in the policies they enact; 
the differences are largely reflected in the policy preferences of the citizens o f each 
state (Erikson, Wright, and Mclver, 1993). Therefore, the authors made a distinction 
between government ideology, which they call state policy liberalism and state 
ideology, which represents the preferences o f the “state electorate’s ideological taste” 
(p.74).
Based on the theoretical distinction reviewed above, Erikson, Wright, and 
Mclver (1993) devised indicators to measure state ideology. The authors used the 
CBS/New York Times national surveys o f more than 167, 000 respondents for the 48 
states conducted between 1976 to 1988 and aggregated the responses to construct a 
single measure of state ideology based on the mean ideological identifications of the 
respondents who classified themselves as liberal, moderate or conservative; however,
“ the correlation between state’s mean ideological identification and the composite 
policy index are highly correlated (r = .82)” (Erikson, Wright, and Mclver, 1993, p.78). 
This strong correlation suggests that both indicators explain 82% of state policy 
variations.
Berry et al. (1998) argued that the two concepts (state ideology and policy 
liberalism or government ideology) as constructed by Erikson, Wright, and Mclver 
(1993) are difficult to operationalize. They developed indicators that measure citizen 
ideology and government ideology as described above. The authors claim that their 
citizen ideology and government ideology measures are dynamic and capture the
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ideological changes of citizens and elites over time and represent an improvement 
over the static measures of current indicators of ideology such as the one developed by 
Erikson, Wright, and Mclver (1993). While acknowledging the importance of static 
measures in cross-sectional studies, the authors nonetheless argue that over time “a 
static measure o f ideology cannot account for changes in policy” (Berry et al., 1998, p. 
328).
Numerous state comparative studies have utilized state/citizen ideology to 
assess state policy outcomes under varying circumstances (Brudney et al., 2004; 
Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Berry and Berry, 1992; Price and Riccucci, 2005; Soss et al., 
2001; Breaux et al., 2007). For example, Brudney et al. (2004) conducted an 
empirical investigation of the determinants o f state contracting out and its impact on 
the quality and costs of service delivery using variables that included citizen ideology 
in their model. The authors used the measure developed by Berry et al. (1998) to 
operationalize the citizen ideology variable; the finding indicated that the “political 
and ideological variables included in the model failed to achieve statistical 
significance” (Brudney et al., 2004, p. 413).
Similarly, in a study that examined the factors that motivate state-level 
privatization decisions in the area o f corrections, Nicholson-Crotty (2004) used Berry 
and his colleagues’ (1998) measure of citizen ideology in order to capture the political 
conservatism of a state. The empirical results show that “state liberalism is significant 
and negatively correlated with contracting” (p.51). The finding supported the author’s 
expectation that “states that are ideologically conservative are more likely to adopt 
legislation that facilitates corrections management contracting” (p.46). Another study
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by Price and Riccucci (2005) examined the extent to which state ideology predicts 
state prison privatization using political culture as a surrogate for state ideology.
As mentioned earlier, Berry et al. (1998) noted the difficulty of
operationalizing the two concepts (government ideology/state policy liberalism and
state/citizens’ ideology) and point to some studies that used “political culture as a
surrogate for citizen ideology” (p.328). Likewise, Price and Riccucci (2005) included
political culture (read state ideology) in their model as one of the indictors o f prison
privatization; the finding indicated that state ideology is significant. The authors thus
concluded: “the factors that seem to better explain why states privatize their prisons
relate more to politics and ideology.. ..The two political and ideological variables that
are statistically significant include government ideology and the political culture o f the
state” (Price and Riccucci, 2005, p.229). In this study, the influence o f state ideology
on the level of state government privatization is tested as hypothesized below.
Hypothesis 13: States with conservative state ideology are more likely to have higher 
level o f state government privatization than states with liberal state ideology.
State Institutional Capacity
Although, as noted earlier, the conservative-liberal ideological divide plays a 
part in the policy preferences of state governments, state institutional capacity 
becomes pertinent in the decision and implementation process and has been 
operationalized and tested as one of the determinants o f state policy decisions in many 
areas o f public policy (Travis, Morris, and Morris, 2004). Essentially, the assumption 
here is that state institutional capacity has the potential to constrain or enhance the
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ability o f a state government to adopt and implement the desired program; and 
scholars have defined and devised indicators to measure state institutional capacity.
Bowman and Kearney (1988) cited previous studies that defined capacity in 
relation to the ability of citizens and their government to develop political and 
administrative institutions that have the capacity to provide responsive, effective, and 
efficient public services. The authors also note that the concept of institutional 
capacity is “multidimensional [and] is composed of variables long associated with 
state institutional modernization” (Bowman and Keamey, 1988, p.347). Yet long 
secular development of political and administrative institutional arrangements are 
most likely to be influenced by the ideological preferences of citizens; and the concept 
of institutional capacity, broadly defined, can be assumed as having an ideological 
construct. However, noting the difficulty o f reaching a consensus on the definition of 
capability/capacity and realizing that the concept is too broad to be adequately 
captured in a single factor,” Bowman and Keamey (1988) devised “measures that 
operationalize the concept capacity or capability in the context o f state government 
institutions” (Bowman and Keamey, 1988, p.343).
Bowman and Keamey (1988) developed an operational definition of capacity 
that takes into account “measures that are commonly associated with institutional 
reform (adaptability, decision making, and conflict management)” (P.347). They also 
included “accountability, centralization, representation, coordination, and staffing and 
spending” (p.359) to account for the multidimensionality o f institutional capacity in 
constructing their measures. Using these indicators the authors developed empirically 
derived separate scores for four factors: staffing and spending, accountability and
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information management, executive centralization and representation (see Bowman 
and Keamey, 1988). The authors claim that the scores o f the four factors together 
measure state institutional capacity.
Some studies have utilized the measures developed by Bowman and Keamey 
(1988) to operationalize state institutional capacity in many state comparative studies. 
For example, in a study that examined the factors that influence state leveraging 
decisions in the implementation of federal environment policy related to Clean Water 
State Revolving Loan Fund (CWSRF) program, Travis, Morris, and Morris (2004) 
used Bowman and Kearney’s (1988) measures o f state institutional capacity. They 
investigated empirically the leveraging decisions process, using three models that 
included institutional capacity as one of the variables in a two-stage decision process 
(the decision to leverage and how much to leverage).. The authors aggregated the 
interval-level scores for the four factors (staffing and spending; accountability and 
information management; executive centralization; and representation) to arrive at a 
single measure of institutional capacity.
With the institutional capacity variable included in the model, the authors 
tested their hypothesis that “states with stronger institutional capacity to be more 
likely to leverage” (Travis, Morris, and Morris, 2004, p.471). The results indicated 
that institutional capacity was found not to be significant in the first stage of the 
process, but it was significant in the second stage of the decision process leading to the 
conclusion that “states with greater institutional capacity are more willing to pursue 
larger leveraging programs” (Travis, Morris, and Morris, 2004, p.472). In this study, 
it is assumed that greater institutional capacity (which implies having, among other
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things, adequate resources, skilled manpower, and expert staffs) is likely to enhance a 
state’s ability to provide services to citizens without the need to resort to privatization. 
As such, it can be hypothesized that higher institutional capacity is expected to lead to 
lower level o f state government privatization.
Hypothesis 14: States with higher institutional capacity are more likely to have lower 
level o f state government privatization than states with lower institutional capacity.
Summary
This study examines the factors that influence the level o f state government 
privatization across the states by drawing on the historical and contemporary 
privatization literature. While the historical account offers useful insights about the 
philosophy that underpins the contemporary privatization movement, a review o f the 
modem literature on privatization reveals the rationales for the emergence and rise of 
contemporary privatization policy across the United States and around the world. The 
review of the contemporary literature further reveals that the factors that drive 
privatization are many and varied and are largely related to socioeconomic, economic, 
political, and ideological factors. The variables identified and discussed above are 
supported by theory and empirical studies and have received considerable attention in 
the literature as the likely drivers o f contemporary privatization. Yet, the extent of 
influence these various factors exert on the level o f state government privatization has 
received little attention in the literature. This study attempts to fill this gap in the 
literature. A summary of the four models is presented in Figure 2.2 below.
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S o c ioecon om ic  M odel
•  S tate  H ealth  Care Spending (+)
•  S ta te  Pension Spending (+)
•  S ta te  Per Capita Personal Incom e (-)
Economic factor
•  S ta te  Labor Costs (+)
•  S ta te  Per Capita Spending (+)
•  S ta te  Fiscal Capacity (high -)
•  S ta te  Deficits (+)
Political factor
•  S ta te  Union Laws (w eak +)
•  Political C ulture (In d /T rad +) ■—
•  G overnor Control Govt. (R+)
•  Party Control Legislature (R +)
Ideological factor
•  S tate  Policy Liberalism (Conservative +)
•  S tate  Ideology (Conservative +)
•  S ta te  Institu tional Capacity (high -)
Figure 2.2. Summary of the Four Models
The 14 hypotheses discussed above are summarized below.
HI: States with higher health care expenditures are more likely to have higher level of 
state government privatization than states with lower health care expenditures.
H2: States with higher pension spending are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with lower pension spending.
H3: States with higher per capita personal income are more likely to have lower level 
of state government privatization than states with lower per capita personal income.
H4: States with higher labor costs are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with lower labor costs.
H5: States with higher per capita spending are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with lower per capita spending.
H6: States with higher fiscal capacity are more likely to have lower level o f state 
government privatization than states with lower fiscal capacity.
H7: States with higher deficits are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with lower deficits.
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H8: States with weak union laws are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with strong union laws.
H9: States with individualistc/traditionalistic political culture are more likely to have 
higher level o f state government privatization than states with moralistic political 
culture.
H10: States with Republican governors are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with Democratic governors.
H l l :  States with Republican-controlled legislature are more likely to have higher 
level o f state government privatization than states with Democratic-controlled 
legislature.
H12: States with conservative government policy are more likely to have higher level 
of state government privatization than states with liberal government policy
H13: States with conservative state ideology are more likely to have higher level of 
state government privatization than states with liberal state ideology.
H14: States with higher institutional capacity are more likely to have lower level of 
state government privatization than states with lower institutional capacity.
Chapter III presents the methodology for this study; the dependent variable and each
of the independent variables are operationalized and the various data sources for each
model are discussed.
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
Chapter I provided an introduction to this study summarizing the background 
information and the rationale for examining the factors that influence the level of state 
government privatization. Chapter II presented the review of the literature and 
provided a detailed analysis of privatization in the historical and contemporary 
contexts; established the philosophical foundation of privatization, identified the 
potential factors that are likely to influence the level of state government privatization, 
and developed 14 testable hypotheses to answer the main research question in this 
study. This chapter presents the methodology detailing the research design, the 
definitions and measurements of variables, the data analysis, the limitations and 
delimitations o f this study.
The Research Design
This is a state comparative cross-sectional study designed to answer the 
research question: What factors predict the level o f state government privatization 
(LSGP)? LSGP is the variable of interest, and states serve as the unit o f analysis. 
According to Sharkansky and Hofferbert (1971), “Scholars who want to explain policy 
differences use policies as dependent variables and try to identify the economic, social, 
or political characteristics of each state that shape those policies” (p.317). Cross­
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sectional study is appropriate for this research since cross-sectional studies usually 
investigate the relationships among several variables and are suited for answering 
questions such as “how much,” “how many,” “what happened” and related questions 
(O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner, 2003, p.27).
There are additional advantages o f using cross-sectional secondary data. 
Essentially, the use o f secondary data saves time as well as costs that researchers 
might otherwise incur in collecting primary data; and researchers with different 
interests can work with data from a single cross-sectional study (O’Sullivan, Rassel, 
and Berner, 2003, p.27). However cross-sectional studies have disadvantages as well. 
Cross-sectional studies do not allow measuring changes over time. Furthermore, 
although cross-sectional studies may uncover some potential relationships that may 
lead to future experimental studies, they cannot be used to establish cause-effect 
relationships between the outcome and the predictor variables (O’Sullivan, Rassel, and 
Berner, 2003). Nevertheless, cross-sectional secondary data are useful for conducting 
non-experimental research studies, such as the proposed study, that are otherwise 
impossible or unfeasible due to the amount of time and costs involved in “instrument 
design, data collection, and compilation” (O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner, 2003, 
p.265).
Every effort has been taken to collect cross-sectional secondary data from the 
same time period (2002) for the independent variables. In some cases where data are 
not available for the same time period, data from different years are used. One 
consistent year for the data collection was chosen because the purpose of this study is 
to measure differences in the level o f state government privatization accounted for by
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a variety of variables at a given point in time. As such this study uses static measures 
and does not attempt to measure changes in the level of state government privatization 
over time.
However, the use of data for a single year is problematic in terms of 
accounting for the effect of data lag on the dependent variable. As mentioned in the 
previous chapters, the 2002 survey data by the Council o f State Governments (CSG) 
were used for the dependent variable in this study, and addressing the data lag effect is 
essential in order to enhance the validity of the dependent variable. Underlying the 
case for lag effect is the argument that prior economic conditions and fiscal decisions 
might have unduly influenced the responses provided in the target year (2002). To get 
around this problem data for four years prior to 2002 were collected, and the data for 
each individual year was used to examine its relationship with the dependent variable.
Specifically, data from 1998 to 2001 were collected for state health care 
spending, state pension spending, state per-capita personal income, state labor cost, 
state per-capita spending, state fiscal capacity, and state deficits. Each of the four 
individual years were used to examine their influence on the dependent variable, and 
the results were compared to the results of the 2002 data. A careful examination o f the 
results o f the five data set revealed that the results were very similar. Furthermore, the 
data for the four years were compiled to estimated data for 2002 and compared with 
the 2002 actual data. The computation of the data is explained below.
Four separate forecasting techniques, namely, simple moving average (SMA), 
exponential smoothing (EXS), transformation moving average (TMA) and regression 
against time (Regression) (see Wang, 2010) were used and compared with each other
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to get a relatively accurate estimate for 2002 for the aforementioned ratio level 
variables. The transformation moving average (TMA) forecasting technique provided 
an estimate that is close to the 2002 actual data. To determine the reliability o f the 
accuracy of the forecast, the absolute percentage error (APE) and the mean absolute 
percentage error (MAPE) measures were used. “A smaller actual-versus-forecast 
difference indicates more accurate forecasting” (Wang, 2010, p.l 1). On both measures, 
TMA was found to be relatively more accurate than the other three techniques. A t- 
test was performed to determine if  there is a significant mean difference between the 
two sets of data. A significant difference was not found, and the 2002 estimated data 
were used for subsequent statistical analyses.
Variables: Definition and Measurement
Dependent Variable
As noted, the dependent variable is the level of state government privatization 
(LSGP) which is measured using the 2002 Council of State Governments (CSG) data*. 
LSGP is thus defined as the level of state government privatization in four service 
areas based on the CSG survey responses o f state agency heads for the four classes of 
services: corrections, education, health and human services, and transportation (Chi, 
Arnold, and Perkins, 2004). The secondary data were obtained directly from the 
Council of State Governments (CSG). “Since the early 1980s, The Council of State 
Governments (CSG) has monitored and disseminated information on privatization 
trends in state government” (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p. 466).
A request was made to obtain an updated or a recent survey data, but the data were unavailable 
because CSG has not conducted similar surveys in recent years.
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In 2002, CSG conducted a 50-state national survey of state officials to identify 
the privatization trends. According to CSG statement, “The survey was sent to 450 
state budget and legislative service agency directors and heads o f five executive 
branch agencies: personnel, education, health and human services, corrections and 
transportation. The survey yielded an overall response rate of nearly 77 percent” (Chi, 
Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p. 466). The 2002 CSG survey provided the data to measure 
the level of state government privatization (LSGP). That is, the conceptual definition 
is operationalized using the responses of state agency heads to the CSG’s question: 
“How many services and programs in your agency are currently privatized?” The 
responses are given in the following order: 0; <1%; 1-5%; 6-10%; 11 -15%; >15%.
The four services were selected out of the five classes of services that the CSG 
identified in its 2002 survey as “the most popular privatized services” and published in 
The Book o f the States (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p.477). However the fifth, 
personnel programs and services, has a large number of missing data on the responses 
to the aforementioned question and is dropped from the study. The ordered responses 
for the four classes of services are coded into the following six levels: 0 = 0; <1% =
1; 1-5% =2; 6-10% =3; 11-15% = 4; >15% =5. Based on these values the total 
scores for each state included in this study are calculated; using these summated scales, 
an index of the level o f state government privatization (LSGP) is constructed. The 
values range from 0 indicating no state government privatization to 20 indicating high 
level o f state government privatization; but there is no case with scores lower than six 
and higher than 16, which in turn are recoded and transformed into three ordinal levels: 
6-10 = 0 (low); 11-13 = 1 (medium); 14-16 = 2 (high).
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Independent Variables
The data for the independent variables are collected from a variety o f sources 
including professional organizations, government databases and websites, and from 
pre-existing studies that have previously developed and published indices. As 
explained in the previous section, the data for the ratio level independent variables for 
2002 were estimated based on the figures collected from 1998 to 2001. The year 2002 
is retained as the target year in order to coincide with the data year for the dependent 
variable. The use o f a consistent year allows for the independent variables to reflect 
the socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological environment of all states at 
the same point in time regardless of variations in the levels of state government 
privatization.
For the few variables for which comparable data are unavailable for the same 
time period, other years are used. In this study the variables state political culture 
(Elazar, 1984), state policy liberalism (Erikson, Wright, Mclver, 1993), state ideology 
(Berry & Berry, 1992), and state institutional capacity (Bowman & Keamey, 1988) are 
from different years. As noted, the data for these variables are from different years and 
are less likely to be a threat to reliability because their values are assumed to be fairly 
stable over time (Erikson, Wright, Mclver, 1993). The definition and measurement for 
each of the independent variables are given below.
State Health Care Spending
State health care spending is the amount o f 2002 estimated state expenditures 
on health care services and is measured as a percentage o f state budget/total
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expenditures. Health care spending is expected to be associated with the level of state 
government privatization because of the fact that many states privatized some of their 
health care services as a cost saving mechanism (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004). The 
data for this variable are collected from State and Local Government Finance, U.S. 
Census website.
State Pension Spending
State pension spending is the amount o f 2002 estimated state expenditures on 
pension benefits and is measured as a percentage of state budget/ total expenditures. 
Many state officials have adopted some strategies including privatization of services to 
reduce costs associated with employee pension benefits (CSG, 2007; Edwards, 2010). 
Therefore, state pension spending may affect the level o f state government 
privatization. The data are collected from State and Local Government Finance, U.S. 
Census website.
State Per-Capita Personal Income
State per-capita personal income is calculated by dividing the 2002 estimated 
gross state product by the total population of the state; the amount is measured in U.S. 
dollars. Extensive theoretical and empirical studies have shown per capita personal 
income to be associated with many areas o f public policy including privatization 
(Berry and Berry, 1992; Price and Riccucci, 2005). The data are collected from State 
and Local Government Finance, U.S. Census website.
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State Labor Cost
State labor cost refers to public employees’ compensations excluding defined 
pension benefits; the amount refers to the 2002 estimated state expenditures on its 
public employees and is measured as a percentage of state budget/total expenditures. 
State labor costs have been partly blamed for growing budget crises that states 
continue to face (Edwards, 2010). Studies have shown that labor costs are associated 
with the privatization of services (Kodrzycki, 1998; Sawicky, 1998). The information 
is collected from State and Local Government Finance, U.S. Census website.
State Per-Capita Spending
State per-capita spending is calculated by dividing the 2002 estimated total 
state expenditures by the total number o f population o f a state. The amount is in U.S. 
dollars. Evidence in the literature has shown that rising per capita expenditure is 
associated with the privatization of services (Kodrzycki, 1998). The information is 
collected from State and Local Government Finance, U.S. Census website
State Fiscal Capacity
Fiscal capacity is defined as the ability o f a state government to finance its 
public services (Price and Riccucci, 2005). Numerous studies have found associations 
between fiscal/economic factors and state privatization decisions (Nicholson-Crotty, 
2004; Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny, 1997; Pouder, 1996; Kodrzycki, 1998; Brudney 
et al., 2005). Following the instrument developed by the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and updated by Tannenwald and Cowan (1997)
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and utilized by Price and Riccucci (2005) in their study of the determinants o f state 
prison privatization, the measure for the fiscal capacity variable for this study is 
calculated in three steps (see Price and Riccucci, 2005).
First, per-capita tax revenue is calculated by dividing the tax revenue of each 
state by the population in that state. Second, the average value of per-capita tax 
revenue is calculated by adding the per-capita tax revenue of each state and dividing 
the total by the 50 states. Third, the per-capita tax revenue is again divided by the 
average per-capita tax revenue and multiplied by 100 to arrive at the value/measure for 
state fiscal capacity variable. Based on this composite measure, anything below 100 is 
considered low capacity, and anything over 100 is considered high capacity. In this 
study, 100 and below is coded as 0 to indicate low fiscal capacity, and 101 and above 
is coded as 1 to indicate high fiscal capacity. The data for tax revenue are collected 
from State and Local Government Finance, U.S. Census website, and the population 
data are collected from U.S. Census Bureau website.
State Deficits
Deficit refers to a level o f expenditures that are not matched by a 
corresponding amount of revenues in a given fiscal year. As it is commonly known, 
deficit occurs when expenditures on government programs exceed the amount o f tax 
receipts. The amount is calculated based on the 2002 estimated deficits and is 
measured as a percentage of state budget/total expenditures. Evidence in the literature 
has shown that deficits are associated with privatization of services (Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Vishny, 1997). The deficit for each state for the 2002 estimated data is calculated
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from the spending and revenue data collected from State and Local Government 
Finance, U.S. Census website.
State Union Laws
Studies have used state union laws as proxy to measure the strength of state 
public employee unions. It is argued that in a state where there is a strong union law, 
public employee unions are strong and deter privatization. Whereas in a state where 
union law is weak, unions are weak as well and encourage privatization (Lopez-de- 
Silanes and Vishny, 1997). Strong or weak union laws refer primarily to the presence 
or absence of collective bargaining protection in a given state. States where employee 
unions have collective bargaining protection usually have strong union laws. The 
“right to work” states usually have weak union laws. As such strong union laws are 
coded as 1 and weak union laws are coded as 0. The information for this variable is 
collected from the National Rights to Work Legal Defense Foundation website.
State Political Culture
Elazar (1984) defined political culture “as the historical sources o f differences 
in habits, perspectives, and attitudes that influence political life in the various states” 
(p.l 10). The author identified three political cultures: moralistic, individualistic, and 
traditionalistic. These political cultures are shown to influence state policymaking 
(Breaux et al., 2000; Breaux and Morris, 2001; Soss et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 2007; 
Price and Riccucci, 2005). Moralistic political culture embraces liberal philosophy, 
and seeks to advance the collective welfare over narrow individual interest. On the
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other hand, individualistic political culture is assumed to have conservative orientation 
and focuses largely on promoting individual self-interest, and view the market place as 
the best means to allocate values that benefit them; similarly, traditionalistic political 
culture is assumed to have conservative leanings and seeks to advance elite interests 
(Elazar, 1984; Dresand and Gosing, 2008). As such, moralistic culture is expected to 
discourage privatization, and individualistic culture is expected to promote 
privatization. Traditionalistic culture focuses on maintaining the status quo, but it can 
also be assumed to favor privatization. In this study, individualistic political culture is 
coded as 0, moralistic political culture is coded as 1, and traditionalistic political 
culture is coded as 2. These three categories are further recoded with two dummy 
variables in the runs of the ordinal logistic regression (OLR). Categorization of state 
political culture is taken from Elazar (1984).
Party Affiliation o f  the Governor Controlling State Government
Studies have shown that the governor controlling state government is 
associated with the level of state government privatization (GAO, 1997). Republican 
governors tend to follow conservative ideology and are shown to be more likely to 
encourage privatization than their Democratic counterparts who are commonly 
associated with liberalism (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004). Republican governor is coded as 
0 and Democratic governor is coded as 1. The information for this variable is 
collected from the National Governors Association website, which includes 
information about party affiliation of the governor and terms of office for each state 
governor in 2002.
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The Party Controlling the State Legislature
It is commonly assumed that the political party controlling or dominating the 
state legislature is more likely to affect state policy decision than the minority 
counterpart ((Freire, 2008; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004). The Republican Party is assumed 
to espouse conservative ideology and is largely associated with the privatization 
movement (Sclar, 2000). On the other hand, the Democratic Party is assumed to 
subscribe to liberal ideology and discourages privatization. In this study, Republican 
Party is coded as 0, Democratic Party is coded as 1, and split control is coded as 2. 
These categories are further recoded with two dummy variables in the runs of the 
ordinal logistic regression (OLR).The information for this variable is collected from 
the National Conference of State Legislatures.
State Policy Liberalism
The measure for this variable is taken from Erikson, Wright, and Mclver 
(1993). State policy liberalism is defined as the policy preferences o f state 
governments and is another name for government ideology; Erikson, Wright, and 
Mclver (1993) developed state policy liberalism (government ideology) index by 
summing the standardized scores of the responses of 47 states to eight policy areas. 
The index runs from negative (-) 1.54 for most conservative to positive (+) 2.12 for 
most liberal.
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State Ideology
State ideology (state citizens’ ideology) reflects the policy preferences o f the 
citizens of a state, and it is found to have association with state policy choices (Berry 
and Berry, 1992; Soss et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 2007). Scholars have developed a 
measure o f state ideology, which is “generally conceived as the mean position on a 
liberal-conservative continuum of the active electorate” (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, 
and Hanson, 1998, p. 327-328). Conservative states are coded as 0 (for all Southern 
states) and liberal is coded as 1 (for all non-Southern states). This information is taken 
from Berry and Berry (1992).
State Institutional Capacity
State institutional capacity refers to the ability o f a state government to develop 
and implement policy decisions, and is shown to be one of the determinants o f state 
policy decisions (Travis, Morris, and Morris, 2004). The information for this variable 
is taken from Bowman and Keamey (1988) who developed measures o f institutional 
capacity based on factor scores in four categories: “accountability, centralization, 
representation, coordination, and staffing and spending” (p.359). The factor scores in 
the four categories are added to arrive at a composite measure for state institutional 
variable. The composite index ranges from negative (-) 3.326 indicating very low 
capacity to positive (+) 4.282 indicating very high capacity. The variable names, 
abbreviations, sources, measurements and coding of variables are summarized in 
Table 3.1 below
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Table 3.1 Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable Name Abbreviation Source Measurement (Coding of 
Variables)
Dependent Variable
Level of State Government 
Privatization (2002)
LSGP Council of State 
Governments (CSG)
Low (0), Medium (1), 
High (2) (Ordinal)
Independent Variables
State Health Care Spending 
(2002)
SHCS State & Local Govt 
Finance, US Census
Percentage of state budget/ 
total expenditure (Ratio)
State Pension Spending 
(2002)
SPS State & Local Govt 
Finance, US Census
Percentage of state budget/ 
total expenditure (Ratio)
State Per-Capita Personal 
Income (2002)
SPCPI State & Local Govt 
Finance, US Census
Dollar amount (Ratio)
State Labor Cost (2002) SLC State & Local Govt 
Finance, US Census
Labor cost as a percentage 
o f state budget/total 
expenditure (Ratio)
State Per-Capita Spending 
(2002)
SPCS State & Local Govt 
Finance, US Census
Per-capita dollar amount 
(Ratio)
State Fiscal Capacity* 
(2002)
SFC State & Local Govt 
Finance, US Census
100 <= 100 Low(0), > 100 
High (1) (Ordinal)
State Deficits (2002) SDEF State & Local Govt 
Finance, US Census
Percentage of state budget/ 
total expenditure (Ratio)
State Union Laws SUL National Rights to Work 
Legal Defense 
Foundation website
Weak (0); Strong (1) 
(Ordinal)
State Political Culture SPC Elazar (1984) DSPC IND = 0; other = 1 
DSPC MOR = 0; other = 1
rWntninah
Party of Governor 
Controlling State 
Government (2002)
GCSG National Governors 
Association website
Republican (0), Democratic 
(1) (Nominal)
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Table 3.1 Continued
Variable Name Abbreviation Source Measurement (Coding of 
Variables)
Party Controlling State 
Legislature (2002)
PCSL National Conference 
of State Legislatures
DPCSL R = 0; other = 1 
DPCSL D = 0; other = 1 
(Nominal)
State Policy Liberalism SPL Erikson, Wright, 
Mclver (1993)
Index ranges from -1.54 
(most Conservative) to 
+2.12 (most Liberal) 
(Interval)
State Ideology SID Berry & Berry 
(1992)
Conservative (0), Liberal 
(1) (Nominal)
State Institutional 
Capacity
SIC Bowman & Keamey 
(1988)
Index runs from -3.326 to 
+4.282 (Interval)
*
State fiscal capacity is calculated in three steps. 1. Per-capita tax revenue (PCR)= total tax revenue 
divided by state population; 2. Average per-capita tax revenue (AVG.PCR) = the sum o f all the per- 
capita tax revenue divided by 50 states. 3. Fiscal capacity is calculated by dividing per-capita tax 
revenue (PCR) by the average per-capita tax revenue (AVG.PCR), and then multiplying the result by 
100. Based on this computation, 100 or less is considered to be low fiscal capacity and is coded as 0; 
101 and above is considered to be high capacity and is coded as 1 (source: Price & Riccucci, 2005).
Data Analyses
The data collected and assembled are analyzed using SPSS program*. Four 
separate state comparative models (socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideology) 
and a combined model are tested using the ordinal logistic regression technique. 
Ordinal logistic regression is appropriate for this study because o f the ordered nature 
of the dependent variable. Ordinal logistic regression model predicts the probabilities
*
Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) program version 20.0 has been used to run the 
statistical tests.
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of outcomes for each case using the maximum likelihood method to estimate the 
model’s parameter coefficients without losing the information contained in the 
ordering o f the dependent variable. The Model Fitting Information, the Goodness-of- 
Fit and the test of significance will be examined to determine the model fit and the 
significant predictor variables. While ordinal logistic regression does not have an 
equivalent to the R-squared that is found in OLS regression (the proportion of variance 
of the dependent variable explained by the predictors), there is a number o f pseudo-R- 
squared statistics which need to be interpreted with caution. In this study, Nagelkerke 
Pseudo R-Squared* will be examined to estimate the variance explained by each o f the 
models.
Data Screening
Prior to conducting multivariate analysis, the data has been screened for 
possible errors. Data screening is the process o f carefully reviewing and cleaning the 
data to ensure quality so that valid conclusions can be drawn from the data; data 
screening increases the likelihood of reducing data errors (Hatcher & Stepan ski, 1994). 
The data have been examined using frequency distributions for categorical variables 
and descriptive statistics for quantitative variables. A frequency distribution 
aggregates the number o f cases with a given value and provides information about the 
percentage or relative frequency distributions of the cases.
*The Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Squared is selected because it has values between 0 and 1 and indicates 
whether the full/fitted model is a far better fit than the intercept/null model. In other words, if the full 
model (the model that included the predictor variables) perfectly predicts the outcome and has a 
likelihood of 1, then Nagelkerke R-Squared = 1. In contrast, Cox and Snell would have a maximum R- 
Squared value that is less than 1, and McFadden’s R-squared is not commonly used because negative R- 
Squared is possible. Hence, the Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Squared is commonly used and is the most 
reported R-Squared estimate in logistic regression (Bums & Bums, 2008; Meyers, Gamst & Guarino, 
2006).
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For categorical variables, the values that correspond to the coded values for the 
possible categories were examined for accuracy. “When reviewing a frequency 
distribution, it is useful to think of these different values as representing categories to 
which a subject may belong” (Hatcher & Stepanski, 1994, p. 106). For quantitative 
variables, descriptive statistics were performed on each quantitative variable to 
generate the means, standard deviations, the minimum and maximum values. The 
ranges of values were examined to ensure that no cases had values outside the range of 
possible values (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010).
Missing Values
Missing values can bias the results o f the data analyses because of loss o f 
legitimate information that should be available (George & Mallery, 2001). Missing 
values were identified and corrected accordingly. Frequency table and descriptive 
statistics provided useful information in identifying missing values for both 
categorical and quantitative variables. Frequency table was used for categorical 
variables and descriptive statistics was used for quantitative variables. SPSS provides 
several options to replace missing data, such as replacing with median value or with 
the mean score of all other cases. However, replacing many missing values can bias 
the results and the replacement should be kept to a small number o f cases; replacing a 
small number of cases has little influence on the outcome o f the analyses (George & 
Mallery, 2001; Mertler &Vannatta, 2010). In this study, an investigation o f the state 
data has shown that 15 of the 50 states had a large number of missing values and were
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excluded from the study. Another case, Alaska, had an outlier and was deleted from 
the data set. The remaining 34 states had usable data and were used in this study.
Outliers
Ordinal logistic regression is sensitive to outliers, and data with extreme values 
were identified using frequency table and descriptive statistics. Outliers are extreme 
scores at one or both ends o f a sample distribution and can adversely affect the results 
of the analyses (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010). “Outliers can exist in both univariate and 
multivariate situations, among dichotomous and continuous variables, and among I Vs 
as well as DVs” (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010, p.27). The frequency table and the 
descriptive statistics allow deciphering the general distributions o f values in the data 
cleaning process, and extreme values were identified and corrected either by deletion 
of cases or by recoding and transforming the data (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010). As 
indicated above Alaska was deleted from the data set because it had one variable (state 
per capita spending) that was found to be an outlier.
Normality
In this study ordinal logistic regression technique is employed to analyze the 
data. One of the advantages of using ordinal logistic regression is that it is flexible in 
its assumptions; “the predictors do not have to be normally distributed, linearly related, 
or have equal variances within each group” (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010, p. 290). 
However, in the data cleaning process, distribution diagnosis was made using 
frequency tables and descriptive statistics as well as graphical methods. For
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categorical variables, bar graphs were generated, and for continuous variables, 
histograms were generated.
Multicollinearity
The data will be examined for multicollinearity. Correlations will be computed 
between the independent variables to identify the variables that are highly correlated 
(intercorrelations of .80 or higher) (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010). “Multicollinearity is a 
problem that arises when moderate to high intercorrelations exist among predictor 
variables to be used in a regression analysis” (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010, p. 163). The 
existence of highly correlated independent variables indicates that the two variables 
are measuring essentially the same thing; one of them can be deleted without losing 
real information (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010).
Limitations
This study employed pre-existing data from multiple sources to examine the 
factors that predict the level of state government privatization. There are a number of 
limitations to this study. One of the limitations involves the sample size; the data for 
the dependent variable are collected from a 50-state survey conducted by the Council 
o f State Governments (CSG) in 2002. While the survey covered all the 50 states, only 
the data for 34 states are usable; the remaining 16 states have incomplete, missing, or 
outlier data and are excluded from the analysis. This limitation raises questions of 
external validity or generalizability because of the fact that results o f the analysis for 
the 34 states cannot be generalized to all the 50 states.
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However, using eight variables measured at interval/ratio scale, a t-test was 
performed to determine if  there was a significant mean difference between the 16 
excluded states and the 34 states that were included in this study; the result revealed 
that there was a statistically significant mean difference in per-capita personal income 
between the two groups. On the other seven measures, statistically significant 
difference was not found (see Appendix D). Since there was no systematic difference 
between the two groups and evidence of sample selection bias was not found, it is safe 
to assume that the results of this study can be generalized to all the 50 states.
Second, the data used are secondary and come from different sources, and the 
accuracy o f the data cannot be verified. Third, history may affect external validity 
because the data collected for both the dependent and independent variables are for 
2002, and some of the measures may have changed over time (O’Sullivan, Rassel, and 
Bemer, 2003). Fourth, confounding variables may also impact the validity of the 
conclusion of this study; for example, while the selfish actions o f politicians and 
bureaucrats are assumed to exist, their influences on the level of state government 
privatization cannot be directly detected, measured, and assessed.
Reliability o f measures is also an issue in this study. While the data for the 
dependent variable and the 10 independent variables are from 2002, data for four 
independent variables are collected from different time periods; that is, data for state 
political culture, state policy liberalism, state ideology, and state institutional capacity 
variables are from 1984, 1993, 1992, and 1988 respectively; in this case the reliability 
of the measures become questionable. These limitations point to some of the potential 
weaknesses o f this study. Although political culture, state policy liberalism, and state
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ideology have been shown to change slightly over time, they are largely assumed to 
remain fairly consistent for a long period of time (Berry & Berry, 1992). State 
institutional capacity is expected to change over time as well, but for lack of recent 
data, the Bowman & Kearney (1988) index is utilized; while these variables may be 
assumed to change slightly over time, the focus o f this study is to examine the level of 
state government privatization at a given point in time (2002) and is static in nature 
and does not attempt to measure changes over time. This static approach therefore 
minimizes the problem associated with the reliability o f measures.
Delimitations
The scope of the statistical analysis of this study is limited to privatized 
services aggregated by four departments (correction, transportation, education, and 
health & human services) and does not investigate specific services or programs that 
are likely to be privatized by each department. Furthermore, this study simply focuses 
on the level of state government privatization, and the statistical investigation will not 
address the nature o f the privatized services, the modes of privatization, the reasons 
why they were privatized, and whether the desired results were achieved or not. Also 
the study is confined by data collected in 2002 and does not attempt to look beyond 
the prescribed one-year time frame. Chapter IV provides the results o f the data 
analyses. Chapter V presents the conclusions, the limitation of this study, and 
suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS OF THE DATA ANALYSIS
Introduction
Chapter III laid out the research design, the data collection method, and the 
analytical technique. This chapter presents the results o f the data analyses in four 
separate sections. The first section provides an overview of the data diagnosis results, 
the second section reports the frequencies and descriptive statistics that included 
univariate and bivariate statistics and individual hypotheses tests. The third section 
presented the multivariate analyses of the four state comparative models 
(socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological models) and a model o f best fit 
that combined the significant predictor variables from each of the four models. The 
last section provides the chapter summary
Data Diagnosis Results
To determine the extent o f missing values, outliers, and multicollinearity, 
frequency distribution and descriptive statistics were performed on both the dependent 
and independent variables using SPSS 20.0 program. The data screening process 
showed a missing value for one nominal independent variable, party controlling state 
legislature (PCSL), for Nebraska; this is so because the state of Nebraska has a 
unicameral legislature with nonpartisan control. The missing value represents less 
than three percent of the variable in question, namely, party controlling the state
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legislature, and is not expected to affect the statistical test significantly. In fact, a 
preliminary statistical test of the political model, which contains the party controlling 
state legislature variable, was run with the missing value and then compared with the 
result of the model that was run without the missing value. The results were identical, 
and the case with the missing value (in this case Nebraska) is left in the dataset 
without further action.
The data screening analysis also revealed that two ratio level independent 
variables were positively skewed; state labor cost (SLC) (skew = 1.725) and state per- 
capita spending (SPCS) (skew = 3.445) were skewed in a positive direction. A log 
transformation of the variable state labor cost corrected the skew to the normal limit of 
between 0 and 1 (skew = .712). However, neither the log-transformed nor the non­
transformed state labor cost variable was found to be a significant predictor o f the 
dependent variable, and the original (the non-log transformed) form was kept in the 
dataset for ease of interpreting the coefficients (which are in log-odds units) generated 
by the ordinal logistic regression.
The log transformation of the state per-capita spending (SPCS) variable failed 
to correct the skewness to its normal limit. The skewness still remained slightly higher 
(skew = 1.762) than the normal limit. Alaska was the case that contributed to the 
positive skew with its state per-capita spending being $11,111.87 compared to the 
maximum state per-capita spending o f $6,037.25 and the mean value of $4,292.67 for 
all other cases. The economic model that contains the state per-capita spending 
variable was run using the original value (the non-log transformed form) for Alaska. 
Then the model was run again using the log-transformed value. The results o f the two
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models were compared. In the former case, only the state deficit was significant; state 
fiscal capacity, state per-capita spending, and state labor cost were not significant. 
However, fiscal capacity and state per capita spending approached significance in a 
two-tailed test with a p-value of .050 and .088 respectively at p <.05. In the latter case, 
that is, with the log-transformed variable, only state labor cost was found not to be 
significant. The other three variables (state fiscal capacity, state deficit, and state per- 
capita spending) became unambiguously statistically significant.
However, the log-transformation did not completely remove the skewness o f 
the state per-capita spending variable, and its use or inclusion in the model is expected 
to distort the results o f the statistical test. In addition, the log-odds unit o f the 
transformed variable poses difficulty in terms of interpreting the coefficients generated 
by the ordinal regression analysis because of the fact that the coefficients are also in 
log-odds units. To get around these two problems, the case that contributed to the 
skewness (Alaska) was removed from the dataset. A t-test was performed on state per 
capita spending by creating two dichotomous groups (one with Alaska included and 
another with Alaska removed) to determine if there are significant mean differences 
between the two groups in terms of their influence on the dependent variable. No 
significant difference was found.
While a significant influence did not exist between the two groups, Alaska was 
nonetheless removed from the dataset for subsequent statistical analysis. This was 
done because outliers can unduly influence the results o f the statistical test causing 
some variables to be insignificant when in fact they are significant or vice versa 
(Mertler & Vannatta, 2010). As indicated above, the retention of Alaska caused two
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out o f the four variables in the economic model to be insignificant when in fact they 
were significant; for this reason Alaska is removed from the dataset. The undesirable 
consequence of this action is that the sample size would be reduced to 34 cases (states).
The diagnostic analysis o f the continuous variables did not reveal problems 
with multicollinearity with collinearity statistics showing levels o f tolerance ranging 
from .281 to .810 and variance inflation factor (VIF) ranging between 1.234 and 3.565. 
Values of tolerance greater than 0.1 and values o f VIF less than 10 indicate that 
multicollinearity is not a problem (Mertler & Vannatta, 2010).
Descriptive Statistics 
This section reports the frequencies and descriptive statistics for all the 
variables that include univariate and bivariate statistics. First, the frequency 
distributions and the associated percentages for the dependent variable are reported. 
Second, the summary statistics for all quantitative independent variables are reported. 
Third, the frequency distributions and percentages for all categorical variables are 
presented. Fourth, the bivariate results are presented.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is coded with three categories (low, medium, high), 
and the extent of the distributions are shown in Table 4.1 below. Out of the 34 states 
included in this study, twelve (35.3%) states are engaged in a low level o f state 
government privatization, thirteen (38.2.0%) states are engaged in medium level o f
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state government privatization, and nine (26.5%) states are engaged in high level of 
state government privatization.
Table 4.1
Dependent Variable: Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP)
Category Frequencies (N) %
Low 12 35.3
Medium 13 38.2
High 9 26.5
N (Total) 34 100.00
Quantitative Independent Variables
Summary statistics for all quantitative variables are presented in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2
Summary Statistics for Quantitative Independent Variables
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Healthcare Spending % expend 3.43 1.22 1.70 5.84
Per-capita Personal Income $32,.828.00 $4,394.00 $24,830.00 $43,980.00
Pension Spending % expend 7.11 1.96 3.68 12.04
Labor Cost % expend 15.55 3.49 10.06 27.90
Per-capita Spending $4,292.67 $752.07 $3,174.31 $6,037.25
Deficit % expend -4.13 11.14 -24.16 15.96
State Institutional Capacity -0.15 1.80 -2.62 4.22
State Policy Liberalism -0.16 0.88 -1.54 1.49
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Categorical Independent Variables
Table 4.3 below presents the descriptive statistics for categorical independent 
variables. The frequency distribution reveals that eighteen (52.9 %) states have weak 
union laws and sixteen (47.1 %) states have strong union laws. The distribution of 
political culture shows that fourteen (41.2%) states are moralistic, ten (29.4%) states 
are individualistic, and ten (29.4%) states are traditionalistic. The distribution of party 
affiliation of governor controlling state government shows that sixteen (47.1%) states 
are Republican controlled and eighteen (52.9%) states are Democratic controlled. The 
distribution of the party controlling state legislature shows that sixteen (47.1%) states 
had Republican controlled legislatures, nine (26.5%) states had Democratic controlled 
legislatures, and eight (23.5%) states had split controlled legislatures. One state, 
Nebraska, has a missing value, which accounts for only 2.9%; Nebraska has a 
unicameral legislature with nonpartisan control and is not classified as Republican or 
Democratic. The state ideology distribution shows that eleven (32.4%) states are 
ideologically conservative and twenty three (67.6%) states are ideologically liberal.
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Table 4.3
Summary Statistics for Categorical Independent Variables
Variable %  (N) List of States
State Fiscal 
Capacity
Low 61.8 (21) AZ, AR, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, 
LA,
MO, NE, NV, NH, OK, PA, SC, TN, 
TX, UT, WA
High 38.2 (13) CA, KY, MI, MT, NJ, NM, ND, OR, RI, 
SD, VT, WV, WY
State Union 
Laws*
Weak 52.9(18) AZ, AR, FL, GA, ID, IA, KS, LA, NE, 
NV, ND, OK, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, WY
Strong 47.1 (16) CA, IL, IN, KY, MI, MO, MT, NH, NJ, 
NM, OR, PA, RI, VT, WA, WV
State Political 
Culture
Moralistic 41.2 (14) CA, ID, IA, KS, MI, MT, NH, ND, OR, 
SC, SD, UT, VT, WA
Individualistic 29.4 (10) IL, IN, KY, MO, NE, NV, NJ, PA, RI, 
WY
Traditionalistic 29.4 (10) AZ, AR, FL, GA, LA, NM, OK, TN, 
TX, WV
Party of Governor 
Controlling State 
Government
Republican 47.1 (16) AR, FL, GA, ID, LA, MT, NE, NV, NH, 
ND, RI, SC, SD, TX, UT, VT
Democratic 52.9(18) AZ, CA, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, MI, MO, 
NJ, NM, OK, OR, PA, TN, WA, WV, 
WY
Party Controlling 
State Legislature
Republican 47.1 (16) AZ, FL, ID, IA, KS, MI, MO, MT, NH, 
ND, OR, SC, SD, TX, UT, WY
Democratic 26.5 (9) AR, CA, IL, LA, NM, OK, RI, TN, WV
Split 23.5 (8) GA, IN, KY, NV, NJ, PA, VT, WA
State Ideology Conservative 32.4(11) AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MO, OK, SC, 
TN, TX, WV
Liberal 67.6 (23) AZ, CA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MT, 
NE, NV, NH, NJ, NM, ND, OR, PA, RI, 
SD, UT, VT, WA, WY,
* Weak and strong union law categories are based on the states that have “the right to work” laws and 
states that do not have “the right to work” laws respectively.
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Bivariate Analyses
Categorical Independent Variables
The bivariate relationships between the categorical variables and the dependent 
variable were computed using cross tabulations and measures of strength of 
association statistics. Cross-tabulations provide in tabular format the relationship 
between two or more categorical variables and allow a comparison o f the proportion 
of subjects in different groups and their relative impact on the response variable 
(Plichta & Garzon, 2009; George & Mallery, 2001). Also, the strength of associations 
between each of the categorical independent variable and the dependent variable is 
examined using the measure that is appropriate for the level of measurement (ordinal 
or nominal). As such, in this study, the strength of associations between ordinal 
independent variables and the dependent variable, which is also ordinal, is measured 
using Sommer’s d coefficients. The Sommer’s d measure is used when both the 
dependent and independent variables are measured at ordinal level (Jones and Olson, 
2005). The Sommer’s d measure is also chosen because it is appropriate for use with a 
table of any size and can be used for hypotheses that specify directional relationships 
(Jones and Olson, 2005).
Similarly, Cramer’s V can be used to measure the strength o f associations 
between nominal predictor variables and ordinal dependent variable (George & 
Mallery, 2001; Jones and Olson, 2005). For example, Jones and Olson (2005) suggest 
using “this measure [Cramer’s V] with any size table if  at least one o f the variables in 
a particular contingency table is nominal” (p.280). According to Jones and Olson
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(2005), the measures of associations assume values ranging “from 0 to 1.0 for 
nominal-level data and from -1.0 to 1.0 for ordinal and metric levels o f data” (p.278).
While the existence, direction, and strength of the relationships between the 
independent and the dependent variables are examined, the chi square test of 
significance is not performed because the data is not a probability sample. Jones and 
Olson (2005) note that “Statistical significance tests are premised on probability 
theory” (p.286). The data used for this study represent all the cases in the population 
of interest (in this case the 50 states), and “it is inappropriate to use statistical 
significance tests when [working] with the entire population in lieu of a sample o f the 
population” (Jones and Olson, 2005, p.286); with this caveat, the results o f the 
bivariate analyses are presented in the pages that follow.
State Fiscal Capacity
State fiscal capacity variable is measured at ordinal level and has low and high 
categories. The results o f the bivariate analysis are shown in Table 4.4 below. An 
examination of the results o f the column percent entries for low fiscal capacity shows 
that 42.9 percent o f the states have low levels of state government privatization, 28.6 
percent have medium levels of state government privatization, and 28.6 percent have 
high levels of state government privatization. Similarly, and examination of the 
column percent entries for high fiscal capacity show that 23.1 percent o f the states 
have low levels of state government privatization, 53.8 percent have medium level of 
state government privatization, and 23.1 percent have high levels o f state government 
privatization.
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The percentages suggest that there is a strong association between state fiscal 
capacity and the levels of state government privatization, as measured by Sommer’s d 
coefficient value of .543. According to Jones and Olson (2005), the coefficient value 
of .50 or higher is interpreted as having “substantial/strong or very strong relationship” 
(p.280) in a positive or negative direction between the independent and the dependent 
variables. As noted above, the Sommer’s d measure is asymmetrical and allows 
considering the direction of the relationships when interpreting the values o f the 
coefficients for ordinal variables. In this study, it was hypothesized that states with 
low fiscal capacity were more likely to have higher levels o f state government 
privatization. The results show that, for most of the states, the associations were in the 
opposite direction than suggested by the hypothesized relationship.
As shown in Table 4.4 below, a majority o f states (42.9 percent) with low 
fiscal capacity were associated with low level of state government privatization 
compared to only 23.1 percent of states with high fiscal capacity. Also, only 28.6 
percent of states with low capacity were associated with medium level of state 
government privatization compared to a majority o f states (53.8 percent) with high 
fiscal capacity. However, for the higher level of state government privatization 
category, the result appeared to be consistent with the hypothesized relationship; 28.6 
percent o f states with low fiscal capacity were associated with high level o f state 
government privatization compared to only 23.1 percent o f states with high fiscal 
capacity. Overall, however, the majority o f states appeared to have relationships with 
the levels of state government privatization in the opposite direction than expected.
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Table 4.4
Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP) by State Fiscal Capacity
State Fiscal Capacity
Level of State Government 
Privatization
Low 
N (%)
High 
N (%)
Total
N (%)
Low 9 (42.9) 3 (23.1) 12 (35.3)
Medium 6 (28.6) 7(53.8) 13 (38.2)
High 6(28.6) 3 (23.1) 9 (26.5)
Total 21 (100.0) 13 (100.0) 34 (100.0)
Somer’s d = .543
State Union Laws
The state union laws variable is measured at ordinal level and has two 
categories: weak and strong. As shown in Table 4.5 below, the results o f bivariate 
analysis indicate that 38.9 percent, 27.8 percent, and 33.3 percent o f states with weak 
union laws have low, medium, and high levels o f state government privatization 
respectively. On the other hand, 31.2 percent, 50.0 percent, and 18.8 percent of states 
with strong union laws have low, medium, and high levels of state government 
privatization respectively. The Somer’s d coefficient value of .921 suggests that there 
is a very strong association between state union laws and the levels of state 
government privatization.
The direction of associations for state union laws variable is similar to that for 
state fiscal capacity variable. It was hypothesized that weak union laws/power would 
lead to higher levels of state government privatization; but, as shown in Table 4.5 
below, the results suggest that 38.9 percent o f states with weak union laws were 
associated with low level o f state government privatization compared to 31.2 percent
of states with strong union laws, which is in the opposite direction than expected. Also, 
only 27.8 percent of states with weak union laws were associated with medium level 
of state government privatization compared to 50.0 percent of states with strong union 
laws. However, 33.3 percent o f states with weak union laws were associated with high 
levels of state government privatization compared to only 18.8 percent o f states with 
strong union laws, which is consistent with the stated hypothesis. Overall, for the 
majority of states, the relationships with the levels of state government privatization 
were in the opposite direction than suggested by the stated hypothesis.
Table 4.5
Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP) by State Union Laws
State Union Laws
Level of State Government Weak Strong Total
Privatization N (%) N (%) N (%)
Low 7 (38.9) 5 (31.2) 12 (35.3)
Medium 5 (27.8) 8 (50.0) 13 (38.2)
High 6(33.3) 3 (18.8) 9 (26.5)
Total 18 (100.0) 16(100.0) 34 (100.0)
Somers’d = .921
State Political Culture
The state political culture variable has three categories: moralistic, 
individualistic, and traditionalistic. The results o f the bivariate analyses are presented 
in Table 4.6 below. Looking at the percentages o f column entries for state political 
culture, the results indicate that 50.0 percent, 40.0 percent, and 10.0 percent o f states
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with individualistic political culture have low, medium, and high levels o f state 
government privatization respectively. The column percent entries for moralistic 
culture show that 42.9 percent, 35.7 percent, and 21.4 percent o f the states have low, 
medium, and high levels of state government privatization. Similarly, the percent 
entries for traditionalistic culture indicate that 10.0 percent, 40.0 percent, and 50.0 
percent o f states with traditionalistic culture have low, medium, and high levels of 
state government privatization. Cramer’s V value of .214 suggests that there is a weak 
association between state political culture and the levels o f state government 
privatization.
Table 4.6
Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP) by State Political Culture
State Political Culture
Level of State Government Individualistic Moralistic Traditionalistic Total
Privatization N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
Low 5 (50.0) 6 (42.9) 1 (10.0) 12 (35.3)
Medium 4 (40.0) 5 (35.7) 4 (40.0) 13 (38.2)
High 1(10.0) 3 (21.4) 5 (50.0) 9 (26.5)
Total 10 (100.0) 14 (100.0) 10 (100.0) 34 (100.0)
Cramer’s V = .214
Party Affiliation o f  the Governor Controlling State Government
The party affiliation of the governor controlling state government variable has 
two categories: Republican and Democratic. The results o f the bivariate analyses are 
presented in Table 4.7 below. The column percent entries for Republican show that 
37.5 percent, 43.8 percent, and 18.8 percent of states with Republican governors have
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low, medium, and high levels of state government privatization respectively. Similarly, 
the column percent entries for Democratic governors show that states with an equal 
percentage of 33.3 percent each have low, medium, and high levels of state 
government privatization respectively. The Cramer’s V value of .686 suggests that 
there is a strong association between the party o f governor controlling state 
government and the levels o f state government privatization.
Table 4.7
Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP) by Party of Governor 
Controlling State Government
Party of Governor Controlling 
State Government
Level of State Government Republican Democratic Total
Privatization N (%) N (%) N (%)
Low 6 (37.5) 6 (33.3) 12(35.3)
Medium 7 (43.8) 6(33.3) 13 (38.2)
High 3(18.8) 6 (33.3) 9 (26.5)
Total 16(100.0) 18 (100.0) 34(100.0)
Cramer’s V = .686
The Party Controlling State Legislature
The party controlling state legislature variable has three categories: Republican, 
Democratic, and split controls. As shown in Table 4.8 below, the column percent 
entries for Republican category show that 37.5 percent o f states with Republican 
governors have low levels o f state government privatization, and another 37.5 percent 
and 25.0 percent have medium and high levels o f state government privatization
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respectively. The Democratic category shows that states with an equal percentage of 
33.3 percent each have low, medium, and high levels of state government privatization 
respectively. Also, the column percent entries for split control show that 37.5 percent 
of states are in the low category of state government privatization, another 37.5 
percent o f states are in the medium category, and 25.0 percent are in the high category 
of state government privatization. The Cramer’s V value of .994 indicates that there is 
a very strong relationship between party controlling state legislature and the level of 
state government privatization.
Table 4.8
Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP) by Party Controlling State 
Legislature
Party Controlling State Legislature
Level of State Government 
Privatization
Republican
N (%)
Democratic 
N (%)
Split Control 
N (%)
Total
N (%)
Low 6 (37.5) 3 (33.3) 3 (37.5) 12 (36.4)
Medium 6 (37.5) 3 (33.3) 3 (37.5) 12 (36.4)
High 4(25.0) 3 (33.3) 2 (25.0) 9 (27.3)
Total 16(100.0) 9 (100.0) 8 (100.0) 33 (100.0)
Cramer’s V = .994
State Ideology
The state ideology variable has two categories: conservative and liberal. The 
results of the bivariate analyses are presented in Table 4.9 below. The column percent 
entries for conservative category show that 27.3 percent, 45.5 percent, and 27.3 
percent o f states with conservative ideology have low, medium, and high levels of
153
state government privatization respectively. Similarly, the column percent entries for 
liberal category show that 39.1 percent, 34.8 percent, and 26.1 percent of states with 
liberal ideology have low, medium, and high levels o f state government privatization 
respectively. The Cramer’s V value of .896 suggests that there is a very strong 
association between state ideology and the levels of state government privatization.
Table 4.9
Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP) by State Ideology
State Ideology
Level of State Government 
Privatization
Conservative 
N (%)
Liberal 
N (%)
Total 
N (%)
Low 3 (27.3) 9 (39.1) 12(35.3)
Medium 5 (45.5) 8 (34.8) 13 (38.2)
High 3 (27.3) 6 (26.1) 9 (26.5)
Total 11 (100.0) 23 (100.0) 34 (100.0)
Cramer’s V = .896
Hypotheses Tests o f Independent Variables
This section presents the results of the statistics for fourteen hypotheses that 
were operationalized using both quantitative and categorical measures. Ordinal 
logistic regression with a logit link function was run to test the hypotheses. A 
summary of the parameter estimates is provided for all the independent variables in 
Table 4.10. The results of other statistical analyses are reported in the context o f the 
stated hypotheses. For the parameter estimates, the coefficients returned from an
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ordinal logistic regression (OLR) are in log-odds units, and the interpretation of the 
effect o f a predictor variable on the dependent variable is also based on the ordered 
log-odds estimate. However, the interpretation of the log-odds estimates o f the 
coefficients is not straightforward; for this reason, the odds ratio (exp (£)) estimate is 
used to interpret the coefficients for statistically significant predictor variables.
Hypothesis 1: States with higher health care expenditures are more likely to have 
higher level of state government privatization than states with lower health care 
expenditures.
The model fitting information for the final model, the parameter o f the model 
for which the model fit is calculated, is not significant (%2 = .599, d f = 1, p-value = 
.439) at .05 level; this suggests that the inclusion of the state health care expenditure 
variable in the model did not show an improvement over the intercept only model. 
However, the Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions (the goodness- 
of-fit tests) were not statistically significant suggesting that the model adequately fits 
the data (Pearson y2 = 58.626, df = 59, p-value = .489; Deviance, %L = 63.953, df =
59, p-value = .307). Overall, only 2% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .020) o f the variation 
in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variable. Furthermore, with a 
chi-square test value of .130 for the general model and an associated p-value o f .729, 
the test of parallel lines failed to reject the null hypothesis which states that there is no 
difference in the coefficients across response categories. The result indicates that the 
proportional odds assumption is not violated.
The results of the parameter estimates are shown in the summary Table 4.10. A 
Wald statistics of .526 and associated p-value of .468 indicates that the state health
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care expenditure variable is not found to be a statistically significant predictor o f the 
level of state government privatization. However, the negative coefficient shows that 
the state health care expenditure variable has an inverse relationship with the low level 
o f state privatization, which is consistent with the stated hypothesis. The result 
nonetheless suggests that the hypothesis is not supported.
Hypothesis 2: States with higher pension spending are more likely to have higher 
level of state government privatization than states with lower pension spending.
Although the model fitting information for the final model is not completely 
significant, it can be stated that it approaches significance (%2 = 3.83, d f = 1, p-value = 
.066) at .05 level. Nonetheless, the statistical result indicates that the inclusion of the 
state pension spending variable in the model did not show an improvement over the 
intercept only model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were 
not statistically significant which indicate that the model adequately fits the data. 
(Pearson x2 -  61.846, df = 63, p-value = .517; Deviance, y(2 = 67.760, df = 63, p-value 
= .318). Also about 11% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .107) o f the variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by the predictor variable. The chi-square test value of 
2.128 for the general model and an associated p-value o f . 145 shows that the test of 
parallel lines failed to reject the null hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption 
is not violated.
The summary Table 4.10 presents the results o f the parameter estimates. A 
Wald statistics of 3.012 and associated p-value of .083 indicates that the state pension 
spending variable approached significance at .05 level, but is not quite significant; this 
result is for a two-tailed test of significance; however, the hypothesis is directional,
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and the variable state pensions spending is significant at p-value of .042 (.083 divided 
by two) for a one-tailed test. Furthermore, the negative sign of the coefficient shows 
that the influence of the state pension spending variable on the level of state 
government privatization is in the expected direction as suggested by the hypothesis. 
The result thus indicates that the hypothesis is supported. As such, the finding 
suggests that states with higher pension spending, compared to states with low pension 
spending, have .736 times more chances o f having higher level o f state government 
privatization than lower level of privatization.
Hypothesis 3: States with higher per capita personal income are more likely to have 
lower level of state government privatization than states with lower per capita personal 
income.
The results of the OLR test shows that the model fitting information for the 
final model is not significant (x2 = .841, d f = 1, p-value = .359) at .05 level, which 
suggests that the state per capita personal income variable did not show an 
improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi- 
square distributions were not statistically significant which indicate that the model 
adequately fits the data. (Pearson y2 = 67.546, d f = 65, p-value = .390; Deviance, y2 -  
73.075, d f = 65, p-value = .230). However, only 2.8% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .028) 
of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variable. Also, 
the chi-square test value of .002 for the general model and an associated p-value 
of .967 shows that the test o f parallel lines failed to reject the null hypothesis and the 
proportional odds assumption is retained.
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The summary Table 4.10 shows the results o f the parameter estimates. A Wald 
statistics of .770 and associated p-value o f .380 indicates that the state per capita 
personal income variable is not significant. However, the positive sign of the 
coefficient shows that the influence of state per capita personal income variable on the 
level o f state government privatization is in the opposite direction than expected, and 
the hypothesis is not supported.
Hypothesis 4: States with higher labor costs are more likely to have higher level o f 
state government privatization than states with lower labor costs.
The results of the model fitting information shows that the model is not 
significant (%2 = .077, d f=  1, p-value = .782) at .05 level; this suggests that the state 
labor cost variable did not show an improvement over the intercept only model. The 
Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not statistically 
significant which indicate that the model adequately fits the data. (Pearson y l  =
63.317, df = 63, p-value = .396; Deviance, %2 = 71.067, df = 63, p-value = .227).
Only 0.3% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R = .003) of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by the predictor variable. Also, the chi-square test value of .668 for the 
general model and an associated p-value of .414 shows that the test of parallel lines 
failed to reject the null hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption is not violated.
The summary Table 4.10 shows the results o f the parameter estimates. A Wald 
statistics o f .092 and associated p-value of .795 indicates that the state labor cost 
variable is not significant; and the negative coefficient shows that the state labor cost 
variable is inversely related to the level of state government privatization which is in 
the opposite direction than expected. The hypothesis is not supported. .
158
Hypothesis 5: States with higher per capita spending are more likely to have higher 
level of state government privatization than states with lower per capita spending.
Overall, the model is not significant (x2 = .351, d f  = 1, p-value = .574) at .05 
level; the result indicates that the state per capita spending variable did not show an 
improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi- 
square distributions were not statistically significant which indicate that the model 
adequately fits the data. (Pearson j l  -  67.711, d f = 65, p-value = .385; Deviance, x2 = 
73.601, df = 65, p-value = .217). Only 1% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .010) of the 
variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variable. Also, the test 
of parallel lines with the chi-square test value of .269 and p-value o f .604 failed to 
reject the null hypothesis. As shown in the summary Table 4.10, a Wald statistics o f 
.290 and a p-value of .590 indicate that the state per capita spending variable is not 
significant; and. the hypothesis is not supported.
Hypothesis 6: States with higher fiscal capacity are more likely to have lower level of 
state government privatization than states with lower fiscal capacity.
The statistical result shows that the state fiscal capacity variable has a direct 
relationship with the dependent variable, which is in the opposite direction than 
suggested by the hypothesis above. The influence o f state fiscal capacity variable on 
the dependent variable is however insignificant. As shown in Table 4.10, a Wald test 
statistics o f .308 with an associated p-value of .579 indicates that fiscal capacity 
variable is not found to be a statistically significant predictor of the level of 
privatization, and the hypothesis is not supported. Also, only 1.1% (Nagelkerke 
Pseudo R2 = .011) of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the
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predictor variable. Overall, the model is not significant (%2 = .320, d f = 1, p-value = 
.572) at .05 level; the result indicates that the state fiscal capacity variable did not 
show an improvement over the intercept only model. Similarly, the Pearson and 
deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not statistically significant indicating 
that the model fits the data adequately (Pearson y2 = 2.027, df = 1, p-value = .154; 
Deviance, y2 = 2.016, d f = 1, p-value = .156). Also, the test of parallel lines with the 
chi-square test value of 2.016 and p-value of .156 failed to reject the null hypothesis 
and the proportional odds assumption is not violated.
Hypothesis 7: States with higher deficits are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with lower deficits.
The result of the model fitting information for the final model shows that the 
model is not significant (y2 = .906, df -  1, p-value = .341) at .05 level, which suggests 
that the state deficits variable did not show an improvement over the intercept only 
model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not 
statistically significant indicating that the model fits the data adequately (Pearson %2 = 
68.636, df = 65, p-value = .355; Deviance, y2 = 73.010, d f = 65, p-value = .232). 
However, only 3% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .030) of the variation in the dependent 
variable is explained by the predictor variable. Also, the chi-square test value of .001 
for the general model and an associated p-value o f .977 shows that the test of parallel 
lines failed to reject the null hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption is not 
violated. As shown in the summary Table 4.10, a Wald statistics o f .977 and 
associated p-value of .327 indicates that the state deficits variable is not found to be a
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statistically significant predictor o f the level of state government privatization. The 
result indicates that the hypothesis is not supported.
Hypothesis 8: States with weak union power are more likely to have higher level o f 
state government privatization than states with strong union power.
The model fitting information for the final model is not significant { j l  = .042, 
df = 1, p-value = .838) at .05 level. The inclusion of the state union power variable in 
the model did not show an improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson 
and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not statistically significant 
suggesting that the model adequately fits the data (Pearson %2 = 1.876, df = 1, p-value 
= .171; Deviance, j l  = 1.893, d f = 1, p-value = .169). Overall, only 1% (Nagelkerke 
Pseudo R2 = .001) of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the 
predictor variable. A chi-square test value of 1.893 for the general model and an 
associated p-value of .169 indicate that the test o f parallel lines failed to reject the null 
hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption is not violated.
The results of the parameter estimates are shown in the summary Table 4.10. A 
Wald statistics of .042 and associated p-value of .838 indicates that the state union 
power variable is not found to be a statistically significant predictor o f the level of 
state government privatization. However, the negative coefficient shows that the state 
union power variable has an inverse relationship with the low level o f state 
government privatization which is consistent with the stated hypothesis. The result 
nonetheless suggests that the hypothesis is not supported.
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Hypothesis 9: States with individualistic/traditionalistic political culture are more 
likely to have higher level o f state government privatization than states with moralistic 
political culture.
The model fitting information for the final model is significant (x2 = 6.071, df 
= 2, p-value = .048) at .05 level. The inclusion o f the state political culture variable in 
the model showed an improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson and 
deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not statistically significant suggesting 
that the model adequately fits the data (Pearson y2 = .400, df = 2, p-value -  .819; 
Deviance, y2 = .405, df = 2, p-value = .817). Overall, 18.4 % (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 
= . 184) of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor 
variable. Furthermore, a chi-square test value of .405 for the general model and an 
associated p-value of .817 indicate that the test o f parallel lines failed to reject the null 
hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption is not violated.
The results o f the parameter estimates are shown in the summary Table 4.10. 
With a Wald statistics o f 4.896 and an associated p-value of .027, the individualistic 
political culture was found to be a statistically significant predictor o f the level of state 
government privatization, but in the opposite direction than expected and the 
hypothesis was not supported. The significant result suggests that states with an 
individualistic political culture, compared to traditionalistic political culture, have 7.42 
times decreased chances of having a higher level o f state government privatization 
than a lower level of state government privatization. Similarly, with a Wald statistics 
of 3.624 and associated p-value of .057, the moralistic political culture approached 
significance at .05 level of significance. Therefore, the hypothesis is supported, and 
states with a moralistic political culture, compared to traditionalistic political culture,
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have 4.768 times greater chances of having a lower level of state government 
privatization than a higher level of state government privatization.
Hypothesis 10: States with Republican governors are more likely to have higher level 
of state government privatization than states with Democratic governors.
The model fitting information for the final model is not significant (x2 = .451, 
df = 1, p-value = .502) at .05 level. The inclusion of the governor controlling state 
government variable in the model did not show an improvement over the intercept 
only model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not 
statistically significant suggesting that the model adequately fits the data (Pearson y l  = 
.526, df = 1, p-value = .468; Deviance, y l  = .528, df = 1, p-value = .467). Overall, 
only 1.5% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .015) o f the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by the predictor variable. The test o f parallel lines with a chi-square test 
value of .528 and an associated p-value of .467 was not found to be significant and 
failed to reject the null hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption is retained.
As shown in the summary Table 4.10, the results of the parameter estimates with a 
Wald statistics of .426 and associated p-value o f .504 indicates that the governor 
controlling state government is not found to be statistically significant, and the 
hypothesis is not supported.
Hypothesis 11: States with Republican-controlled legislature are more likely to have 
higher level o f state government privatization than states with Democratic-controlled 
legislature.
The model fitting information for the final model was not significant (y l = 
.152, d f = 2, p-value = .927). The inclusion of the party controlling state legislature
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variable in the model did not improve the intercept only model. The Pearson and 
deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not statistically significant indicating 
that the model adequately fits the data (Pearson y l  = .264, d f = 2, p-value = .876; 
Deviance, y l  = .264, df = 2, p-value = .876). Overall, only .5% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 
= .005) of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor 
variable. The test of parallel lines with a chi-square test value of .264 and an 
associated p-value of .876 was not found to be significant and failed to reject the null 
hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption was not violated; the summary Table 
4.10 shows the results of the parameter estimates. With a Wald statistics o f .003 and 
associated p-value of .953, the Republican Party was found to be insignificant 
compared to the split control. Similarly, with a Wald statistics of .083 and a p-value of 
.773, the Democratic Party was insignificant compared to a split control. Therefore, 
the hypothesis is not supported.
Hypothesis 12: States with conservative government policy are more likely to have 
higher level of state government privatization than states with liberal government 
policy.
The result of the model fitting information for the final model shows that the 
model is not significant (y l = .246, d f = 1, p-value = .620) at .05 level, which suggests 
that the inclusion of state (government) policy liberalism variable in the model did not 
show an improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson and deviance 
statistics chi-square distributions were not statistically significant indicating that the 
model fits the data adequately (Pearson y l  = 68.658, d f = 61, p-value = .234;
Deviance, y l  = 73.670, df = 61, p-value = .128), but only .8% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2
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= .008) of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor 
variable. As shown in the summary Table 4.10, a Wald statistics o f .263 and 
associated p-value of .608 indicates that the state (government) policy liberalism 
variable is not found to be a statistically significant predictor of the level of 
privatization which also indicates that the hypothesis is not supported.
However, with a chi-square test value of 7.024 and an associated p-value 
of .008, the test of parallel lines was significant, which indicates that the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the proportional odds assumption is violated. A multinomial 
regression was run to test the hypothesis, but the variable failed to achieve statistical 
significance and the result is similar to that for ordinal logistic regression; therefore 
the result o f the ordinal logistic analysis is retained.
Hypothesis 13: States with conservative state ideology are more likely to have higher 
level of state government privatization than states with liberal state ideology.
The result o f the model fitting information for the final model was not 
significant (y l  = .223, df = 1, p-value = .637) at .05 level, which suggests that the 
inclusion of the state ideology variable in the model did not show an improvement 
over the intercept only model. But the Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square 
distributions were not statistically significant which indicate that the model fits the 
data adequately (Pearson y l  = .309, d f = 1, p-value = .578; Deviance, y l  = .307, df =
1, p-value = .580). Overall, only 0.7% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .007) of the variation 
in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variable. The test o f parallel 
lines with a chi-square test value o f .307 and an associated p-value of .580 was not 
found to be significant and failed to reject the null hypothesis and the proportional
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odds assumption was not violated. Also, the summary Table 4.10 shows the results o f 
the parameter estimates. With a Wald statistics o f -.316 and associated p-value of .641, 
the state ideology variable is not found to be a statistically significant predictor of the 
level o f privatization, and the hypothesis is not supported.
Hypothesis 14: States with higher institutional capacity are more likely to have lower 
level o f state government privatization than states with lower institutional capacity.
The statistical result shows that the state institutional capacity variable has a 
negative relationship with the dependent variable as expected, but its influence on the 
dependent variable was insignificant. As shown in the summary Table 4.10 below, a 
Wald test statistics of .015 and an associated p-value of .902 suggest that the state 
institutional capacity variable is not found to be a statistically significant predictor of 
the level of state government privatization, and the hypothesis is not supported. The 
model fitting information also shows that the final model that included the predictor 
variable was not significant; this suggests that the inclusion of the state institutional 
capacity variable in the model did not show an improvement over the intercept only 
model. Likewise, the goodness-of-fit test result shows that the model fits the data 
adequately; the Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not 
statistically significant (Pearson y l  = 68.108, df = 65, p-value = .372; Deviance, y l  = 
73.901, df = 65, p-value = .210). However, only .1% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .001) 
of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variable.
The test o f parallel lines turned out to be significant with a chi-square test 
value of 4.192 and an associated p-value of .041. The result suggests that the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the proportional odds assumption is violated. A multinomial
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regression was run to test the hypothesis for state institutional capacity variable, but 
the test failed to achieve statistical significance as predictor of the level o f state 
government privatization. Therefore, the ordinal logistic regression result is retained.
Table 4.10
Bivariate Ordinal Logistic Regression: Parameter Estimates of Independent
Variables
Hypotheses Variable 0 S.E. Wald d f Sig. Exp(0)
HI Health Care Spending -.193 .268 .526 .468 .824
H2 Per-Capita Personal Income .065 .075 .770 .380 1.067
H3 Pension Spending -.306 .176 3.012 .083 .736
H4 Labor Cost -.024 .092 .068 .795 .976
H5 Per-Capita Spending -.023 .043 .290 .590 .977
H6 Fiscal Capacity (High) -.363 .653 .308 .579 .696
H7 State Deficit -.029 .029 .977 .323 .971
H8 State Union Law (weak) -1.30 .634 .042 .838 .273
Political Culture (Ind.) 2.004 .905 4.896 .027* 7.42
H9
Political Culture (Mor.) 1.562 .821 3.624
**
.057 4.768
H10 Governor of State Govt.(R) .426 .638 .447 .504 1.531
Party Cont. State Legist. (R) .046 .770 .003 .953 1.047
H ll
Party Cont. State Legist (D) -.251 .870 .083 .773 .778
H12 Policy Liberalism .188 .367 .263 .608 1.207
H13 State (Citizens) Ideology -.316 .677 .217 .641 .729
H14 Institutional Capacity .022 .178 .015 .902 1.022
* Significant at .05 level (two-tailed); ** significant at .05 level (one-tailed).
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Multivariate Analyses
This section reports the results o f the four comparative models (socioeconomic, 
economic, political, and ideology) and a fifth model of best fit that combined all the 
significant predictor variables from each of the four models. As noted, the level of 
state government privatization is the dependent variable and is coded with three 
ordinal levels: 0 = low, 1 = medium, 2 = high. However, since OLR takes the highest 
number as a reference category be default, the dependent variable is recoded to 0 = 
high, 1 = medium, and 2 = low for ease o f interpreting the ordinal logistic regression 
analysis.
Before constructing each factor model, correlation analysis was performed for 
the interval/ratio level independent variables. The results o f the correlation analysis 
did not reveal serious problem of multicollinearity (where r = >.80). While there is no 
serious multicollinearity among the independent variables, a close examination of the 
correlation results shows the existence of low to moderate correlations between some 
of the independent variables. As shown in Table 4.11 below, the following variables 
have low to moderate correlations.
The state deficit (SDEF) variable is negatively correlated with a relatively low 
level of significance with the state health care spending (SHCS) variable (r = -.367, 
p< .05). The state (government) policy liberalism (SPL) variable is positively 
correlated with the per capita personal income (SPCPI) variable with a relatively low 
level o f significance (r = .376, p < .05), the state per capita spending (SPCS) variable 
with a relatively modest level of significance (r = .460, p<.01), and the state 
institutional capacity (SIC) variable with a relatively modest level o f significance (r
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=.597, p<.01). In addition, state institutional capacity variable is slightly significantly 
correlated positively with state per-capita personal income (r = .441, p < .01), and 
negatively with the state labor cost (SLC) (r = -.393, p < .05).
Table 4.11
Correlations Matrix: Quantitative Independent Variables
Health
Care
Spending % 
Expend.
Per-
Capita
Personal
Income
Pension 
Spending 
% Expend
Labor 
Cost % 
Expend
Per- Deficit % 
Capita Expend 
Spending
Policy
Libera­
lism
Institu­
tional
Capacity
Health Care 
Spending % 
Expend.
1
Per-Capita
Personal
Income
.139 1
Pension 
Spending % 
Expend
-.093 .198 1
Labor 
Cost % 
Expend
.023 -.258 -.034 1
Per-Capita
Spending
-.122 -.034 -.117 -.077 1
Deficit % 
Expend
-.367*
(.05)
-.016 .268 .040 .148 1
Policy
Liberalism
.198 .376*
(.05)
.092 -.119 .460** .032 
(.01)
1
Institutional
Capacity
.268 .441**
(.01)
-.100 -.393*
(.05)
.157 -.020 .597**
(.01) 1
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed).
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Results of the Model Analyses
The ordinal regression results of each of the four factor models and the model of best 
fit are presented below.
Socioeconomic Model
The socioeconomic model examined the joint effects of state healthcare 
expenditure, state pension expenditure, and state per capita personal income variables. 
The model fitting information (the likelihood ratio) provided a chi-square test value of 
7.155 with an associated p-value of .067 for the final model (the model that included 
the three predictor variables) and approached significance at .05 level o f significance, 
two-tailed test. However, the hypothesis is directional, and the model is significant 
with a p-value of .034 at.05 level o f significance, one-tailed test. The result indicates 
that the combined model is better than the intercept only model. The Pearson and 
deviance statistics chi-square distributions (the goodness-of-fit tests) were not 
statistically significant suggesting that the model adequately fits the data (Pearson y2 = 
63.516, df = 63, p-value = .458; Deviance, y2 = 66.761, d f = 63, p-value = .349). 
Overall, 21.4% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .214) o f the variation in the dependent 
variable is explained by the predictor variables included in the model. Furthermore, 
with a chi-square test value of 2.129 for the general model and an associated p-value 
of .546, the test of parallel lines failed to reject the null hypothesis which states that 
there is no difference in the coefficients across response categories. The result 
indicates that the proportional odds assumption is not violated. As shown in Table
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4.12 below, only state pension spending is significant by controlling for health care 
spending and per capita income variables.
Table 4.12
Ordinal Logistic Regression: Socioeconomic Model
Variable
J8
(Estimate) S.E. Wald df Sig.
ExpGS)
ODDS
RATIO
Health Care Spending -0.343 .284 1.465 1 .226 .709
Pension Spending -0.423 .195 4.717 1 .030* .655
Per-Capita Income 0.122 .080 2.319 1 .128 1.129
R2 = .214; * P <05
Economic Model
The economic model examined the joint effects o f state labor cost, state per 
capita spending, state fiscal capacity, and state deficits variables. The likelihood ratio 
chi-square test value of 8.556 with an associated p-value o f .073 indicate that the 
model approached significance at .05 level, two-tailed test, but it is unambiguously 
significant for a one-tailed test. The result suggests that the combined model is an 
improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi- 
square distributions were not statistically significant suggesting that the model 
adequately fits the data (Pearson y l  = 69.723, d f = 62, p-value = .234; Deviance, y l  = 
65.360, df = 62, p-value = .361). Overall, about 25% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .251) 
of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variables 
included in the model. Furthermore, a chi-square test value of 2.129 for the general
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model and an associated p-value of .546 indicate that the test of parallel lines failed to 
reject the null hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption is not violated. As 
shown in Table 4.13 below, state per capita spending, state fiscal capacity, and state 
deficit turned out to be significant when each is evaluated by controlling for the other 
three variables in the model.
Table 4.13
Ordinal Logistic Regression: Economic Model
Variable
0
(Estimate) S.E. W ald df Sig.
ExpfiS)
ODDS
RATIO
Labor Cost -.062 .097 .402 1 .526 .939
Per-Capita Spending .180 .078 5.391 1 .020* 1.197
Fiscal Capacity (High) -3.714 1.470 6.383 1 .012* .024
Deficit .100 .045 4.874 1 .027* 1.105
R2 = .251; *P< 0 5
Political Model
The political model examined the joint effects o f four variables: state union 
laws, state political culture, the party o f governor controlling state government, and 
the party controlling state legislature. The likelihood ratio chi-square test value o f 
8.963 and a p-value o f . 176 for the final model suggest that the combined model is not 
better than the intercept model. However, the model fits the data adequately (Pearson 
X2 = 30.346, d f = 30, p-value = .448; Deviance, y2 = 34.995, df = 30, p-value = .243), 
and about 26% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R = .261) o f the variation in the dependent
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variable is explained by the predictor variables included in the model. The test of 
parallel lines with a chi-square test value o f 10.077 and an associated p-value of .121 
is insignificant and failed to reject the null hypothesis, and the proportional odds 
assumption is not violated. As shown in Table 4.14 below, only the political culture 
variable (both individualistic and moralistic) is significant by controlling for the other 
predictor variables included in the model.
Table 4.14
Ordinal Logistic Regression: Political Model
Variable P(Estimate) S.E. Wald df Sig.
Exp(iS)
ODDS
RATIO
Union Laws (Weak) .575 .857 .450 1 .502 1.777
Political Culture (Individualistic) 3.120 1.212 6.621 1 .010* 22.646
Political Culture (Moralistic) 2.236 1.099 4.136 1 .042* 9.356
Party of Governor (R) .626 .772 .656 1 .418 1.870
Party Controlling Legislature (R) .606 .989 .376 1 .540 1.833
Party Controlling Legislature (D) 1.474 1.128 1.908 1 .191 4.367
R2 = .261; *P<05 
Ideology Model
The ideology model examined the joint effects o f state (government) policy 
liberalism, state (citizens) ideology, and state institutional variables. With a likelihood 
ratio chi-square test value of 1.052 and an associated p-value of .789, the model turned 
out to be insignificant, suggesting that the combined model did not show an 
improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi-
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square distributions were not statistically significant, which indicates that the model 
fits the data adequately (Pearson y2 = 70.407, df = 63, p-value = .244; Deviance, &2 = 
72.864, df = 63, p-value = .185). Overall, only 3.4 % (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .034) 
of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variables in the 
model. However, with a chi-square test value of 16.401 and an associated p-value 
of .001, the test o f parallel lines rejected the null hypothesis which states that there is 
no difference in the coefficients across response categories. The result thus indicates 
that the proportional odds assumption is violated. Furthermore, as shown in Table 
4.15 below, all the variables included in the model failed to achieve statistical 
significance.
Table 4.15
Ordinal Logistic Regression: Ideology Model
Variable
0
(Estimate) S.E. W ald df Sig
Exp(0)
ODDS
RATIO
State Policy Liberalism -.446 .512 .759 1 .384 .640
State Ideology (Conservative) -.711 .797 .796 1 .372 .491
State Institutional Capacity .031 .224 .019 1 .890 1.031
R2 = .034
Model o f  Best Fit
The chi-square test value of 17.764 and an associated p-value of .007 indicates 
that the combined model o f best fit showed an improvement over the intercept only 
model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not 
statistically significant, indicating that the model fits the data adequately (Pearson %2 =
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64.364, d f = 60, p-value = .326; Deviance, y2 = 56.153, df = 60, p-value = .617). Also, 
with a chi-square test value of 7.157 and an associated p-value o f .307, the test of 
parallel lines failed to reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that the proportional odds 
assumption is not violated. Furthermore, as shown in Table 4.16 below, in the 
combined model of best fit, state pension spending (Wald = 5.359, p = .021), and state 
fiscal capacity (Wald = 5.595, p = .018), were significant in the expected direction.. 
Also, state deficits (Wald = 4.775, p = .029), and individualistic political culture 
(Wald = 3.901, p = .048) were significant, but in the opposite direction than expected.. 
But the moralistic political culture and the state per-capita spending variables were 
insignificant in the combined model of best fit. Overall, about 46% (Nagelkerke 
Pseudo R2 = .459) of the variations in the dependent variable is explained by the 
model of the best fit, which is much higher than the variations explained by each of 
the four previous models.
Table 4.16
Ordinal Logistic Regression Model: Model of Best Fit
Variable
P
(Estimate) s.E. Wald df
Exp (0) 
ODDS 
Sig. RATIO
Pension Spending -.502 .217 5.359 .021* .605
Per-Capita Spending .140 .084 2.777 .096 1.150
Fiscal Capacity(High) -3.587 1.516 5.595 .018* .028
Deficit .112 051 4.775 .029* 1.119
Political Culture (Individualistic) 2.019 1.022 3.901 .048* 7.531
Political Culture (Moralistic) 1.034 .954 1.175 .278 2.812
R2 = .459; *P <05
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Chapter Summary
The introduction section of this chapter laid out the statistical tests to be 
performed and the order in which the results would be presented. Accordingly, the 
first section provided the results of the data diagnostic test followed in the second 
section by the report o f the frequencies and descriptive statistics that included 
univariate and bivariate statistics and individual hypotheses tests. The third section 
presented the multivariate analyses o f the four state comparative models.
The data diagnostic analysis showed one missing value and one outlier, and 
these problems were corrected for subsequent bivariate and multivariate analyses. The 
crosstab analysis revealed the existence o f strong relationships between the state fiscal 
capacity categories and the level of state government privatization, as measured by 
Sommer’s d coefficient value of .543; but for most of the states, the relationships were 
in the opposite direction than suggested by the hypothesized relationship. Similarly, 
state union law categories were found to have very strong relationships with the level 
o f state government privatization, as measured by Somer’s d coefficient value of .921. 
Overall, for the majority of states, the relationships were in the opposite direction than 
expected.
However, with Cramer’s V value of .214, the relationships between the state 
political culture categories and the level o f state government privatization were found 
to be weak. Also, the Cramer’s V value of .686 showed the existence of strong 
relationships between the categories o f the party o f governor controlling state 
government and the level o f state government privatization. As measured by the
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Cramer’s V value of .994, the relationships between the party controlling state 
legislature categories and the level o f state government privatization were very strong. 
The relationships between the state ideology categories and the level o f state 
government privatization were also very strong as measured by the Cramer’s V value 
of.896. The results of the hypotheses tests for individual variables revealed that all the 
variables, with the exception of state pension spending and individualistic political 
culture, were insignificant. The state pension spending variable was significant at .05 
levels of significance in one-tailed test in the expected direction. The individualistic 
political culture was also significant, but in the opposite direction than expected. The 
hypotheses and the test results are summarized in Table 4.17 below.
Also, the multivariate analyses of the socioeconomic, economic, political, and 
ideology models and a model of best fit were examined. The results revealed that the 
socioeconomic model was better than the intercept/base model, and explained about 
21.4% o f variations in the dependent variable. The economic model also showed an 
improvement over the intercept/base model, and explained 25% o f the variations in the 
dependent variable. However, both the political model and the ideology model were 
not better than the intercept/base only model; the political model explained about 29% 
of the variations in the dependent variable, but only 3.4% o f the variations in the 
dependent variable were explained by the ideology model. Furthermore, a combined 
model of best fit that included the significant variables from the previous four models 
was run. The combined model was significant and showed an improvement over the 
intercept/base model and explained about 46% of the variance in the dependent 
variable.
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Table 4.17
Summary of the Hypotheses Testing and Findings
Hypotheses Test Result Supported/Not
Supported
1 States with higher health care expenditures are more likely to 
have higher level of state government privatization than 
states with lower health care expenditures.
Insignificant Not Supported
2 States with higher pension spending are more likely to have 
higher level o f state government privatization than states 
with lower pension spending.
Significant Supported
3 States with higher per capita personal income are more likely t( 
have lower level of state government privatization than states 
with lower per capita personal income.
Insignificant Not Supported
4 States with higher labor costs are more likely to have higher 
level of state government privatization than states with lower 
labor costs.
Insignificant Not Supported
5 States with higher per capita spending are more likely to 
have higher level of state government privatization than 
states with lower per capita spending.
Insignificant Not Supported
6 States with higher fiscal capacity are more likely to have 
lower level of state government privatization than states 
with lower fiscal capacity
Insignificant Not Supported
7 States with higher deficit are more likely to have higher level 
o f state government privatization than states with lower 
deficits.
Insignificant Not Supported
8 States with weak union power are more likely to have higher 
level of state government privatization than states with 
strong union power
Insignificant Not Supported
9 States with individualistic/traditionalistic political culture are 
more likely to have higher level of state government 
privatization than states with moralistic political culture.
Significant Not Supported
10 States with Republican governors are more likely to have 
higher level of state government privatization than states 
with Democratic governors
Insignificant Not Supported
11 States with Republican-controlled legislatures are more 
likely to have higher level o f state government privatization 
than states with Democratic-controlled legislatures.
Insignificant Not Supported
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Table 4.17 Continued
Hypotheses Test Result Supported/Not
Supported
12 States with conservative policy (government ideology) are 
more likely to have higher level of state government 
privatization than states with liberal policy
Insignificant Not supported
13 States with conservative state ideology (citizens’ ideology) 
are more likely to have higher level o f  state privatization than 
states with liberal state ideology.
Insignificant Not Supported
14 States with high institutional capacity are more likely to have Insignificant Not Supported 
lower level o f state government privatization than states with 
low institutional capacity
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
Introduction
This study examined the factors that influence the level o f state government 
privatization. Chapter IV reported the results of the statistical analyses that included 
frequencies, descriptive statistics, bivariate and multivariate analyses. This chapter 
presents a summary of the study, summary and discussion of the findings, policy 
implications, limitations and delimitations, contribution o f this study, as well as 
recommendations for future study and the conclusion.
Summary of the Study
This study attempted to answer the research question: What factors predict the 
level of state government privatization? The survey conducted by the Council o f State 
Governments (CSG) in 2002 provided the data for the dependent variable, which was 
constructed based on the responses of state agency heads to the CSG’s question: “How 
many services and programs in your agency are currently privatized?” The responses 
were ordinal in nature, and the dependent variable was transformed and recoded with 
three ordinal levels o f low, medium, and high. The literature review guided the 
selection of the factors that were thought to be the likely drivers o f the amount of 
privatization that state governments undertake. As such, socioeconomic, economic, 
political, and ideological factors were theorized as having considerable influences on 
the level of state government privatization, and fourteen hypotheses were tested. Also
180
four models were developed and tested and analyzed using quantitative method. 
Specifically, data for eight quantitative and six categorical variables were compiled 
and analyzed for each of the final 34 states included in this study.
After the data were collected, assembled, and cleaned, bivariate and 
multivariate analyses were conducted. Correlation and crosstab statistics were 
performed on quantitative and categorical variables respectively, and ordinal logistic 
regression was employed for the multivariate analysis to answer the overarching 
research question of this study, namely, what factors predict the level o f state 
government privatization? The purpose was achieved by developing and testing 
fourteen hypotheses and examining four models: socioeconomic, economic, political, 
and ideology models. A fifth model of best fit that included five significant variables 
from the four models was run to determine the variables that reemerge as significant 
predictors of the level o f state government privatization (the dependent variable).
Summary and Discussion of the Findings
Fourteen hypotheses were developed and tested using ordinal logistic 
regression to answer the overarching question: What factors predict the level o f state 
government privatization? The bivariate ordinal regressions indicated that only two 
(state pension spending and state political culture) of the 14 explanatory variables 
were found to have statistically significant associations with the level o f state 
government privatization (the dependent variable), but individualistic political culture 
was significant in the opposite direction than expected; thus only state pension
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spending hypothesis was supported. These results are summarized and discussed 
below.
Hypothesis 1: States with higher health care expenditures are more likely to have 
higher level of state government privatization than states with lower health care 
expenditures.
The statistical results failed to support this hypothesis. As indicated in the 
review of the literature, state policymakers sought to reform health care services to 
control the rising costs as well as to expand access to citizens (Dye, 1998); as a result 
many states privatized some of their health care services as a cost saving mechanism 
(Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004). But the hypothesis in this study was not supported 
perhaps because the negative impact of health care expenditure on state fiscal 
conditions might have been mitigated by the support states receive from the federal 
government.
The data used for the state health care expenditure variable are the aggregate 
expenditure on health care services, and does not distinguish between Medicaid and 
other types of services that states might be providing to their citizens. However, it is 
commonly known that Medicare is designed for the aged (elderly) and is directly 
under the purview of the federal government; whereas, in the case o f Medicaid, both 
the federal and state governments share the financial burden of the program; that is, 
the federal government is responsible for about half o f the cost o f the program (Dye, 
1998). Moreover, since the program (Medicaid) was designed for the needy or poor 
people, some politicians, advocates for the poor, and other interest groups might have 
expressed concerns that the recipients o f the benefits might not be well served by
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private providers; as such, policymakers might have recognized the need to exercise 
caution in terms of engaging in large scale privatization o f health care services to 
avoid undesirable social and political consequences. This reasoning perhaps explains 
why there were fewer services privatized in the Health and Human Services (HHS) 
category compared to corrections, education, and transportation categories.
Hypothesis 2: States with higher pension spending are more likely to have higher 
level of state government privatization than states with lower pension spending.
This hypothesis was supported by both the bivariate and multivariate analyses. 
The review of the literature revealed that the majority of public pension plans is 
underfunded or unfunded and has constrained states’ ability to finance their public 
pensions and health care expenditures (CSG, 2007). As a response to the growing 
fiscal crises, state officials have been engaged, among other things, in the privatization 
of services when feasible (CSG, 2007; Edwards, 2010). The result o f this statistical 
test supports the hypothesis that pension spending is indeed positively and 
significantly associated with the level o f state government privatization. Although the 
state employee pension system has been designed to alleviate the financial hardships 
of retirees and has been an integral part o f state programs since the Great Depression 
(Boivie and Almeida, 2009; Munnell, Aubry, and Muldoon, 2008), the result o f this 
study suggests that the growth in pension spending may require state policymakers to 
rethink their priorities and focus their attention on alleviating the fiscal crises.
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Hypothesis 3: States with higher per capita personal income are more likely to have 
lower level of state government privatization than states with lower per capita personal 
income.
This hypothesis was not supported. The result is consistent with previous studies 
that examined the impact of per capita income on state policy making in general and 
privatization policy in particular (Berry and Berry, 1992; Price and Riccucci, 2005).
For example, in their study of the determinants o f state prison privatization decisions, 
Price and Riccucci (2005) found per capita personal income not to be a significant 
determinant of prison privatization decision.
In this study, the result o f insignificant association between per capita personal 
income and the level of state privatization can perhaps be understood in terms of the 
pressures that state policymakers face from different groups of citizens. Assuming other 
things such as tax collection effort being equal, it can theoretically be argued that states 
with higher per capita personal income are more likely to collect more in tax revenue 
and are less likely to face financial crises warranting privatization of services. However, 
some scholars have argued that citizens in states with higher per capita personal income 
are more likely to demand privatization of services because they want more choices 
(Savas, 1987). It is also possible to argue theoretically that, in states with low per capita 
personal income, the need to prevent some people from falling into poverty might have 
constrained the desire o f elected state official to privatize most services. It is common 
for opponents of privatization to argue that privatization creates “a harsh state where 
only the fittest survive and the poor and sick are left to cope as better they can” (Savas,
1987, p.3). Thus, a multitude of reasons can be offered to justify the insignificant
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associations between higher per capita personal income and the level o f state 
government privatization.
Hypothesis 4: States with higher labor costs are more likely to have higher level o f 
state government privatization than states with lower labor costs.
This hypothesis was not supported. Previous empirical studies, at least at local 
level, have found that privatization in the form of contracting out was more prevalent 
in cities and towns paying high wages to their own employees (Kodrzycki, 1998). The 
privatization trend in the 1980s and 1990s did not resonate well with the public sector 
employees because of their perceived fears o f losing their jobs. This perception might 
have mitigated the aggressive demand by public employees for wage and salary 
increases, which in turn might have contributed to less aggressive privatization of 
services by state governments.
Hypothesis 5: States with higher per capita spending are more likely to have higher 
level of state government privatization than states with lower per capita spending.
The hypothesis was not significant at the bivariate level. In the economic 
model, the statistical result was significant by controlling the other predictor variables 
in the model. But the significance was in the opposite direction than expected, and the 
hypothesis was not supported. Moreover, the significance disappeared in the model of 
best fit after controlling for the other variable included in the model.
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Hypothesis 6: States with higher fiscal capacity are more likely to have lower level of 
state government privatization than states with lower fiscal capacity.
This predictor was not significant at the bivariate level, and the hypothesis was 
not supported; the multivariate analysis indicated that it was significant, but in the 
opposite direction than suggested by the hypothesized relationship, indicating that the 
hypothesis was not supported. The result appeared to be consistent with previous 
studies that have found state fiscal capacity to be insignificant at least in the context of 
a single service such as prison privatization (Price and Riccucci, 2005).
Hypothesis 7: States with higher deficit are more likely to have higher level o f state 
government privatization than states with lower deficits.
Higher deficit was found to be insignificant in the bivariate analysis. In the 
combined economic model and the model o f best-fit, the state deficit variable was 
significant when controlled for other predictor variables, but the significance was 
inconsistent with the relationship suggested by the hypothesis, which indicates that the 
hypothesis was not supported. The failure of the state deficit variable to achieve 
statistical significance in the expected direction appear to reject or contradict the 
argument in much of the privatization literature that governments resort to 
privatization as a means to reduce costs and to balance their budgets (Henton and 
Waldhom, 1984; Chi, 1998; Kettl, 2002; Van Slyke, 2003).
Hypothesis 8: States with weak union power are more likely to have higher level of 
state government privatization than states with strong union power.
This hypothesis was not supported by the statistical tests at either the bivariate 
or multivariate level. The insignificant result is consistent with some prior studies that
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found state union laws not to be significant predictors o f state privatization decisions 
(Price and Riccucci, 2005). The result further suggests that the drive toward 
privatization in the 1980s and 1990s might have restrained or reduced the power of 
unions to thwart state decisions to privatize services; in this sense it can be concluded 
that contemporary privatization serves as a counterweight against activist and 
powerful public employee unions and that, as Nicholson-Crotty (2004) observed, 
“public employee unions simply do not wield the power over the privatization process 
that researchers had previously suspected” (p.53).
Hypothesis 9: States with individualistic/traditionalistic political culture are more 
likely to have higher level of state government privatization than states with moralistic 
political culture.
This variable was significant at both the bivariate and multivariate levels. 
However, the hypothesis was not supported by the results because of the fact that the 
influence was in the opposite direction than suggested by the stated hypothesis. The 
moralistic political culture was found to be significant in the expected direction in the 
bivariate analysis as well as in the political model; but its significance disappeared in 
the model o f best fit after controlling for state pension spending, state per-capita 
spending, state fiscal capacity, state deficit, and individualistic political culture. Given 
the mixed statistical results, unambiguous conclusion cannot be drawn. At best, the 
results suggest conducting further empirical investigation.
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Hypothesis 10: States with Republican governors are more likely to have higher level 
of state government privatization than states with Democratic governors.
As indicated in the review of the literature, some scholars argue that 
contemporary privatization follows conservative ideology (Ginsberg, 2009; Hodge, 
2000), and privatization policy is associated primarily with the Republican governors 
who are assumed to promote conservative agendas in government (Sclar, 2000; Savas, 
2000; Donahue, 1989). It is therefore hypothesized that states with Republican 
governors are more likely to have higher level o f state government privatization. 
However, the statistical result failed to support this hypothesis and is consistent with 
some of the results of prior studies that found neither the Republican governor nor the 
Democratic governor as having significant effect on the decision to privatize services; 
while both Republican and Democratic governors have privatized services, their 
decisions whether or not to privatize were less swayed by their respective ideological 
beliefs than by pragmatic considerations (see Price and Riccucci, 2005). Likewise, the 
failure of the statistical result in this study is indicative o f the fact that the level o f state 
government privatization is not dependent on the party affiliations o f state governors.
Hypothesis 11: States with Republican-controlled legislature are more likely to have 
higher level of state government privatization than states with Democratic-controlled 
legislature.
The result failed to support the hypothesis. The result suggests that party 
affiliations, based on the Republican and Democratic configuration, were not 
significant. As shown in the literature, at state level, pragmatism appeared to 
overshadow political and ideological considerations (Donahue, 1989; Allen, et. al., 
1989). The result also confirmed previous findings that the party controlling state
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legislature was not a significant predictor of privatization decisions at least in the 
context o f prison privatization (Price and Riccucci, 2005).
Hypothesis 12: States with conservative government policy are more likely to have 
higher level of state government privatization than states with liberal government 
policy.
The statistical result was not significant at both the bivariate and multivariate 
levels, and the hypothesis was not supported. The result in this study contradicted 
both the theoretical argument and the empirical evidence in the literature. The review 
of the literature has revealed that the conservative-liberal spectrum or the right-left 
cleavage serves as a functional device to categorize government political orientations 
and policy proposals (Freire,2008); that is, political motivations figure prominently 
when legislators and/or governors consider the adoption o f enabling legislations for 
privatization or other policy areas (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004). While this argument has 
merit on theoretical grounds, the statistical result in this study raises questions about 
the validity o f the argument especially when combined with the empirical evidence, 
which was found to be insignificant.
For example, previous empirical studies have found that “states are more likely 
to privatize their prisons when the government ideology is more conservative as 
compared with more liberal” (Price and Riccucci, 2005, p.228), but this result is 
contradicted by the findings in the current study. While the comparison made between 
the statistical results of a single privatized program and the aggregate amount of 
privatization appears to be somewhat tenuous, it can safely be assumed that the
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comparison does not necessarily alter the fundamental distinction inherent in the 
conservative-liberal ideological spectrum.
The failure o f the statistical findings to support the hypothesis has perhaps one 
possible explanation which is essentially not dissimilar to the explanations offered in 
the preceding two hypotheses (hypotheses 10 and 11). That is, state policymakers are 
more likely to take a pragmatic path, and the conservative-liberal cleavage does not 
appear to play a significant role in terms of government decisions regarding the 
amount of privatization that states undertake.
Hypothesis 13: States with conservative state ideology are more likely to have higher 
level of state government privatization than states with liberal state ideology.
This hypothesis was not supported by the statistical result, and the findings 
supported some prior empirical studies and contradicted others. Many state 
comparative studies have utilized state ideology variable to assess state policy 
outcomes under varying circumstances (Brudney et al., 2004; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; 
Berry and Berry, 1992; Price and Riccucci, 2005; Soss et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 
2007). For example, Brudney et al. (2004) conducted an empirical investigation of the 
determinants o f state contracting out using variables in their model that included state 
ideology variable as developed by Berry et al. (1998). Their findings indicated that the 
“political and ideological variables included in the model failed to achieve statistical 
significance” (Brudney et al., 2004, p. 413), an outcome supported by the current 
study.
On the other hand, studies that examined the factors that motivate state level 
privatization decisions in the area o f prison and corrections have found political and
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ideological variables (used as a proxy for state ideology) to be significant (Price and 
Riccucci, 2005; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004), an outcome contradicted by the results of 
this study. These conflicting results are perhaps a reflection of the differences in the 
target or outcome variables; one of the studies focused on the method of privatization, 
which was contracting out and the other two focused on prison and corrections 
privatization. While the current study utilized the same variable that the three studies 
mentioned above used, this study is however different from the previous studies 
because of its focus on the aggregate level o f state government privatization; this shift 
of focus from individual program to an aggregated level o f privatization may have 
altered the results o f the statistical analysis.
Hypothesis 14: States with higher institutional capacity are more likely to have lower 
level of state government privatization than states with lower institutional capacity.
The statistical result failed to support the hypothesis and the finding was not 
significant. State institutional capacity variable has been used in empirical studies as 
one of the determinants of state policy decisions in many areas of public policy 
(Travis, Morris, and Morris, 2004). Essentially, the assumption is that state 
institutional capacity has the potential to constrain or enhance the ability o f a state 
government to adopt and implement the desired program. But there are no prior 
studies that have examined the effect o f state institutional capacity on the level o f state 
government privatization. In the current study, state institutional capacity variable was 
employed in the ideology model as one of the determinants of the level o f state 
government privatization, and it was found to be insignificant.
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One possible explanation for the finding to be insignificant is that 
implementation of privatization decisions perhaps involves negotiations with outside 
contractors or providers, and the task is likely to demand a considerable amount o f 
time, resources, staff, and experts; this requires high not low institutional capacity to 
undertake time-consuming, back and forth negotiations, bargaining, and writing 
complex contracts to avoid or minimize risks that might otherwise affect the 
government in the future; when considering scenario o f this nature, it appears 
plausible to hypothesize a direct relationship between high institutional capacity and 
higher level of state government privatization. Indeed, the findings of this study 
appear to be at variance with the assumption that states with high institutional capacity 
have the flexibility and ability to implement programs and provide services without 
necessarily adopting a privatization strategy. Thus, as the result indicates, associating 
high institutional capacity with lower level of state government privatization and low 
institutional capacity with higher level o f state government privatization may not hold 
much sway.
Study Implications
In the 1980s and 1990s many states began embracing privatization as a 
strategy to deal with their fiscal crises. As indicated in the review o f the literature, by 
and large, microeconomic-based theories provided the intellectual rationale for and 
informed the development o f privatization policy (Savas, 1987; Sclar, 2000). 
Numerous studies point to the superiority o f the private sector (the market system) as 
an effective and efficient means of providing goods and services, and the use of
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privatization was justified largely on grounds of economic efficiency (Savas, 1987; 
Henton and Waldhom, 1984; Donahue, 1989; Pouder, 1996). Privatization was thus 
viewed by state policymakers primarily as a “management issue” devoid o f political 
and ideological considerations (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p. 466). As such, state 
governments began adopting privatization policy to promote economic efficiency and 
to save costs (Donahue, 1989; Allen et al., 1989; GAO, 1997; Price and Riccucci, 
2005).
As noted, the belief in the fundamental superiority o f the private sector/the 
market system as an engine of economic growth is rooted in microeconomic-based 
theories, the philosophical/ideological origin of which is traced to the classical 
political and economic thoughts o f the 18th century. The analysis o f the historical 
literature in this study established the connection between contemporary privatization 
theory and the conservative political and ideological beliefs that dominated the social 
and economic thoughts o f the 18th century. While the social, political and economic 
realities o f the late 20th century are fundamentally different from that o f the 18th 
century, advocates of privatization and in particular some economists of the classical 
persuasion appear to be less convinced about the influences of politics and ideology on 
the privatization policy. Nevertheless other scholars question the argument that 
privatization is undertaken solely for economic reasons and contend that politics and 
ideology are also factors that are likely to influence the decisions to privatize services 
(Boix, 1997; Morris, 1999; Hodge, 2000; Sclar, 2000).
These competing claims set the background for investigating the drivers of the 
level o f state government privatization in this study. As such, this study conducted an
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empirical investigation to determine the extent to which variables related to 
socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors influence the level of state 
government privatization. The results are discussed and summarized in the preceding 
section. The implications are presented below.
In the socioeconomic model, only state pension spending variable was found to 
be a statistically significant predictor of the level o f state government privatization in 
the expected direction. This variable was also statistically significant in the model of 
best fit after controlling for other variables. Many studies have shown that growing 
pension liabilities and increasing health care expenditures have exasperated state 
budget crises requiring major budget reforms and cuts (Edward, 2010; CSG, 2007). 
Given the findings o f this study, policy initiative to privatize some pension programs 
is not unwarranted. Identifying areas of state pension programs that can be privatized 
to save costs without increasing the financial hardships o f retirees might prove to be 
challenging, but it appears to be the desirable course of action from the perspective of 
state policymakers.
The results of the economic model and the model o f best fit showed that most 
of the economic variables had statistically significant influence on the level o f state 
government privatization; however, the influences were in the opposite directions 
than suggested by the stated hypotheses. The contradictory results in terms o f the 
direction of the influence suggest that the hypotheses were not supported. The policy 
implications are thus not readily apparent. At best, the findings can be interpreted as 
providing tentative support to the argument in the literature that economic factors are
194
more likely to influence privatization of goods and services by state government; the 
findings further suggest the need to conduct a follow up study.
The political model failed to demonstrate significant associations between the 
political variables and the level o f state government privatization with the exception of 
individualistic and moralistic political cultures. The findings of this study showed that 
both individualistic and moralistic cultures were significant, but the significance of the 
moralistic culture disappeared in the model of best fit when controlling for other 
variables. The significance of the individualistic political culture was in the opposite 
direction than expected and the hypothesis was not supported. Similarly, the results of 
the statistical analyses failed to link Republican governors and legislatures to higher 
level of state government privatization relative to their Democratic counterparts, 
supporting previous studies that state government privatization is rather dependent on 
pragmatic consideration than on the party affiliation of the governor and/or legislature 
(Donahue, 1989). Also, the results of the political model supported previous findings 
that showed that public employee unions do not exert significant influence on 
privatization decisions ( Nicholson-Crotty, 2004). In general, the implication of the 
results o f the political model is that political factors are less likely to inform policy 
development at least in the area of privatization.
By far, the ideology model appeared to have the weakest explanatory power 
with only 3.4% of the variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the model, 
and none of the predictor variables was found to be significant. The results failed to 
link ideology to the level of state government privatization and contradicted previous 
empirical studies that found ideology to be significantly associated with privatization
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(see, for example, Price and Riccucci, 2005). The results o f the ideology model 
indicate that ideology is less likely to play a significant role in terms o f influencing 
policy decisions with regard to privatizing public services.
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that state policymakers are less 
likely to be swayed by socioeconomic, political and ideological factors in making 
policy decisions at least in the area of privatization. Although the influences of the 
significant variables in the economic model were in the opposite direction than 
expected, the findings nonetheless provide tentative support to the argument in the 
literature that economic factors matter; the implication is that economic factors are 
more likely to influence state government privatization decisions.
Limitations and Delimitations o f This Study
Limitations
Limitations are essentially weaknesses that have the potential to limit the 
validity of the study (Plichta and Garzon, 2001). This study has limitations that can be 
attributed to a number o f factors that include: small sample size, history, confounding 
variables, and the secondary nature of the data; these possible limitations are discussed 
in detail below.
One of the limitations o f this study is the small sample size. Sample size is an 
important issue because it has the potential to diminish or enhance the validity of the 
results (Irby & Lunenburg, 2008). While the sample size required for credible research 
depends on the nature o f the study (O’Sullivan, Rassel, & Bemer, 2003), researchers 
who seek to undertake state comparative studies are usually constrained by the
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existence of a maximum sample size o f 50 cases (states) only. In this study, the 
problem related to the small sample is essentially two-fold: first, as noted, state 
comparative studies normally use 50 states as the maximum sample size, but this study 
employed only 34 cases/states for lack of usable and valid data for the remaining 16 
states. The smaller sample size is an obvious weakness that limits the validity and 
generalizability of the results to all the 50 states.
However, in general, the characteristics o f the 16 states were found to be 
similar to the characteristics o f the 34 states based on the t-test o f the mean 
difference between the two groups that was performed using eight interval/ratio level 
data (see Appendix D); the result of the t-test provides limited support to the validity 
and generalizability of the results of this study to the 16 states that were not included 
in this study as well. Second, many o f the variables used in this study failed to be 
significant, and the inadequate sample size may have been a factor in the failure of 
those variables to achieve statistical significance; according to Irby & Lunenburg 
(2008), “Inadequate sample size.. .can bias the results o f a quantitative study” (p.230).
History may have been another factor limiting the external validity o f this 
study because some o f the measures may have changed over time (O’Sullivan, Rassel, 
and Bemer, 2003). While the data for the dependent variable and the 10 independent 
variables were from year 2002, data for state political culture, state policy liberalism, 
state ideology, and state institutional capacity variables were from 1984, 1993, 1992, 
and 1988 respectively; in this case, the reliability o f the measures become questionable 
and point to some potential weaknesses o f this study. Although political culture, state 
policy liberalism, and state ideology are believed to be fairly consistent for a long
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time, they have nonetheless been shown to change slightly over time (Berry & Berry, 
1992). Likewise, state institutional capacity is expected to change over time as well, 
but for lack of recent data, Bowman & Kearney (1988) index has been utilized.
Essentially, this study focused on investigating the factors that influence the 
level of state government privatization at a given point in time (2002) and did not 
attempt to measure changes over time and was static in nature. Nonetheless, the use of 
data from different time periods ranging from nine to eighteen years represented quite 
a significant time lag and may have been a factor for the failure o f many o f the 
variables to achieve statistical significance in the current study. In addition, state 
governors and the majority party in state legislatures can change from one political 
party to another in a year or two. If at all one or more changes had taken place 
between political parties prior and during the year the CSG conducted its privatization 
survey (2002), these changes were not accounted for, and this deficiency may have 
been a factor for the party affiliation of the governor and the party controlling state 
legislature variables to be insignificant.
Moreover, confounding variables may have impacted the validity o f the 
conclusion of this study. Events other than the independent variables such as the 
behaviors o f politicians and bureaucrats may have limited the validity o f this study. 
While spurious results are not suspected in the current study, the rational utility 
maximizing behaviors of politicians and bureaucrats (Buchanan, 1978) are nonetheless 
assumed to exist, but their behaviors could not be directly detected, measured, and 
assessed in quantitative studies. As such, the indirect influence of the utility 
maximizing behaviors of the actors many have altered the influences o f some o f the
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measures on the level of state government privatization. Furthermore, this study used 
secondary data from multiple sources and the accuracy o f the data could not be 
verified and may have influenced the results of this study in ways that are hard to 
detect.
Delimitations
Delimitations are essentially the boundaries that limit the scope of the 
investigation (Plichta and Garzon, 2009). The scope of this study is confined to 
investigating the factors that are expected to influence the amount o f privatized 
services aggregated by four departments (correction, transportation, education, and 
health & human services), and did not attempt to examine specific services or 
programs that may have been privatized by each department. Also, as the review of 
the literature has indicated, state governments privatize services primarily for 
economic reasons, that is, to achieve economic efficiency and cost savings (Donahue, 
1989; Allen et al., 1989; GAO, 1997). However, evaluating and analyzing the 
privatized services to determine whether or not the stated economic goals were 
achieved is beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, the current study did not 
attempt to look beyond the prescribed one-year time frame.
Contribution of This Study
This study has contributed to state comparative research in general and the 
theory and practice in privatization theory in particular in two major ways: First, this 
study has taken a macro approach/model that allows investigating the aggregate level
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of state government privatization as opposed to investigating individual services. 
Investigating the aggregate level o f state privatization is one important area that has 
received little attention in the literature. Second, the results raise new questions and 
provide new information that future researchers can build on. These are explained in 
detail below.
First, as indicated in the review of the literature, competing theoretical 
arguments were offered as explanations for the adoption o f privatization policy by 
state governments, and a considerable amount o f empirical research has been 
conducted either to support or refute the theoretical claims. Many variables with 
different social, economic, political, and ideological dimensions were used in a 
number o f empirical studies to determine the significant predictors o f state 
privatization efforts. Yet, in much of the empirical research, case studies were largely 
the focus of the investigation with the aim of determining whether or not the services 
privatized have achieved the intended goals, be it cost savings, efficiency gains, and/or 
quality services. While the focus on single cases is appropriate under certain 
circumstance, the approach is less useful in terms of understanding the factors that 
drive the aggregate level of state government privatization at a macro level.
However, building on the multidimensional approach used in single case 
studies, this study adopted a macro level strategy and examined the extent to which 
variables related to socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors 
influence the level of state government privatization aggregated by departments. No 
previous studies have investigated simultaneously a broad range of privatized services 
aggregated by corrections, education, transportation, and health and human services
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departments. This approach is the first of its kind and provides an umbrella framework 
that can serve as a guide for future research in the area o f privatization; in this sense, 
this study is fundamentally different from prior approaches and is an important 
contribution to research in state comparative studies.
Second, the results o f this study suggest that further research is warranted. 
Essentially, the results o f this study have generally shown the existence of statistically 
significant associations between some variables, largely economic variables, and the 
level of state government privatization, but the hypotheses were not supported by the 
statistical analyses; these conflicting results raise new questions that other researches 
may try to answer. Future research can build on the findings of this study and resolve 
the conflicting results; this is as an important contribution to the privatization 
literature. On the other hand, the findings with regard to the political and ideological 
factors provide new information that may serve as a useful contribution to future 
research. In general, the political and ideological variables included in this study, with 
the exception of political culture, which was found to have mixed results, were refuted 
as having significant influence on the level of state government privatization; this is an 
important finding because it provides a less ambiguous general conclusion about the 
extent to which political and ideological factors influence the level of state 
government privatization. Overall, the findings add to our knowledge base in 
privatization theory and contribute to the body o f research and scholarship in public 
administration.
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Recommendation for Future Research
This study empirically examined the factors that drive the level o f state 
government privatization by developing and testing 14 independent hypotheses and 
four state comparative models (socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological 
models) and a model of best-fit. The bivariate analyses showed that only one of the 14 
hypotheses was found to be statistically significant in the expected direction, 
suggesting that the hypothesis was supported. The multivariate analyses showed that 
most o f the variables in the economic model were significant, but the hypotheses were 
not supported because of the fact that the significances were in the opposite direction 
than suggested by the stated hypotheses. Also, most of the variables in the 
socioeconomic, political, and ideology failed to achieve statistical significance. Some 
of the significant variables were in the opposite direction than expected, and a large 
part of the variance in the dependent variable (the level of state government 
privatization) remained unexplained; this result points to the limitation of this study 
and suggests the need to conduct further research. Below are two suggestions for 
future research.
First, researchers may build on the current study by conducting new 
privatization survey across the 50 states; this provides complete data for all the 50 
states and avoids the problems associated with small sample size as was the case in 
this study. While this approach is likely to be costly and complex for individual 
researchers, it is certainly doable if  conducted or sponsored by an institution, such as a 
university or other organization. The use of new privatization data that covers all the
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50 states will perhaps shade new lights and fill the gap created by the small sample 
size used in the current study.
Second, a research design is one important consideration that needs to be 
addressed upfront when conducting future research similar to the current study. It is 
commonly known that different research designs can be used to investigate the same 
phenomenon and produce similar or different results. This study employed cross- 
sectional quantitative method, which is a static and time bound design, but, as 
indicated earlier, the data used for some of the categorical independent variables were 
from different time period, which may have weakened the findings of this study. 
Cross-sectional design may be suitable to the extent that the data collected are from 
the same time period. However, other research designs that allow capturing changes of 
variable values over time such as longitudinal design (time-series or panel studies) 
may be suitable and may uncover important information that extends or improves the 
current study.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to examine the factors that influence the level of 
state government privatization. Specifically, this study attempted to answer the 
research question: What factors predict the level o f state government privatization? 
Literature has shown that privatization is a multidimensional concept with social, 
economic, political, and ideological implications. Therefore, to answer the research 
question, fourteen hypotheses were developed and tested along with four state 
comparative models and a model of best-fit. Bivariate and multivariate analyses were
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conducted, and most o f the economic variables at the multivariate level were found to 
be negatively but statistically significant predictors of the level o f state government 
privatization; although the negative relationships are inconsistent with the stated 
hypotheses and warrant further investigation, the statistically significant results 
nonetheless provide limited support to the argument in the literature that state 
governments privatize services for pragmatic reasons, that is, to achieve economic 
efficiency and cost savings. And the statistically insignificant findings o f most o f the 
variables in the socioeconomic, political, and ideology models may be interpreted in 
ways that support the views that alleviating the fiscal problems that states face takes 
precedence over social, political, and ideological concerns.
A concluding remark that can be inferred from this study but does not speak 
directly to the findings is that, political and ideological orientations and social 
concerns aside, state policymakers need to promote privatization policies that 
encourage the development o f management strategies to achieve the optimal level of 
economic efficiencies and cost savings. This could mean looking for alternative 
management approaches to the current public-private partnerships. As indicated in the 
review of the literature, previous studies have suggested using alternative management 
that include fostering in-house competitions, promoting managed competition to 
induce efficiency in the public sector by allowing both the public and private sectors 
to compete in providing services (Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001), or 
using the “public authorities that may take advantage of private-sector efficiencies 
while maintaining public accountability” (Leavitt and Morris, 2004, p. 154).
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
LIST OF OBJECTIVES OF PRIVATIZATION PROGRAMS
• Reduce the cost o f government
•  Generate revenue, both by selling assets and then by collecting taxes from them
• Reduce government debt, for instance, through debt-equity swaps
• Supply infrastructure or other facilities that government cannot otherwise provide
• Bring in specialized skills needed for technologically advanced activities
• Initiate or expand a service quickly
• Lessen government interference and direct presence in the economy
• Reduce the role of government in society (build or strengthen civil society)
• Accelerate economic development
• Decentralize the economy and broaden the ownership of economic assets
• Show commitment to economic liberalization and increase business confidence
• Promote the development o f capital markets (by creating and selling shares)
• Attract new foreign and domestic investment and encourage return o f flight capital
• Satisfy foreign lenders (including international bodies such as the World Bank)
• Improve living standards
• Gain popular support (by getting rid of malfunctioning bureaucracies)
• Reward political allies
• Weaken political opponents (for example, labor unions)
Source: Savas, 2000, p. 119-120.
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Appendix B
LIST OF STATES INCLUDED AND EXCLUDED IN THIS STUDY
States Included States Excluded
1 Arkansas Alabama
2 Arizona Alaska
3 California Colorado
4 Florida Connecticut
5 Georgia Delaware
6 Idaho Hawaii
7 Illinois Maine
8 Indiana Maryland
9 Iowa Massachusetts
10 Kansas Minnesota
11 Kentucky Mississippi
12 Louisiana New York
13 Michigan North Carolina
14 Missouri Ohio
15 Montana Virginia
16 Nebraska Wisconsin
17 Nevada
18 New Hampshire
19 New Jersey
20 New Mexico
21 North Dakota
22 Oklahoma
23 Oregon
24 Pennsylvania
25 Rhode Island
26 South Carolina
27 South Dakota
28 Tennessee
29 Texas
30 Utah
31 Vermont
32 Washington
33 West Virginia
34 Wyoming
Alaska had an outlier and was excluded from the data set.
214
Appendix C
CASE SUMMARIES: LOW, MEDIUM, AND HIGH LEVEL OF STATE 
GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZATION
Low M edium  High
1 Arkansas Florida Arizona
2 California Iowa Georgia
3 Idaho Kentucky Kansas
4 Illinois Michigan Louisiana
5 Indian Montana New Mexico
6 Missouri Nebraska Oklahoma
7 Nevada New Hampshire Oregon
8 North Dakota New Jersey Pennsylvania
9 South Carolina Rhode Island South Dakota
10 Utah Tennessee
11 Washington Texas
12 Wyoming Vermont
13 West Virginia
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Appendix D
A COMPARISON OF THE MEAN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 34 STATES 
INCLUDED AND THE 16 STATED NOT INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY
2-tailed
Variables M ean (n=34) M ean (n=16) d f t-test p-value
State Labor Cost 15.551 15.456 24 0.940 .05
State Health Care Spending 3.416 3.703 24 0.532 .05
State Per-Capita Spending 4292.665 4934.475 18 0.186 .05
State Pension Spending 7.107 8.064 26 0.164 .05
State Per-Capita Personal Income 32885.601 38576.544 19 0.020* .05
State Deficits -4.120 -5.734 22 0.721 .05
State Policy Liberalism -0.165 0.3285 25 0.124 .05
State Institutional Capacity -0.152 0.331 26 0.439 .05
* Significant at p<= .05
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